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What accounts for legislative capacity?  Legislative capacity is the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the executive and legislative branches in lawmaking.  Much literature in 
political science has addressed this important question.  I join the discussion by examining the 
impact of bicameralism on legislative capacity and outcomes.  I argue that bicameralism 
affects legislative capacity but its effects are conditioned by the location of preferences, inter-
chamber bargaining, and legislative rules.  Using Brazil as a case, I uncover the ways in 
which the inter-chamber interplays and their interaction with the executive influence 
legislative processes and their outcomes.  First, an event history analysis of Brazilian 
legislative data (1988-2004) examines legislative approval and rejection as well as their 
timing.  Next, I conduct case studies of key legislative issues in post-authoritarian Brazil 
(pension reform, presidential decree authority, gun control, and political reform).  Evidence 
provides support for the arguments of this dissertation.   
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 1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 On September 13, 2004, the government of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da 
Silva made a risky move.  Lula invited various senators of opposition parties for a dinner at the 
house of his Chief of Staff, José Dirceu.  The event had intense media coverage and was severely 
criticized by opposition parties as an attempt by the Lula government to co-opt dissident senators 
of opposition parties.  The purpose of this meeting was to amplify the government’s base of 
support in the Senate.  Thus far, the Lula government had enjoyed a comfortable majority in the 
Chamber of Deputies, but its support base in the Senate had been precarious.  In 2004, certain 
government initiatives that the Lula administration considered crucial were defeated in the 
Senate, and some others stalled.1  Hence, Lula and his aides sought closer relationships with the 
senators of opposition parties who had been sympathetic to the government.  The media reported 
that the government intended to weaken the opposition by helping dissident senators to create an 
independent party or to gain membership in one or more of the governing parties.  This 
encounter was considered a high-risk action because it could damage the image of the president 
and infuriate opposition senators without necessarily broadening the government’s support base 
in the Senate, thus aggravating executive-senate relationships.  Despite those risks, the 
government chose to pursue a dinner hosted by President Lula with sympathetic opposition 
                                                 
1 For example, the presidential decree that outlawed gambling was defeated in the Senate.  President Lula issued this 
decree in response to the scandal that involved a high-ranking government aide illegally soliciting campaign 
contributions from an individual known to be involved illegal gambling.  The Senate also increased the value of the 
minimum wage to R$270 from the R$260 determined by the government despite its concerted efforts to maintain the 
original value.  The government was only able to restore the original R$260 in the Chamber.   
1 
 senators in the hope that this initiative would help avoid future government defeats in the Senate.
 Politicians working with a bicameral legislature know that having two independent 
houses of Congress has implications for the legislative process and its outcomes.  In the episode 
above, the Brazilian government recognized that the legislative success of government initiatives 
depended not only on the majority it entertained in the lower house but also on increasing its 
solid base of support in the upper house.  However, there is virtually no research to date on the 
effects of bicameralism in recently democratized countries.  The existing work on bicameralism 
focuses on the U.S. presidential system and European parliamentary systems. 2  Prior studies of 
legislative politics in new democracies have instead concentrated on presidential-lower chamber 
relations or modeled bicameral legislatures as if there were only one chamber (e.g., Shugart and 
Carey 1992; Linz 1994; Ames 2001; Cox and Morgenstern 2002).  This neglect of bicameral 
relations in legislative research is problematic, because if rules that govern bicameral relations 
differ from country to country and/or from one type of bill to another, then their consequences 
are likely to differ as well.  Moreover, modeling a bicameral legislature as a single chamber 
would lead to misleading conclusions and introduce a bias in the results of research (Tsebelis and 
Money 1997, 3).3   
 The central argument of this dissertation is this: Bicameralism affects legislative capacity 
but its effects are conditioned by the location of preferences, inter-chamber bargaining, and 
legislative rules.  By legislative capacity, I mean the efficiency and effectiveness of the executive 
and legislative branches in lawmaking.  Using Brazil as a case, I will uncover the ways in which 
the inter-chamber interplays and their interaction with the executive influence legislative 
                                                 
2 For example, Tsebelis and Money 1997, Heller 1997, 2001, Binder 1999, Patterson and Mughan 1999, König 
2001, and Druckman and Thies 2002 deal with US presidential or European parliamentary bicameral systems. 
3 Such modeling strategy will not lead to a biased estimate only when the effect of the omitted chamber or bicameral 
interaction is zero, which itself must be demonstrated empirically. 
2 
 capacity and its outcomes.  Although this dissertation is about bicameralism in Brazil, its 
findings should also be of interest to scholars of comparative legislative politics, because the 
analyses in subsequent chapters will show how various legislative rules, preferences of the two 
chambers, and environments that shifted over time have affected legislative output in Brazil.  
Three main questions guide this dissertation:  (1) How does bicameralism function and what are 
its consequences?  (2) How are the effects of bicameralism mediated by legislative rules, partisan 
forces, and elections?  (3) What, if any, is the impact of crises on the working of a bicameral 
regime?   
 This dissertation also has implications for the design of political institutions.  For 
centuries, political pundits and scholars have sought to lay out the conditions that promote policy 
stability—when stability is regarded as a virtue—or conversely, the conditions that break 
gridlock—when a change of the status quo is desired.  Many political scientists have argued that 
bicameralism is a key institution that makes a policy change difficult (e.g., Hammond and Miller 
1987; Riker 1992; Tsebelis and Money 1997; Binder 1999).  Whether policy stability is desirable 
or undesirable depends upon the context in which it is discussed.  However, legislative delay and 
gridlock can be detrimental to political systems faced with significant challenges and thus may 
need to undertake important reforms.4  Such is the case with many nascent democracies like 
Brazil.  Linz (1994) argued that presidential systems have an inherent tendency to generate 
executive-legislative conflict that may result in policy stalemate and may ultimately lead to 
democratic breakdown.  Shugart and Carey (1992) differentiated among presidential systems and 
showed the dangerous correlation between presidents with substantial legislative powers and the 
propensity for the collapse of democracy.  In fact, so much of the literature dealing with 
democratizing countries is focused on regime survival and breakdown (e.g., Przeworski et al. 
                                                 
4 Policy stalemate is especially harmful when delays do not accompany an improvement in the quality of legislation. 
3 
 2000), but there is little work on the systems that survive, that ‘muddle through,’ but do so 
ineffectually and slowly, satisfying nobody.   
 Moreover, virtually no study has systematically examined the impact of bicameralism on 
legislative stalemate and, by implication, on the stability of democracy in presidential bicameral 
systems.  If bicameralism indeed has the propensity for increasing policy deadlock, if excessive 
policy stability arising from institutional conflict may threaten the survival of democracy as is 
often argued, and if a certain degree of policy predictability is nonetheless desired, it is then 
crucial to understand under what rules and conditions bicameralism is likely to generate policy 
immobility.  This dissertation provides this crucial information, which is not only of analytical 
interest for political scientists, but is of practical interest to those designing new political 
systems, an increasingly frequent occurrence in the democratizing world.   
 
 
 
 
1.2. BICAMERALISM AND LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY 
 
 
 Political pundits and practitioners alike have long debated the merits of bicameralism.5  
Proponents of bicameralism have argued that it strengthens a representative function of 
government by allowing one additional arena for interest representation, improves the quality of 
legislation, furnishes an institutionalized check on the abuse of legislative power, increases 
policy stability, and reduces uncertainty in government action (Madison, Federalist 62 and 63; 
Montesquieu 1977; Riker 1992; Levmokre 1992; Hammond and Miller 1987, Rogers 2001).  
The major critique of bicameralism was raised by Sieyès two centuries ago, which still is a good 
                                                 
5 A good summary of the historical justifications of bicameralism is found in Tsebelis and Money (1997).   
4 
 representative of the current debate: “Of what use will a Second Chamber be? If it agrees with 
the Representative House, it will be superfluous; if it disagrees, mischievous” (Sieyès, quoted in 
Bryce 1921, 438).6  Despite these potentially important influences of bicameralism, however, 
many influential works on legislatures and political capacity of government remain silent on the 
distinction between bicameral and unicameral legislatures (e.g., Jacobson 1990; Baron and 
Ferejohn 1989; Mayhew 1991; Shugart and Carey 1992; Weaver and Rockman 1993; Krehbiel 
1996, 1998; McCarty 2000; Cox and Morgenstern 2001; Ames 2001; Epstein and O’Halloran 
2001).   
 However, bicameral research is vital in institutional and legislative studies.  
Approximately one-third of the world’s legislatures are bicameral (Tsebelis and Money 1997), 
and empirical studies of bicameralism that do exist have shown that bicameralism is 
consequential.  Bicameral incongruence, or divided policy majorities between the two chambers, 
increases legislative delays and gridlock (Tsebelis and Money 1997; Binder 1999; Bottom et al. 
2000; König 2001).  Bicameral incongruence also worsens government deficits where political 
party discipline is weak but improves budget balances where there is a tight party discipline 
(Heller 1997, 2001).  The lack of a government majority in the upper house in bicameral 
parliamentary systems threatens cabinet stability (Druckman and Thies 2002).  And bicameral 
rules and informational (a)symmetries affect the sequence of the legislative move, bargaining 
between the two chambers, the strategies that actors use to pursue their goals, and the likelihood 
that the bills are adopted (Money and Tsebelis 1992; Tsebelis and Money 1997; Rogers 1998).   
 Much of the contemporary debate on legislative politics focuses on the conditions that 
constrain a political system’s ability to act promptly and decisively (e.g., Weaver and Rockman 
1993).  Research based on the theories of veto players and divided government has shown that a 
                                                 
6Bemtham, Samuel Adams, Paine, Turgot, and Condorcet were also critical of bicameralism (Rockow 1928). 
5 
 concurrence of the preferences of key legislative actors (both collectives and individuals) is 
crucial to a change of a prevailing policy.7  Where this condition is absent, legislative delays and 
gridlock are expected to ensue.  Prior research has also revealed that even when all parties agree 
that some agreement is better than no agreement, conflict can still arise over the specifics of new 
legislation.  In the bargaining over the content of legislation, no one wants to back down first, 
and thus delays are a prominent property of legislative bargaining (Cox and Kernell 1991, 243).   
 In a similar fashion, bicameralism imposes a more stringent condition for a change of the 
status quo policy than unicameralism by requiring a concurrence of preferred policy positions by 
two distinct chambers (Hammond and Miller 1987; Riker 1992; Tsebelis and Money 1997).8  In 
more technical terms, as the preferences of the two chambers diverge, the “winset” of the status 
quo—the set of all points that can defeat the status quo—becomes smaller, and hence the change 
of the status quo less likely.  The convergence of preferences, in turn, is less likely if the two 
chambers have different partisan compositions and member characteristics. The sources of inter-
chamber differences include, but not limited to, different methods and timing of membership 
selection and different career trajectories.  
 Besides the distribution of preferences, decision rules affect a political system’s 
propensity for policy change.  The difficulty of implementing a policy change under the 
requirement of supermajority voting rules has been well documented (Krehbiel 1996, 1998; 
Brady and Volden 1997).  In a bicameral setting, in addition to voting quotas, rules that govern 
inter-chamber conflict resolution influence the speed of legislation and legislative outcomes.  
                                                 
7 See Tsebelis (1995, 1999, 2002) for the analysis of veto players. For research on divided government, see a 
collection of essays in Cox and Kernell (1991). The most influential work against the alleged effect of divided 
government remains Mayhew (1991).  
8 This statement assumes that both chambers are endowed with veto power. However, even if one of the chambers 
has only the power to delay, modeling legislative politics in a bicameral legislature as if it were unicameral would be 
fallacious (Tsebelis and Money 1997).  
6 
 Two exemplary bicameral conflict resolution mechanisms are the navette system, in which bills 
shuttle between the two chambers until an agreement is reached or some stopping rule is applied, 
and a conference committee, in which representatives from both chambers draft a compromise 
bill that is subsequently voted in the floor under a closed rule (that is, without amendment) 
(Money and Tsebelis 1992; Tsebelis and Money 1997).  In a navette system, bicameral 
bargaining is central to determining the outcome, and holding all else equal, the chamber that can 
better withstand the delays of new legislation has a bargaining advantage.  
 Conferring on one chamber the power to be decisive is yet another conflict resolution 
mechanism.  An example is to grant the chamber that initiates a bill the ‘last word’ after it is 
reviewed by the other chamber.  Lijphart (1999) calls two chambers with equal constitutional 
prerogatives and democratic legitimacy (i.e., whether members are appointed or selected through 
popular elections) symmetric and ones that lack these qualifications as asymmetric.  If, in 
symmetric bicameralism, the composition of the two chambers differs with respect to the 
membership characteristics and members’ preferences (that is, if the two chambers are 
incongruent), policy immobility likely results.  If incongruence occurs in an asymmetric 
bicameral system, then the more powerful chamber is likely to overshadow the less powerful 
one, albeit to varying degrees.  If there is bicameral congruence in either symmetric or 
asymmetric bicameralism, policy change should not be difficult, if so desired by all actors.   
 Bicameralism thus affects legislative capacity.  However, how it influences legislative 
capacity depends upon various factors.  I will analyze those points in the theory and empirical 
chapters.   
 
 
 
 
7 
 1.3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
 Although the theories I develop in this dissertation are general and thus can be applied to 
various bicameral systems, this particular work focuses on one country—Brazil—for empirical 
analyses.  There are various reasons why Brazil is a fascinating and important case to study 
bicameralism. 
 
 
1.3.1. Why study Brazil? 
 
 
 Brazil is an ideal case to examine the effects of bicameralism and various decision rules 
on the dynamics of lawmaking for at least four reasons: (1) because the question of legislative 
capacity is of substantive importance in Brazilian politics; (2) because the Brazilian political 
system accords its president strong legislative power; (3) because the country has unique 
legislative rules that in effect make it possible to study different “types” of bicameralism; and (4) 
because accessibility to legislative information and peaceful and uninterrupted alternations in 
government since democratization make this type of research viable. 
 The “Governability” Puzzle  To many observers of Brazilian politics, Brazil suffers 
governability problems.  Governability refers to “the efficiency of a nation’s executive and 
legislative branches in the making of programs and policies” (Ames 2001, 1).  Scholars such as 
Mainwaring (1999), Ames (2001), and Stepan (2000) argue that, despite substantial and 
immediate needs for economic, political and social reforms, the Brazilian political system has 
been unable to carry out these reforms.  Where changes were made, moreover, they often came 
too late (usually punctuated by some sort of crises) and/or too little.  These scholars contend that 
Brazil’s governability crisis results from the country’s electoral system to the lower chamber that 
8 
 hinders efficient interest aggregation and strong regional powers vis-à-vis central authority due 
to its federal system.  
 These claims are far from obvious, however.  Figueiredo and Limongi (2001) argue that 
the Brazilian political system does not have the governability crisis as often alleged because the 
executive dominates the legislative process.  Brazilian presidents use their constitutionally 
endowed substantial legislative prerogatives—the exclusive right to initiate certain legislation, 
executive decree authority, and the ability to request “urgency” in the examination of their 
proposals in Congress—to promote their projects.  
 However, none of the major studies on Brazilian legislative politics has examined 
bicameralism as a potential cause of legislative gridlock.  Both Ames and Figueiredo and 
Limongi focus on executive-lower chamber relations in their research.  This scarcity of scholarly 
attention to bicameralism in Brazil may stem from the widespread perception that the Senate is 
simply the house of review and tends to be pro-executive (“governista”), making the upper house 
appear a non-significant actor in the legislative process (see, for example, Figueiredo and 
Limongi 1996, 8).  While it is true that many bills originate from the lower house (due to the 
constitutional requirement that the executive proposals must be presented in the Chamber of 
Deputies) and the initiating house has the last word on the bills, still the Senate holds vetoes on 
such proposals.  Moreover, the Senate has the same ‘last word’ prerogative as the Chamber in 
relation to the bills originating from that house.  With respect to constitutional amendments, 
furthermore, there is no advantage for being the initiating house.  Any disagreements on the text 
of constitutional amendment must be resolved by both chambers, or else the amendment will be 
aborted.  Hence, any analysis of legislative politics in Brazil should explicitly treat the powers 
and preferences of the Senate as variables to be studied, rather than assume its non-impact.  
9 
 Understanding the relationships between and among the two chambers and the executive will 
shed new light into the study of legislative politics in Brazil and contribute to solving the 
governability puzzle. 
 Presidential Legislative Power  Democratization of authoritarian regimes in the last few 
decades has brought about the rapid expansion of presidential bicameral systems.  With the 
numerical expansion, different forms of presidential bicameralism emerged.9  Whereas in the 
U.S. separation of powers system the executive has little proactive legislative prerogative (at 
least formally) and the powers of the two chambers are roughly equal, many of those new 
presidential democracies vary in their bicameral power divisions and presidential legislative 
authority.  This growth of presidential bicameral systems has created an unprecedented 
opportunity to inquire into the workings and consequences of such political systems.  The 
findings of Shugart and Carey (1992)—the propensity of presidential systems with strong 
executive legislative prerogatives to experience democratic failures—strengthen the motivation 
to study the effects of bicameralism in new presidential democracies.  Nevertheless, almost all 
empirical research on bicameralism to date examines established democracies such as the United 
States and West European countries.    
 Unlike the United States, Brazil is a nascent democracy governed by a president with 
considerable legislative power.  Brazilian presidents not only have the power to veto legislation 
(both line-item and package veto power) but also the power to initiate bills.  Historically 
Brazilian presidents have amply used these prerogatives.  This presidential power, in addition to 
the internal organization of Congress that gives party leadership considerable decision-making 
authority, is what Figueiredo and Limongi (2001) and other Brazilian scholars have argued to 
                                                 
9 Presidential bicameralism is a system in which the legislature is divided into two independent chambers and the 
executive is presidential rather than parliamentary. 
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 make the otherwise inefficient Brazilian legislative process surprisingly efficient.  It is worth 
probing to what extent legislative gridlock occurs due to bicameral differences even in the 
system with a president with strong legislative prerogatives. 
 Unique Institutional Setting  One of the greatest challenges to an empirical assessment 
of theoretical predictions is case selection.  There are simply not enough legislative data of the 
quality we would like to have to perform a large-N cross-national quantitative study, especially 
when one deals with newly democratized developing countries.  However, with a small-N cross-
national study that examines nations as cases, it is difficult to determine whether a phenomenon 
we want to explain (e.g., legislative gridlock) is caused by bicameral divergences, various 
decision rules, or some other factors such as their cultures and historical peculiarities.  A study of 
Brazil offers great advantages in this regard.   
 Constitutionally, the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (the lower house) and the Senate 
(upper house) are co-equal.  Unlike many countries in which the lower chamber dominates the 
upper chamber, there is no area of legislation that is granted to the Chamber of Deputies but 
denied to the Senate.10  However, in the making and remaking of statutory regimes in Brazil, the 
house where a bill is first introduced is decisive in the final decision (Article 65 of the 
Constitution).  That is, although the reviewing house has the right to amend, so long as it 
approves the bill, there is no formal mechanism for the reviewing house to enforce such 
amendments.  In this case, the Brazilian bicameral system can be considered, in Lijphart’s 
terminology, asymmetric.  What makes Brazilian bicameralism particularly unique is the fact 
that, by initiating bills first, both the Chamber and Senate can be the house with the power to 
make the final decision.  This contrast with other countries with asymmetric bicameralism in 
                                                 
10 In contrast, there are twelve areas of legislation that are constitutionally exclusive to the Senate’s competency.   
These include the authority to appoint two-thirds of the judges that review federal expenditures and the right to 
authorize international loans by the states.   
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 which one chamber (usually the lower house) always dominates the other (usually the upper 
house).   
 By contrast, constitutional amendments represent legislative activities in the context of 
symmetric bicameralism.  The Brazilian Constitution requires that each chamber of the Congress 
approve an identical text of an amendment by a three-fifths majority, voted in two separate 
rounds (Article 60).  Neither house dominates the other in cases of bicameral disputes; they must 
be resolved by a navette rule.   
 In short, due to variation in decision-making rules, Brazil provides a natural experimental 
setting to test, while holding country-specific factors constant, whether and how different types 
of bicameralism and decision rules affect legislative outcomes.  Table 1.1 summarizes decision 
rules and procedures of the Brazilian Congress. 
 
 
 
Table 1.1: Rules and Procedures in the Brazilian Congress 
 
 
 Mode of Deliberation 
Type of 
Vote No of Votes Required 
Type of 
Bicameralism 
Constitutional 
Amendment 
Navette until 
agreement is reached 
Roll call 3/5 of each chamber on 2 
rounds  
Symmetric 
Complementary 
Law 
Navette (initiating 
house is decisive) 
Roll call Absolute majority in 
each chamber 
Asymmetric 
Ordinary Law Navette (initiating 
house is decisive) 
Symbolic Simple majority in each 
chamber 
Asymmetric 
Source: Brazilian Constitution. 
Notes: This table excludes budgetary procedures and deliberation of presidential decrees and vetoes. A simple 
majority refers to votes by a majority of members present in the session, and an absolute majority refers to votes by 
a majority of each chamber’s membership.   Symbolic votes are equivalent to voice votes in the United States.  In 
symbolic voting, those who are in favor remain seated whereas those who are opposed stand up.   
 
 
 
 Feasibility Brazil is a continuing democracy since 1985 with constitutional alternation in 
government. Between 1985 and 2005, there have been six different administrations (Sarney 
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 1985-90, Collor 1990-92, Franco 1992-94, Cardoso 1995-98, Cardoso 1999-2002, Lula 2003-
present) and six different congresses, allowing enough longitudinal variation in executive-
legislative and bicameral relations.  Moreover, the preferences of presidents, deputies and 
senators are expected to vary in Brazil due to their elections by different rules (a nation-wide 
majority rule for presidents; state-wide plurality rule for senators; and open-list proportional 
representation for deputies), staggering elections of the members of the Senate, different terms of 
office (8 years for senators and 4 years for deputies), and different career profiles (e.g., senators 
have particularly strong ties with state governors and deputies are especially close to mayors).   
Furthermore, in the last several years, the Brazilian Congress has made significant 
improvement in making information on legislative activities available to the public.  For 
example, Brazilian citizens and observers can accompany the progress of the bills that interest 
them via the sites of the Chamber and Senate on the Internet.  The Chamber and Senate sites also 
began publishing results of roll call votes as well.  Researchers can also obtain information that 
is not available online through their archives.  In short, Brazil today provides wealth of 
information to researchers interested in testing with developing countries theories and techniques 
developed originally to study legislative politics of advanced industrial countries.  
 
 
1.3.2. Methodology 
 
 
 This dissertation analyzes the legislative dynamics of bicameralism through both 
quantitative and qualitative methods.  A quantitative analysis shows general patterns of how 
bicameral divergences, decision rules, and other factors affect the legislative process and 
outcomes.  In contrast, qualitative case studies of significant legislation enable us to pay closer 
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 attention to whether theoretically predicted behavior in fact caused the patterns observed in the 
data.  For the quantitative analysis, I use an event history analysis to examine legislative delays 
and outcomes.  I analyze bills proposed in the Brazilian Congress since the promulgation of the 
1988 Constitution.   
 Following the quantitative analysis, I closely examine several important legislative issues 
that have been debated in post-authoritarian Brazil.  The case study method is the best approach 
to investigate how the contents of legislation changed as a result of strategic interactions between 
and within the executive and bicameral legislature, because such analysis requires a close 
examination of the legislative history of individual proposals.  Moreover, there is no better way 
than the case study method to test whether the causal mechanisms posited by theory are actually 
the ones that produced the observed outcomes (Tsebelis and Money 1997, 126).  The use of 
aggregate data may give insufficient attention to the actual processes that generate the observed 
outcomes.  In this sense, case studies can complement the shortcomings in the quantitative study 
that may exist. 
 Specifically, this dissertation analyzes the following legislative agendas: pension reform, 
regulation of executive decree authority, political reform, and gun control law.  The cases are 
chosen on the basis of variations in the key independent variables.  Thus, the list includes 
statutory bills (political reform and gun control) examined by a simple majority rule under 
asymmetric bicameral powers and constitutional amendments (pension reform and reform of 
executive decree authority) considered by a supermajority rule under symmetric bicameral 
powers.  In addition to variation in legislative rules, many of the cases in this list are also 
recurring reform issues across different administrations and congresses in Brazil.  The long life 
cycles of certain important legislative issues in Brazil (unfortunately from the perspective of 
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 legislative efficiency) allow us to investigate the impact of various bicameral partisan 
compositions on the processes and outcomes of bill deliberation.  They also allow us to examine 
the changes in the economic and political contexts in which those issues were discussed.  
 
 
 
 
1.4. PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 
 This dissertation proceeds as follows.  Chapter 2 reviews theoretical perspectives on 
bicameralism and legislative decision-making.  Conventional approaches to studying Brazilian 
legislative politics focus on the executive or executive-lower chamber relations.  I argue that it is 
necessary to analyze inter-chamber relations within the Congress in addition to executive-
legislative relations.  I then posit a set of hypotheses derived from a review of the theories.  I 
argue that legislative gridlock is a function of intra-branch as well as inter-branch divergences, 
decision rules, the context in which bargaining occurs, and the temporal dimension of the bill in 
discussion.   
 Chapter 3 describes formal and informal legislative rules and practices under the 1988 
Constitution in Brazil.  It identifies actors and their roles as well as decision rules with respect to 
constitutional amendments, statutory bills, and presidential decrees.  This chapter also compares 
deputies and senators in terms of their career trajectories and electoral mandates and draws their 
implications for legislative behavior. 
 In Chapter 4, I test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2.  I explain why the analysis of 
roll call votes is not sufficient in understanding legislative dynamics.  I argue that greater 
attention should be given to analyzing timing of legislation as well as legislative outcomes.  I 
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 offer an event history technique as a way of analyzing the legislative dynamics of bill approval 
and gridlock.   
 The next three chapters investigate several important legislative issues that have been 
debated since Brazil’s transition to democracy.  Chapter 5 deals with pension reform under the 
Cardoso and Lula governments.  Pension reform has been discussed in Brazil mainly as a 
constitutional reform.  Although both presidents managed to approve constitutional amendment 
proposals, they were far short of what they originally intended and the issue requires more 
reforms in the future.  This chapter also shows the strategic role that the Senate played and the 
effect of economic crises on the passage of the proposals. 
 Unlike the pension reforms, the topic of Chapter 6, the reform of presidential decree 
authority, was initiated by Congress.  Although almost all members of Congress agreed that 
presidential decree power should be restricted and regulated, they disagreed on two points: to 
what extent should decree power be restricted and which of the legislative houses should review 
decrees first, thus retaining final words on their texts?  The stalemate was resolved when the 
Senate gave in and accepted the Chamber’s arguments.  The president also did not lose 
completely; he successfully had Congress approve a provision that expanded his decree 
authority. 
 Chapter 7 discusses political reform and gun control.  Both political reform and gun 
control bills are statutory bills, but their fates proved to be different.  In 2003, the gun control bill 
was approved by Congress and sanctioned by the president.  Political reform, which has been on 
legislative agenda for many years, seems to have suffered a legislative lapse in Congress once 
again.  What accounts for the difference?  This chapter discusses the role of a joint committee 
that enhances a chance for a bill’s approval.   
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  Chapter 8 concludes this dissertation.  I summarize the findings of the research, draw 
implications for policymaking and institutional reforms, and set an agenda for future research.  
One of the important lessons that emerge from this dissertation is that the effects of bicameralism 
vary with chamber characteristics and preferences, legislative rules, and relative bicameral 
bargaining powers.  Before reforming or adopting a bicameral legislature, institutional designers 
should examine many available options in order to find the alternatives that best fit their citizens’ 
needs.   
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 2. CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON BICAMERALISM AND 
DECISION-MAKING 
 
 
 
 
 “It is easy and even, perhaps, historically correct 
to think of bicameralism as designed to stall or stop 
legislation.  There will almost surely be less 
government intervention, less hasty legislation, and 
more preservation of the status quo if proposals 
must pass two hurdles rather than one.”  Saul 
Levmore (1992: 151) 
 
 
 Conventional approaches to studying Brazilian legislative politics focus on the executive 
or executive-lower chamber relations.  However, the Brazilian legislature is bicameral.  It 
consists of two independent legislative bodies, each of which with power to propose, amend, and 
veto legislation.  Hence, legislative research that does not explicitly model bicameral politics 
may produce misleading conclusions.  What are the consequences for policymaking of having 
two chambers rather than one?  Under what conditions does bicameralism make a difference and 
what kind difference does it make under those conditions?  
 In this chapter, I discuss theories of lawmaking in a bicameral legislature and posit a set 
of hypotheses.  I argue that legislative gridlock and speed of legislation are a function of intra-
branch divergences, decision rules, and the context in which bargaining takes place in a 
bicameral legislature.   
 
 
 
 
18 
 2.1. SPATIAL MODELS OF LAWMAKING IN A BICAMERAL LEGISLATURE 
 
 
 Voting cycles and instability in multidimensional policy spaces have been major 
concerns among social choice scholars (e.g., McKelvey 1976).  Scholars such as Hammond and 
Miller (1987), Riker (1992), and Tsebelis and Money (1997) have argued that bicameralism is an 
institution that can promote policy stability.  The stability-inducing property of bicameralism 
depends upon the two chambers having divergent preferences.  
 Let us consider Figure 2.1.  There are six legislators, D1, …, D6, discussing a policy 
change in a two-dimensional space.  We assume that the legislators have Euclidian preferences 
and they vote by simple majority rule.  The figure shows the ideal point of each legislator and the 
location of the status quo policy, SQ.  Suppose, for now, that this is a unicameral legislature.  An 
alternative policy x can defeat SQ by a coalition of D1, D2, D3, and D6 since they all prefer x to 
SQ.  However, a different majority consisting of D3, D4, D5, and D6 prefers alternative y to x 
(indifference curves are not drawn).  Indeed, given the preferences of the six legislators, there is 
no point that can defeat any other alternative by simple majority rule, and as such, there is, at 
least theoretically, no policy stability.11   
                                                 
11 McKelvey’s (1976) chaos theorem establishes that in multidimensional spaces, except under very strict and rare 
conditions, there will be no majority rule empty-winset point.  Instead there will be chaos; whoever controls the 
order of voting can determine the final outcome. 
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Figure 2.1: Majority Cycles in a Two-Dimensional Policy Space in a Unicameral 
Legislature 
20 
  
 
U
L1
L2
U1
U2
U3
L
L3
SQ
x
y
 
 
Figure 2.2: Bicameral Core 
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  Now consider Figure 2.2. There are six legislators and their ideal points are identically 
positioned as in Figure 2.1, but they are assigned to one of the two chambers of a bicameral 
legislature.  Legislators L1, L2, and L3 are the members of the lower house while legislators U1, 
U2, and U3 belong to the upper house.  A passage of a bill now requires a joint majority of the 
two chambers.  In this bicameral setting, a bicameral core—the set of all points that cannot be 
defeated with a given decision-making rule—exists that includes SQ.  Therefore, neither the 
alternative x nor any other alternative policy can upset the status quo policy.  In other words, the 
status quo policy cannot be changed. 
 To understand why a bicameral core exists given the locations of the six legislators’ most 
preferred policy positions, consider the following.  A chamber bisector is the median hyperplane 
that goes through at least two chamber actors as shown in Figure 2.2.  A change of the status quo 
is possible if and only if there is a (simple) majority in both houses.  A bicameral bisector is a 
cross-chamber bisector each side of which constitutes a joint majority (Hammond and Miller 
1987).  The line passing through L2 and U2 is the bicameral bisector.  Hammond and Miller 
(1987) proved that the bicameral core is a subset of a bicameral bisector. In their words: 
Theorem 1. A point x is in the core if and only if no straight line 
through x leaves a majority of both chambers to one and the same 
side of that line (Hammond and Miller 1987: 1159). 
 
Theorem 2.  If (1) a bicameral legislature has only one bicameral 
bisector and (2) there is a point x on the bicameral bisector such 
that the chamber bisectors from one and only one chamber 
intersect at the bicameral bisector in each direction from x, then x 
is a core point (Hammond and Miller 1987: 1160). 
 
In Figure 2.2, line segment LU lying on the L2U2 bicameral bisector is the core because a 
majority of both chambers exists on the line segment and its either side.   
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  It is straightforward to illustrate why any policy in the core is invulnerable to alternative 
policies.  First, notice that SQ that would be defeated by point x in a unicameral legislature 
prevails over x by a joint majority of L2 and L3 in the lower house and U2 and U3 of the upper 
house.  More generally, any point above LU is defeated by a concurrent majority of the two 
chambers.  Also, any point below LU is defeated by another joint majority consisting of L1 and 
L2 and U1 and U2.  Likewise, any point to the left and the right of LU cannot gain a concurrent 
majority supporting it.  Moreover, the upper house will reject any movement to the left of SQ on 
LU while the lower house will veto any movement to the right of it.  Consequently, LU is the 
bicameral core, and SQ has an empty winset.   
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Figure 2.3: The Absence of a Bicameral Core 
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  This argument does not hold for cases in which the ideal points of the two houses 
overlap.  Let us examine Figure 2.3.  I reshuffled the chamber assignments of the six legislators 
but kept their respective ideal points unaltered.  In this example, there is no bicameral core.  
There are three bicameral bisectors in this configuration (L1U2, L2U3, and L3U1) and the points 
on each of the line segments can defeat points not on the line segments.  Accordingly, there is no 
point with an empty winset.  An exception occurs only when all three bicameral bisectors 
intersect at the same point, in which case that point is the bicameral core (Tsebelis and Money 
1997: 83).  In general, for one and two dimensional policy spaces, the larger the distance of the 
ideal points between the members of the two chambers, the greater is the size of the bicameral 
core, and consequently the greater is the likelihood of legislative gridlock.  Also, the more 
overlapped the ideal points between the members of the two chambers, the less likely it is that a 
bicameral legislature will have a core. 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the distance of policy preferences between the two chambers, 
the greater is the likelihood of gridlock.   
Bicameral policy differences may arise from dissimilar partisan compositions of the two 
chambers, asymmetrically sized government’s bases of support, divergent constituencies and 
electoral mandates, and so forth. 
 Generally, a bicameral core rarely exists in more than two-dimensional policy spaces, 
except for under very restrictive conditions.  However, Tsebelis and Money (1997) have shown 
formally that even in the case in which there is no core, the uncovered set—the set of points that 
cannot be defeated directly and indirectly by any other points—always exists in a bicameral 
legislature.  Furthermore, “as the number of legislators increases and as the distance between the 
centers of the yolks of the two chambers grows, [the area that contains the uncovered set of a 
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 bicameral legislature]…becomes more like a straight line” (Tsebelis and Money 1997: 87).12  In 
their elegant expression, “…the line connecting the centers of the yolks of the two chambers is 
the privileged dimension of conflict and compromise in bicameral legislatures” (Tsebelis and 
Money 1997: 90).   
 
 
 
 
2.2. DYNAMIC MODELS OF LAWMAKING IN A BICAMERAL LEGISLATURE: 
BICAMERAL POLITICS AS A TIMING GAME 
 
 
 Bicameral games can be reduced to one “privileged dimension of conflict and 
compromise.”  Although the spatial illustration of decisionmaking in a bicameral legislature in 
the previous section helps us to predict the likelihood of the rejection of an alternative policy, it 
tells us little about how and when conflicts will be resolved or compromises will be made in 
cases where both chambers agree that a new policy is desirable but disagree on its details.  In 
other words, if the bicameral core (or uncovered set) attracts point x, then the two houses must 
decide exactly where the new policy should be placed on that line segment.  The location of x 
depends on the relative bargaining power of each house.   
 This section introduces bargaining models in analyzing bicameral politics.  As in Tsebelis 
and Money (1997), I approach bicameral bargaining as a timing game where two actors—the 
lower and upper houses—must decide the timing of concessions given its and the other actor’s 
degrees of impatience to reach an agreement.  First, I will describe a finite game (i.e., game with 
a stopping rule) with complete information in which each player’s payoffs are common 
knowledge, followed by an infinite game (game with no stopping rule) with complete 
                                                 
12 Yolk is “the smallest circle intersecting with all median lines” (Tsebelis and Money 1997, 86). 
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 information.  I then move to bargaining under incomplete information in which the two players 
do not know each other’s payoffs.   
 
 
2.2.1. Bargaining with Complete Information 
 
 
 Bicameral bargaining may be modeled as a simple noncooperative model of bargaining 
developed by Rubinstein (1982).  In this game, the two players have to reach an agreement on 
how to split a pie and they alternate offers sequentially.  Both players are assumed to want to 
reach an agreement.  Moreover, both players value an immediate agreement more than an 
agreement in a later period.  That is, the players are impatient.  In the application to legislative 
bargaining, Rubinstein’s alternating offers game inspired Baron and Ferejon’s (1989) bargaining 
model in a (unicameral) legislature and Tsebelis and Money’s (1997) model of intercameral 
bargaining in a bicameral legislature.   
 Bargaining over Finite Rounds  There are two players: the Chamber of Deputies (C) and 
the Senate (S).  I assume that both the Chamber and the Senate are unified players in order to 
simplify the game.  The Chamber and the Senate alternate offers and counteroffers sequentially; 
once an offer is made, the other side must decide whether to accept or reject the offer.  If a house 
rejects the offer, that house must make a counteroffer.  The game continues until an offer is 
accepted or it reaches round T, the final round of bargaining.  If there is no discounting, that is, if 
both players consider the future is as worthy as the present, the player who gets to make an offer 
in the last round gets the whole pie.  However, the assumption of no discounting may not be 
realistic in many legislative settings. 
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  For one reason or another, legislative actors may desire to approve legislation that they 
deem desirable sooner than later.  Impatience for a speedy legislative approval may arise due to 
constituency pressures, upcoming elections, or economic crises.  A swift approval of a new law 
allows society to enjoy its benefits longer.  Legislative actors also wish to portray themselves as 
efficient lawmakers.  Impatience may also stem from a risk that a bill may be aborted between 
the present and next round of negotiations.  The level of impatience can be captured by a 
discount factor, δ.  If δ > 1, the future is worth more than the present.  If δ = 1, the future is as 
good as the present.  Finally, if δ < 1, the future is worth less than the present.  The relationship 
between the discount factor and the discount rate, r, is δ = 1/(1 + r).  I assume 0 < δi < 1 where i 
is either the Chamber of Deputies (C) or Senate (S).13    
 The Chamber and the Senate must bargain on the content of legislation.  Both players 
desire to pass a law closer to their ideal points.  If the Chamber wins α, then the Senate gets 1-α.  
If all the Chamber’s demands are accepted by the Senate, the former gets 1 and the latter 0, and 
vice versa.  Since both houses attach greater importance to the passage of legislation today than 
its passage tomorrow, a failure to reach a bicameral agreement in each round of bargaining 
results in a discounting of its passage by rC and rS, respectively.  Thus, if the total value of 
legislation is 1 in the first round, it will be δC and δS in the second round, respectively.   
 
 
 
                                                 
13 This assumption is necessary if the players are impatient.  
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 Table 2.1: Bicameral Bargaining over Three Rounds 
 
 
Round Proposer Chamber's share Senate's share 
T C 1 0 
T-1 S δC 1-δC
T-2 C 1-δS (1-δC) δS (1-δC) 
 
 
 
 Suppose that the Chamber makes an initial proposal.  Suppose also that there are three 
rounds of bargaining. This situation is analogous to one in which the house that initiates a bill 
has the final word.  We employ a backwards induction to solve this game, as illustrated in Table 
2.1.  In the final round, T, if it is ever reached, the Chamber keeps all its demands and offers no 
compromise to the Senate.  The Senate accepts the Chamber’s proposal because it is indifferent 
between the Chamber’s proposal and rejecting the proposal, in which case the Senate gets 
nothing.  At T-1, the Senate offers the Chamber δC, which, for the Chamber, is equivalent to 
having an entire pie at T and thus will be accepted, keeping 1-δC for itself.  By the same logic, in 
the initial round, T-2, the Chamber offers the Senate δS (1-δC) and retains 1-δS (1-δC).  In 
equilibrium, an agreement is concluded in the very first round, with the Chamber keeping 1-δS 
(1-δC) for itself and offering the Senate δS (1-δC), which it accepts.   
 There are a few remarks.  First, the first offer is always accepted.  Second, δS and δC 
capture the bargaining strength of each player.  The share of a pie for player i increases with the 
value of δC.  Third, the house that initiates a bill has an advantage over the reviewing house in 
games with odd numbers of rounds.  If δC = δS, the house that gets to propose first always wins 
more than the reviewing house.  The magnitude of the first mover advantage diminishes with the 
number of rounds, however.   
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  Bargaining over finite rounds can be applied to the analysis of statutory lawmaking in 
Brazil where the house in which bills are first introduced retains the final word as long as the 
reviewing house approves them.  What will happen if there is no formal restriction on how many 
rounds the two houses can bargain? 
 Bargaining over Infinite Rounds  Bargaining over infinite rounds represents bicameral 
bargaining where there is no formal stopping rule.  Bargaining over infinite time is appropriate to 
study bicameral bargaining with respect to constitutional amendments in Brazil.   
 There is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for the discounted infinite-time 
bargaining game.  For two players with fixed discount factors, δS and δC, the only subgame 
perfect equilibrium outcome is ,
1
1
SC
S
CM δδ
δ
−
−=  where the Chamber of Deputies is the first 
mover and MC is the Chamber’s non-discounted maximum share (Rubinstein 1982).   Why is this 
the case?  It uses the same logic as in the case of finite games but with an introduction of Mi, the 
non-discounted maximum share that i can receive.  At some point in the course of bargaining, 
denote it as time t, the Chamber and the Senate know that the Chamber’s largest possible share is 
MC and the Senate’s 1-MC.  Thus at t-1, the Senate offers the Chamber δCMC and keeps 1-δCMC 
for itself.  At t-2, the Chamber proposes a share of δS(1-δCMC) to the Senate, saving 1-δS(1-δCMC) 
for itself.  We then solve for M by setting the two expressions for the Chamber’s maximum 
share, M = 1-δS(1-δCMC), which becomes .1
1
SC
S
CM δδ
δ
−
−=    
 One of the striking features of this game is that, as with finite-time games with complete 
information, the first offer is always accepted.  That is, there is no real bargaining in the 
equilibrium even in the case where negotiations can theoretically continue infinitely.  However, 
in real politics bargaining failures and delays in reaching agreements are commonplace.  The 
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 inadequacy of those models in explaining delays stems from the assumption of complete 
information.  Once this assumption is relaxed, delays in bargaining are possible. 
 
 
2.2.2. Bargaining with Incomplete Information 
 
 
Under bargaining with incomplete information, negotiations can last more than one 
round.  Delays in reaching an agreement may be inefficient—especially if all parties in 
negotiation concur on the desirability of a policy change in the same direction—but certainly 
realistic.  In the literature on bargaining with incomplete information, there are typically two 
players (customarily a seller and a buyer), and one player is uninformed about the other player’s 
discount factor or reservation level (e.g., Rubinstein 1985; Fudenberg and Tirole 1983).  
Therefore, finding the correct “type” of the player is essential for an agreement to be concluded.  
The first player updates his beliefs about the possible type of the second player using Bayes’ 
rule.  Models where both sides are uninformed and/or can make offers are much more 
complicated and support multiple equilibria.  
 In their analysis of bicameral bargaining with incomplete information, Tsebelis and 
Money (1997) adopt Grossman and Perry’s (1986a, 1986b) model in which a seller bargains with 
a buyer over the price of an object.  The buyer knows the seller’s asking price, but the seller is 
uninformed of the buyer’s valuation of the object.  Grossman and Perry’s model relies on 
computer simulations to discern equilibrium outcomes.  Tsebelis and Money (1997: 104) 
highlight two of the findings by Grossman and Perry to formulate their “conjectures” about 
bicameral bargaining: the level of uncertainty and time discount factor have positive effects on 
the duration of bargaining.   
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  Rather than using Grossman and Perry’s model, I apply Alesina and Drazen’s (1991) 
model of concession timing to bicameral bargaining because the latter does not rely on the 
asssumption of asymmetric information as the former.  Alesina and Drazen use a war of attrition 
model in which two (or more) societal groups must agree on the distribution of the burdens of 
economic stabilization—the levels of taxation.  Both groups desire economic stabilization but 
each wants the other to assume a larger share of the burdens of stabilization.  Stabilization will 
not occur until at least one of the groups concedes so that an agreement can be reached.  What 
drives this game is the costs of waiting for another instant to concede in order to maximize 
expected present discounted utilities.  In this model, each group’s pre-stabilization utility loss 
(denoted θ) is only known to the group itself, and the other group knows only the distribution of 
its opponent’s θ.  Thus, unlike Grossman and Perry’s model where only one side is an 
uninformed player, in Alesina and Drazen’s model both sides are uninformed of each other’s 
level of impatience now represented by θ.  This representation of incomplete information is more 
suitable to an analysis of bicameral bargaining than the model with asymmetric information 
because there is no strong a priori reason to believe that one of the chambers knows the costs 
and payoffs of the other chamber.14   
 Alesina and Drazen’s model helps to explain “rational” delay and predicts concession 
timing in bargaining.  As applied to bicameral bargaining, each chamber’s challenge is to choose 
whether it will concede at time t based on its costs and payoffs and the distribution of the other 
chamber’s possible type with the knowledge that the other side also desires a policy change.  
Pre-stabilization utility losses can be considered as opportunity costs for the current policy.  In 
                                                 
14 Although Alesina and Drazen’s model reaches conclusions similar to Grossman and Perry’s findings adopted by 
Tsebelis and Money, I prefer to adopt their model because of their treatment of incomplete information for the two, 
not just one, players.  In addition, Alesina and Drazen’s model can be extended to account for different aspects of 
lawmaking as discussed subsequently.   
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 equilibrium, the optimal time for concession is when the costs of waiting another period to 
concede just equals the expected gains from waiting another period.15  A lower θ makes a 
chamber a strong bargainer; a higher θ makes it a weak bargainer.  Thus, the higher the costs of 
legislative delay, the sooner will a concession be made, and the faster the speed of legislation.  
Delays in legislation also occurs as long as one or both of the chambers believe that the other 
side has a higher θ and thus choose to wait for the other to concede.  
 Alesina and Drazen’s war of attrition model can also be extended to account for why one 
might observe inefficient delays in bicameralism (as explained above) but not in unicameralism 
(under the assumption of a unified actor).  Since there is only one legislative body that can pass a 
law, the single chamber legislature alone must bear any burdens incurred to itself that are 
associated with the passage of legislation.  Since flow utility before the passage of new 
legislation is negative and lifetime utility after its passage is positive, the legislature’s expected 
utility is maximized by passing it immediately.   
 The model also implies that an uneven allocation of post-legislation costs between the 
two chambers tends to lengthen the period of pre-legislation bargaining.  The distribution of 
post-legislation burdens is an indicator of the degree of concession required in order to strike a 
deal, and the greater the distance of the two chambers’ ideal points, the larger is the degree of 
concession required to pass legislation.  Since both houses must live with the consequences of 
new legislation which affect the anticipated values of their future payoffs, ceteris paribus, an 
uneven distribution of compromises gives strong incentives to bargain harder, resulting in more 
time before an agreement is concluded.16   
                                                 
15 See Alesina and Drazen (1991) for the formal representation of the model. 
16 See Fearon (1998) for a similar argument in the context of inter-state bargaining in international relations.  
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  In contrast, if a new policy’s expected duration is short—for instance if it has a pre-set 
expiration date, then an expected post-legislation utility loss from compromise is smaller than in 
a case where new legislation is expected to last infinitely.  Therefore, the duration of bargaining 
should be positively related to the duration of legislation proposed.  
  The discussions in this section have generated several hypotheses, three of which I will 
highlight. 
Hypothesis 2: Impatience reduces the propensity for legislative delay.  
Hypothesis 3: Legislative delay is positively related to the duration of legislation 
proposed.   
Hypothesis 4: Holding the levels of impatience constant, the house that initiates a bill 
compromises less than the reviewing house in the content of legislation over which they 
are bargaining. 
 
 
2.2.3. Informational Expertise and Sequential Moves in a Bicameral Legislature 
 
 
 The models of bargaining under complete information reveal a first mover’s advantage in 
legislation when there is an odd number of rounds.  However, the order of play in these models is 
exogenously determined.  Rogers (1998) argues that sequential moves themselves are strategic 
choices that bicameral legislatures face.  Since information acquisition is costly, in an 
environment of high uncertainty, the chamber that has higher expected payoffs (gains from 
specialization minus costs of specialization) specializes, given that the net expected payoffs are 
positive.   
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  Rogers maintains that the costs of information acquisition are inversely related to 
chambers’ sizes such that the cost function is usually lower for the lower house than the upper 
house.  Moreover, when the two chambers are controlled by the same party, the less specialized 
house wants the more specialized house to move first.  Hence, the probability that the lower 
house introduces legislation that will be adopted is higher than the probability that the upper 
house introduces such legislation (assuming that the lower house has a greater number of 
members than the upper house).  Furthermore, since the upper house desires to take advantage of 
the lower house’s informational expertise, bills initiated by the lower house should enjoy 
relatively swifter approval and fewer modifications by the upper house than bills initiated by the 
upper house. 
Hypothesis 5: Bills initiated by the lower house are more likely to have speedy approval 
than bills initiated by the upper house.  
 Note that this argument challenges a conventional wisdom of bicameralism that focuses 
on senatorial expertise.  According to this view, a senate (or an upper house) promotes superior 
legislation relative to a lower chamber because of longer terms of office, higher minimum ages, 
and finer career trajectories that make senators professional legislators capable of studying 
legislation objectively (Tsebelis and Money 1997: 40).17  Therefore, this perspective implies that 
senate-initiated bills should entertain higher approval rates than those proposed by the lower 
house.  However, Rogers’ informational model predicts the contrary.  In addition, given the costs 
associated with specialization, the senate is likely to concentrate on developing expertise only in 
certain areas determined by its institutional and membership mandates and characteristics.   
                                                 
17 Brazilian senators’ term of office is eight years and the minimum age to run for senatorial seats is 35.  In contrast, 
federal deputies’ term of office is four years and candidates for such offices may be as young as 21 years of age.   
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 2.3. TYPES OF BICAMERALISM AND LEGISLATIVE RULES 
 
 
 It is generally agreed upon that institutional settings and legislative rules affect the 
likelihood of legislative success.  Many scholars have argued that supermajority voting rules 
make legislative gridlock more likely (e.g., Krehbiel 1996, 1998; Brady and Volden 1997; 
Tsebelis 2002).  The theoretical models of qualified majority rules tend to be simple and elegant, 
but they are usually built on an (implicit) assumption that there exists only a single chamber (and 
a president).   
 Krehbiel’s (1996, 1998) model of lawmaking in the United States assumes one-
dimensional policy space and a unicameral congress (although the U.S. Congress is bicameral).  
His model predicts a “gridlock interval” in the policy space based on two variables: the location 
of the status quo and the locations of the “pivotal” players.  According to Krehbiel, “Among the 
n legislators…two players may have unique pivotal status due to supermajoritarian procedures” 
(Krehbiel 1998: 23).  Those supermajoritarian procedures are the U.S. Senate’s filibuster 
procedure, which requires a three-fifth vote to invoke cloture, and the executive veto override, 
which requires a two-third majority in Congress.  The interval between filibuster and veto pivots 
is a gridlock interval where no policy change is likely to occur.  Brady and Volden (1997) also 
developed a model similar to Krehbiel’s in analyzing legislative gridlock in the United States.   
 The stability (or gridlock)-inducing property of supermajority rules is in fact well known 
and not new.  Greenberg (1979) demonstrated that a core always exists if 
1+> m
mq , where q is 
the required majority, m is the number of dimensions, and 1
2
1 ≤< q .  Tsebelis (2002: 150) agues 
that a qualified majority core exists more frequently than a bicameral core.  What happens when 
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 a bicameral legislature adopts demanding decision rules such as supermajority and unanimity 
rules? 
 Figure 2.4 replicates Figure 2.2 with the exception that x is the status quo now.  With a 
simple majority rule, points on and inside the shaded area (the winset of x denoted W(x)) defeat 
x with a concurrent majority of the upper (U2 and U3) and lower (L2 and L3) houses.  However, if 
a unanimity rule is adopted, the winset of the status quo is empty.  Hence there is no policy 
change.  In general, a combination of bicameralism and supermajority decision rules increases 
the probability of gridlock because it reduces the size of the winset of the status quo.   
Hypothesis 6: Legislative gridlock increases with the number of votes required to pass 
legislation.  
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Figure 2.4: Winset of X under Simple Majority (and Empty Winset under Unanimity) in a 
Bicameral Legislature 
 
 
 
 In addition to decision rules, bicameral conflict resolution procedures may affect the 
propensity for gridlock.  Conferring on one chamber (typically the lower house) the power to be 
decisive in case of bicameral disagreements is a conflict resolution mechanism adopted in many 
bicameral systems.  Another exemplary procedure for bicameral conflict resolution is navette in 
which bills shuttle between the two chambers until they reach an agreement or the bills are 
aborted.  There is also a conference committee in which select members of the two houses draft a 
compromise bill to be voted in each house under a closed rule (without amendments).  
Conference committees are often adopted in the United States and France.   
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  Lijphart (1999) calls two chambers with equal constitutional prerogatives and democratic 
legitimacy (i.e., whether members are appointed or selected through popular elections) 
symmetric and ones that lack these qualifications as asymmetric.  The navette procedure (without 
a stopping rule) is an instance of symmetric bicameralism (assuming equal democratic 
legitimacy of the two houses) and rules that give one of the chambers prevalence over the other 
is asymmetric bicameralism.  If, in symmetric bicameralism, the composition of the two 
chambers differs with respect to the characteristics of membership and their preferences (that is, 
if the two chambers are incongruent), policy immobility likely results.  It is also likely to take 
longer to strike a deal under symmetric bicameralism than under asymmetric bicameralism.  By 
contrast, an asymmetric bicameral procedure facilitates legislation even if the two houses are 
incongruent because the more powerful chamber is likely to overshadow the less powerful one.  
If there is bicameral congruence in either symmetric or asymmetric bicameralism, policy change 
should not be difficult, if so desired by all actors.  To summarize,  
Hypothesis 7: Legislative delay and immobility are more likely under symmetric 
bicameralism than in asymmetric bicameralism.  
 
 
 
 
2.4. RECAPITULATION 
 
 
 Social choice theories of bicameralism posit that bicameral legislatures reduce the 
propensity for policy change than unicameral legislatures.  Bicameralism induces policy 
immobility when the ideal points of the two houses are sufficiently apart from each other.  When 
their ideal points overlap, however, policy change is as likely to occur in bicameralism as in 
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 unicameralism.  Therefore, the stability-inducing property of bicameralism critically depends 
upon the two houses having divergent preferences.   
 When both houses desire a policy change, bargaining is a key to understanding both the 
timing of new legislation and its location in a policy space.  In the bargaining theory, the players 
are assumed to be impatient, i.e., they prefer to reach an agreement sooner than later.  Although 
under the assumption of complete information, the players theoretically always reach an 
agreement in the first round (hence there is no real bargaining), under incomplete information, 
rational delay in concluding an agreement can occur.  Section 2.2 posited three hypotheses based 
on Rubistein’s and Alesina and Drazen’s bargaining models.  First, impatience reduces the 
propensity for legislative delay.  Second, the longer the expected duration of legislation, the 
longer will be the bargaining in a pre-legislation period.  And finally, the house that initiates a 
consideration of a bill is likely to compromise less than the reviewing house.   
 Chapter 2 also discussed the effects of informational expertise.  Rogers argued that bills 
initiated by the lower house are more likely to be approved than bills initiated by the upper house 
because of the former’s lower cost of information acquisition.  Interestingly, this argument 
counters the conventional wisdom of bicameralism that highlights senatorial expertise in 
lawmaking.  Empirical tests of the two opposing views will contribute to a better understanding 
of bicameralism.   
 Finally, I argued that legislative rules and bicameral “types” are likely to affect 
lawmaking.  Supermajority rules increase the propensity of legislative gridlock because it 
reduces the size of the winset of the status quo policy.  In addition, delay and gridlock are more 
likely when the legislative powers of the two houses are symmetric than when they are 
asymmetric.   
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  In the subsequent chapters, I will test the hypotheses quantitatively and qualitatively with 
case studies using Brazilian legislative data.  In Chapter 4, I test all hypotheses, except for 
hypothesis 4 (first mover advantage), with an event history analysis of legislative timing and 
outcomes.  Chapter 5 (pension reform) examines hypotheses 1 (bicameral divergence), 2 
(impatience), and 6 (supermajority rule).  I investigate hypotheses 1 and 2 again in Chapter 6 
(presidential decree authority).  In Chapter 7, I analyze hypotheses 1 (bicameral divergence), 4 
(first mover advantage), and 7 (asymmetric bicameralism).  However, before moving to 
empirical analyses of lawmaking, I will review the legislative rules and processes in the 
Brazilian bicameral legislature in Chapter 3. 
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 3. CHAPTER 3: THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN BRAZIL 
 
 
 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Institutional arrangements and decision-making rules determine who can propose a bill 
and who participates in the legislative process.  They also affect the likelihood of a policy 
change.  This chapter describes formal legislative rules and informal practices under the 1988 
Constitution.  It also discusses the characteristics of Brazilian deputies and senators in terms of 
their political trajectories and electoral mandates.   
 The chapter is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 discusses institutional actors in 
Brazilian lawmaking.  The 1988 Constitution endowed Brazilian presidents with substantial 
legislative powers.  Brazilian presidents have the prerogatives not only to propose and veto 
legislation but also to issue decrees with immediate force of law.  The Brazilian Congress 
consists of the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate.  The most significant actors within 
each house are the presiding officers, who retain agenda-setting power, and party leaders, who 
appoint and discharge committee members and make recommendations for votes.  The degree of 
control that party leadership has over the rank and files is a matter of contention, however.  
Many parties have experienced defection by their members in important voting.   
 Section 3.3 describes decision rules and procedures.  Adoption of a constitutional 
amendment requires that an identical text be approved by the Chamber and the Senate by three-
fifth majorities.  In contrast, ordinary and complementary laws require only simple and absolute 
majorities, respectively, in each house to pass Congress.  However, statutory bills are subject to 
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 presidential sanction and veto.  Besides constitutional amendments and ordinary and 
complementary laws, there is a third venue for policy change: presidential decrees.  Brazilian 
presidents have used decrees rather frequently.  Under the original 1988 Constitution, 
presidential decrees were effective for 30 days, and the National Congress was to convene 
immediately after the issuance of a decree to examine it.  By the mid-1990s, however, many 
legislators argued for sweeping changes in the rules of the usage and examination of decrees in 
order to restrict this powerful presidential prerogative.  In this chapter, I discuss the rules and 
procedures of using and examining presidential decrees before and after the adoption of the 2001 
constitutional amendment that altered them.  I will return to the issue in Chapter 6. 
 Finally, Section 3.4 discusses the characteristics and career trajectories of federal 
deputies and senators.  I draw from those features implications for deputies’ and senators’ 
legislative behavior.  The open-list rule electing deputies and short electoral cycles motivate 
many deputies to seek federal largesse and make them vulnerable to cooptation by the 
government.  In contrast, longer tenure and high name recognition tend to make senators more 
independent legislators.  These implications will be explored in case studies.   
 
 
 
 
3.2. INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS 
 
 
 The 1988 Brazilian Constitution continued a presidential bicameral system for the 
country.  Under this institutional arrangement, the president and the two houses of Congress are 
the principal institutional actors in lawmaking.  There is also an independent judiciary whose 
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 major legislative role is a judicial review of new legislation.  The judicial branch can also 
propose bills but in limited areas only.     
 Unlike the U.S. president, the Brazilian president is endowed with substantial legislative 
prerogatives.  In the Shugart and Carey (1992) classification assessing presidential legislative 
powers, the Brazilian president ranks among the most powerful presidents in the world.  For 
example, the Brazilian president enjoys tremendous agenda-setting power.  The Brazilian 
Constitution grants the president the power to propose constitutional amendments and new 
legislation.  Presidents can also request from the congress an expedited consideration (known as 
a pedido de urgência) of statutory bills that he has proposed.  This request sets a deadline for a 
bill’s consideration in each chamber of Congress.  Should either house fail to conclude its 
deliberation within the deadline, the deliberation of any other proposition is suspended in that 
house until the bill is voted.18  In addition, the Brazilian president retains the exclusive right to 
propose budgetary bills and various administrative changes.   
 The Brazilian president also has both line-item and package veto powers.  Traditionally, 
Brazilian presidents have amply used these prerogatives by vetoing, in entirety or partially, 
legislation approved by Congress.  Although Congress is entitled to override the president’s 
vetoes by an absolute majority of each chamber’s vote,19 it has been very rare that Congress 
override presidential vetoes.  In fact, at this writing, Congress has overturned presidential vetoes 
only thirteen times in the post-Constituent period (since 1988).20   
                                                 
18 An exception is applied for presidential decrees that also have constitutionally determined deadlines for 
deliberation by Congress 
19 Although joint sessions of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (called the “National Congress”) deliberate 
presidential vetoes in Brazil, votes are taken sequentially in a joint session, beginning with votes by the Chamber of 
Deputies.  See the section on Presidential Veto in this chapter for details. 
20 Although why the Brazilian Congress rarely overturns presidential vetoes is an interesting question, it is not a 
subject of inquiry of this dissertation. 
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  The most controversial among presidential prerogatives in Brazil is probably executive 
decree authority called provisional measure (medida provisória in Portuguese).  Although the 
Brazilian Constitution allows the use of presidential decrees only in the matters of “urgency and 
relevance” (article 62), Brazilian presidents have used this prerogative in a wide range of areas—
from purchasing an automobile for the vice president to shutting down bingo games to 
introducing new currencies.  The range and frequency of policy changes enacted through 
presidential decrees have been such that many prominent members of Congress deplored that 
provisional decrees were more authoritarian than the infamous institutional acts of the military 
regime.21   
 Presidential decrees introduce to the legislative process dynamics different than normal 
routes of bill initiation and appreciation because the president changes policies bypassing 
congressional debates and approval.  When it is time for Congress to debate the desirability and 
appropriateness of a policy change, the status quo has already been altered.  With a stroke of a 
pen, presidential decrees force Congress and society to face a new reality.  The frequent use of 
decrees by Brazilian presidents has reinforced the image that the Brazilian president is 
“proactive” and Congress “reactive” (Cox and Morgenstern 2002).   
 The Brazilian Congress consists of two independent houses: the Chamber of Deputies 
and the Federal Senate.  The Chamber of Deputies is comprised of 513 federal deputies and the 
Senate of 81 senators.  Each house separately elects the members of the Executive Board of the 
house (called Mesa) for two-year terms.  The president of the respective house presides over the 
executive board.  The president of the Senate is the president of the National Congress.  
                                                 
21 See, for example, “Uso abusivo de MPs contraria Congresso,” Jornal do Brasil, January 29, 1995, p. 3, and 
“Congress limitará edição de MP, ” Jornal do Brasil, October 23, 1995. 
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 Although any member of Congress can propose a statutory bill, house presidents possess 
enormous agenda-setting power in both houses.   
 In each house of Congress, the house president is responsible for organizing the 
legislative agenda every month upon consultation with the College of Leaders composed of party 
leaders, minority and majority leaders, and a deputy or senator representing the government in 
the respective house.  In addition to setting the monthly legislative agenda, the president also 
arranges daily session agendas called Ordem do Dia according to the legislative agenda of the 
month.  These prerogatives give the house president the ability not only to select the materials to 
be discussed in the chamber but also to decide when they are voted.  The presidents of the 
Chamber and the Senate can also call for extraordinary daily sessions as needed, and they jointly 
can convoke an extraordinary legislative session during seasons of congressional recess to 
deliberate the materials of legislative priorities.22  The house president can also install ad hoc and 
special committees to consider issues of particular importance.   
 Party leadership also has significant control over the organization of legislative work in 
Congress.  Party leaders influence legislative priorities through the College of Leaders (Colégio 
de Líderes) upon which the house president draws recommendations in organizing the legislative 
agenda.  Decisions in the College are made by consensus whenever possible, but when it is not 
possible, they are made by an absolute majority of votes weighted by the size of each party in 
that house (Article 20 of the Internal Rules of the Chamber of Deputies).  Party leaders also give 
recommendations on votes for members of their parties and appoint (and discharge) their 
members to (or from) committees.   
 Those party leaders’ prerogatives notwithstanding, however, the actual degree of control 
that party leadership has over individual party members is a matter of contention in Brazil.  
                                                 
22 The President of the Republic is also entitled to convoke an extraordinary legislative session.   
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 Brazil adopts an open-list proportional representation system to elect federal deputies.  Under 
this system, voters can vote either for individual candidates or parties (and most voters choose to 
vote for candidates) and candidates are ranked in the lists according to the number of votes cast 
for each candidate.  Party leaders have no control over the ranks of the candidates in the lists.  
Shugart and Carey (1995) place this Brazilian electoral rule among the systems that offer the 
highest incentives to seek ‘personal votes.’  Mainwaring (1999) and Ames (2001) contend that 
the open-list rule used to elect members of the Chamber of Deputies combined with strong 
federalism fragment the Brazilian party system and weaken party discipline in Congress.  
However, Figueiredo and Limongi (1995, 2001) argue that the highly centralized internal 
organization of the Chamber of Deputies makes political parties cohesive and disciplined.  Part 
of this contention results from the disagreement over the level of party unity that makes parties 
“disciplined.”  Using the Rice index of party unity,23 which shows that at minimum 85 percent of 
the members of Brazilian parties vote in the same way within each party, Figueiredo and 
Limongi find that Brazilian parties are disciplined.  However, Ames argues that even these 
scores are much lower compared to those of other Latin American countries such as Argentina 
and Venezuela.24  
 Regardless of the overall level of party discipline in Congress, the difficulties of party 
leaders in controlling party members’ votes in certain key legislation appear to have troubled 
Brazilian political leaders.  Although the Brazilian Congress approves a significant number of 
bills every year, it can take many years to pass important bills.  For example, the approval of the 
pension reform bill took more than three years despite the fact that it was one of the key reforms 
put forward by President Cardoso in 1995.  Moreover, the bill almost died in the Chamber of 
                                                 
23 The Rice index measures the degree to which the members of a party oppose to each other in roll call votes.   
24 Ames also mentions other factors, such as party switching and the problem of non-decisions, that complicate the 
inference of party discipline from roll call data (Ames 2001, 190-204). 
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 Deputies when this house rejected the special committee’s substitution bill by 294 in favor to 
190 against (with 8 abstentions) in 1996.  To approve this bill, at least 308 favorable votes were 
necessary.  If all members of the political parties in President Cardoso’s governing coalition had 
voted in favor of the bill, it would have passed easily in the Chamber.  The pension reform bill 
was resurrected only by a maneuver of Cardoso’s allies in the Chamber in interpreting internal 
rules of this house.25
 The behavior of Brazilian elected officials is not unpredictable, however.  Party leaders 
usually know the positions of their party members before an important vote takes place.  It is a 
common practice to map the intended votes of party members and postpone voting until the 
approval of a contested bill becomes certain.  Party leaders and the government often use 
administrative appointments and the release of funds to benefit congressional members’ 
constituencies as a way of influencing their votes.  These strategies work better in the Chamber 
than in the Senate because many deputies do not have high recognition in their states and thus 
rely on delivering particularized benefits to their target constituencies to advance their political 
careers.  In contrast, most senators are already prominent politicians at the national or state level 
and hence more independent of government favors for their political survival.26  Due to the 
relative political independence of many senators, party leaders also enjoy less influence over 
senators than deputies.  Former Leader of the PMDB in the Senate, Jader Barbalho said, “Here, 
there is no rank and file.  I don’t convoke them [PMDB senators to meetings].  I invite them.”27 
These differences between the senators and deputies have important implications for 
policymaking.  When political leaders deal with a recalcitrant Chamber, they may use the 
                                                 
25 President Cardoso’s allies in the Chamber of Deputies argued that the house could still vote on the original bill 
proposed by the government even after the special committee’s substitution bill was rejected. 
26 Interview with Senator Pedro Simon (PMDB-Rio Grande do Sul) on May 27, 2004. 
27 Special Edition of Folha de São Paulo, March 22, 2000, A-6.   
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 strategy of cooptation through exchange of favors.  But when one is faced with a rebellious 
Senate, that strategy may not work as effectively as in the Chamber. 
 
 
 
 
3.3. DECISION RULES AND PROCEDURES 
 
 
 This section describes the rules and procedures for the deliberation of constitutional 
amendments, statutory bills, and presidential decrees.  In each case, the principle of 
bicameralism is maintained in the sense that floor votes always occur separately in the Chamber 
of Deputies and the Senate.  This is the case even when a joint committee is established to 
consider certain bills or to appreciate presidential vetoes.   There is also no conference committee 
in the Brazilian Congress.  The Chamber and the Senate have separate staff, libraries, and 
printing offices, and the communication between the two houses is either non-existent or 
minimal even within the same parties.   
 
 
3.3.1. Constitutional Amendment 
 
 
 Constitutional amendments are frequent occurrences in Brazil.  The 1988 Constitution 
originally had 245 articles and additional 70 articles of transitory constitutional acts, together 
containing nearly 2,400 constitutional provisions.  The magnitude of details that the constitution 
covers impressed Giovanni Sartori, who said “[I]t is a novel of the size of a telephone 
catalogue….It is a Constitution replete with not only trivial details but also almost suicidal 
provisions and promises that are impossible to fulfill” (Sartori 1996: 211).  Since the birth of the 
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 constitution, in addition to the six amendments promulgated with the constitutional revision of 
1994, there have been 42 constitutional amendments only in sixteen years.  Federal Deputy Luiz 
Carlos Santos, former Minister of Political Coordination during the first term of President 
Cardoso, pointed out that the extremely detailed texts of the Constitution have made it practically 
impossible to govern unless the Constitution is substantially modified.28   Concerns about 
constitutional reform have echoed in Congress as well.  In fact, most of the proposals for 
constitutional amendments have origins in Congress.  At this writing, approximately 2,000 
constitutional amendment proposals are circulating in the Brazilian Congress.   
 Article 60 of the Constitution states that a constitutional amendment may be submitted 
by: (1) at least one-third of the members of the Chamber of Deputies or of the Senate; (2) the 
President of the Republic; or (3) more than one half of the Legislative Assemblies of the units of 
the Federation, each of them having a majority of members in favor of the amendment.  In 
practice, all proposals for constitutional amendment have been submitted by the executive or 
Congress.  The initial hurdle for proposing a constitutional change is also high compared to a 
statutory change, which may be proposed by individual members of Congress.  The initial house 
of deliberation depends on the author of the proposal.  The Chamber of Deputies is the first 
house to consider bills proposed by deputies and the president.  The Senate is the initial house to 
consider bills proposed by senators.  The initial house may approve the bill as it is, approve the 
bill with amendments, or reject the bill.  An approval of a constitutional amendment proposal 
requires favorable votes by a three-fifth majority of its members voted on two separate rounds.  
If the initial house approves the proposal, it is then sent to the second house for a review.   
                                                 
28 Interview on December 2, 2003.  Deputy Luiz Carlos Santos was responsible for executive-legislative relations to 
realize the reform of the economic order and presidential re-election, both of which required constitutional changes. 
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  The reviewing house also has three options: approve the bill as it is, approve the bill with 
amendments, or reject the bill.  If the reviewer house approves exactly the same text as the one 
approved by the first house in two rounds with three-fifth majority votes, the executive boards of 
the Chamber and the Senate promulgate the constitutional amendment.  If the reviewer house 
rejects the bill, it is sent to an archive.  If the reviewer house approves the bill but with 
amendments, the bill must be considered by the first house once again as a new proposal.  It is 
worth re-emphasizing that the Brazilian Constitution requires that an identical text of a 
constitutional amendment be approved by the two houses of Congress to promulgate it.  Until an 
identical text is approved, the bill shuttles between the two houses indefinitely unless it is 
rejected.  Therefore, holding all else equal, there is no built-in advantage to be the first house to 
consider a proposal for a constitutional amendment.  Put differently, the powers of the Chamber 
of Deputies and the Senate are symmetric in this case.  In addition, urgency may not be requested 
for an appreciation of constitutional amendments.  All votes on constitutional amendments use 
roll calls.  Figure 3.1 summarizes the flow of the legislative process for constitutional 
amendments.   
 In both houses, a proposal for constitutional amendment is first reviewed by committees.  
In the Chamber, the Committee on Constitution, Justice and Citizenship (Comissão de 
Constituição e Justiça e Cidadania—CCJC) considers the bill and produces a report on its 
admissibility.  In the case of inadmissibility, the author of the proposal, with the support of at 
least one-third of deputies, may appeal to the floor to consider the reversal of the CCJC’s 
decision.  If the CCJC or the floor votes in favor of admissibility, the president of the Chamber 
designates a special committee to examine the merit of the proposal.  The special committee has 
forty sessions to produce its report.  Amendments to the proposal must be submitted to the 
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 special committee with a support by at least one-third of the members of the house.  After the 
appreciation by the special committee, the proposal is discussed and voted in the floor. 
 In the Senate, a constitutional amendment proposal directly proceeds to the floor for 
discussion after an examination by the Committee on Constitution, Justice and Citizenship 
(Comissão de Constituição e Justiça e Cidadania—CCJ).  The Senate’s CCJ analyzes the merit 
as well as the admissibility of the proposal and has thirty business days to submit a committee 
report.  Only the members of the CCJ are allowed to submit amendments with their individual 
signatures during this phase.  If the CCJ approves the proposal, it is discussed in the floor for five 
sessions.  Senators may submit amendments during those five sessions with signatures of at least 
one-third of the members of the house.  If no amendment is submitted, the bill is put for a vote at 
the fifth session.  Should amendments be submitted, however, the bill returns to the CCJ for the 
analysis of the amendments.  The proposal and amendments are voted in the floor after the CCJ 
reports its analysis to the plenary.  The rest of the deliberation follows the rules and processes 
described earlier and in Figure 3.1. 
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 3.3.2. Statutory Bills 
 
 
 In contrast to the rules and procedures to consider proposals for constitutional 
amendment, the 1988 Constitution and the internal rules of the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate established various procedures by which to make expedited examinations of statutory 
bills possible.  Article 58, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution grants committees the power “to 
debate and vote on bills of law which…are exempt from being submitted to the Plenary 
Assembly, except in the event of an appeal from one-tenth of the members of the respective 
house.”  This summary process is called conclusive power (in the Chamber) or terminative 
power (in the Senate).  In addition, as discussed previously, the President of the Republic also 
holds a constitutional right to request urgency in the examination of bills of his/her own initiative 
(Article 64).  If urgency is requested by the president, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate 
each must vote the bill within forty-five days.  The failure to do so leads to the suspension of the 
deliberation of all other materials in the respective house, except for those with constitutional 
deadlines, until the bill is voted.  Deputies and Senators can also request urgency in deliberation, 
but unlike the president’s request, it must be supported by between one-forth to two-thirds of the 
members of the respective house, depending on the case in consideration, and approved by the 
plenary.   
 There are two types of laws in Brazil: ordinary law (lei ordinária) and complementary 
law (lei complementar).  The fundamental qualitative difference between the two types of bills is 
whether the Constitution explicitly stipulates that a particular clause be regulated by a 
complementary law.  If there is no reference to complementary law in the Constitution, then 
ordinary law is used.  In terms of rules and procedures, an approval of a bill of ordinary law 
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 requires a simple majority whereas it is necessary to have at least an absolute majority to pass a 
bill of complementary law.  Furthermore, roll calls are required by the Constitution to vote on a 
complementary law bill, but symbolic voting is usually used to vote on an ordinary law bill29 
unless a roll call is requested by six percent of deputies or three senators in the respective house.  
Another difference in the mode of consideration between bills of ordinary law and 
complementary law is that the former needs only one round of voting while the latter calls for 
two separate rounds of voting in the Chamber unless it is a bill that originated in the Senate.  
Both types of bills are voted only once in the Senate.  Moreover, bills of complementary law are 
not subject to the conclusive or terminative power of committees.  In short, the rules and 
procedures are more rigid for complementary law than for ordinary law.   
 Proposals for both ordinary and complementary laws may be submitted by any of the 
following individuals or collectives within their competence (Art. 61 of the Constitution): any 
member(s) or committee of the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, or the National Congress; the 
President of the Republic; the Supreme Federal Court; the Superior Courts; the Prosecutor-
General; and the citizens.  The citizens’ initiative may be exercised “by means of the 
presentation to the Chamber of Deputies of a bill of law subscribed by at least one percent of the 
national electorate, distributed throughout at least five states, with not less than three-tenths of 
one percent of the voters in each of them” (Paragraph 2, Art. 61).  The President of the Republic 
retains an exclusive initiative to propose in many areas pertaining to the administrative 
organization of the federal government, national public enterprises, and budgetary matters.  The 
Chamber of Deputies is the first house to examine bills of law that are the initiative of the 
President, the Supreme Federal Court, and the Prosecutor-General as well as those of deputies 
                                                 
29 Symbolic vote is equivalent to voice vote in the United States.  In the Brazilian Congress, those who are in favor 
of the bill in discussion remain seated whereas those who are against are asked to stand up.   
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 and citizens.  Figure 3.2 shows a ‘normal’ flow of the legislative process for statutory bills, i.e., 
when urgency is not requested. 
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56 Sent to President after review by the Initial House 
of amendments made by the Reviewer HousePresident of the Republi-Statutory Bills Archiv
  Once a statutory bill is submitted, the president of the house distributes it to relevant 
committees, indicating whether the bill follows a normal or summary process.  In the Chamber 
of Deputies, the bill must be examined by the CCJC and the Finance and Tax Committee 
(Comissão de Finanças e Tributação—CFT) when it has financial or budgetary implications, in 
addition to a thematic committee(s).  The approval by the CCJC and CFT (if required) is a 
requisite for the house to pass the bill regardless of whether a normal or summary process is 
adopted.  If the substance of the bill falls under the jurisdiction of more than three thematic 
committees, a special ad hoc committee is created.  In the Senate, only thematic committee(s) 
examine(s) the bill.  In the case of a summary process, members of the respective house submit 
amendments to the committees and the reporting officers of the committees (called relator) 
prepare their analyses of the bill and amendments and make recommendations of vote.  The 
committees then vote on the bill and the amendments.  Committee decisions are made by simple 
majority.  If the committees approve the bill, it is sent to the reviewer house for appreciation.  If 
the committees reject the bill, it is sent to an archive.  Deputies or senators who do not agree with 
the committee’s decision may appeal to the plenary if they have the support of at least one-tenth 
of the members of their respective house.  In the case of disagreements among competent 
committees over approval or rejection of the material, the bill is also taken to the floor for voting. 
 There are a few major differences from a summary process in the case of a normal 
process.  First, only members of competent committees may present amendments during the 
examination in the committees.  Non-members may submit amendments during floor sessions.  
Second, the approval of a bill by a committee(s) does not warrant its passage.  Although a 
rejection by a committee(s) leads to a termination of a bill’s examination (unless the committee 
decision is appealed), its approval by a committee(s) leads to a further deliberation and voting in 
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 the plenary.   In the event of an approval in the floor, the bill is sent to the other house for a 
review.  Finally, bills pertaining to codes (penal, civil, electoral, and transit codes) and 
complementary laws always follow the normal processes.   
 When a bill reaches the reviewer house after its passage by the initial house, the 
executive board distributes it to relevant committees.  The deliberation in the reviewer house 
uses the normal process.  The committee(s) may approve, approve with amendments, or reject 
the bill.  A rejection by committees discontinues the examination of the bill in that house (unless 
there is an appeal).  In the case that the committees approve the bill with or without amendments, 
it is discussed and voted in the floor.   
 The reviewer house may approve the bill as it came from the initial house (i.e., without 
amendments), approve it with amendments, or reject it.  In the first case, the reviewer house 
sends the approved text to the President of the Republic for sanctioning.  If the reviewer house 
approves the bill but modifies the text, the bill is returned to the initial house for a review of the 
changes made by the reviewer house.  It is the prerogative of the initial house to accept or reject 
the modifications made by the reviewer house.  The initial house may disregard all the 
amendments of the reviewer house and send the original text approved by the initial house to the 
President for sanctioning.  Hence, there is a substantial advantage to be the first house to 
consider statutory bills.  However, the reviewer house retains veto power upon the bill’s arrival 
in the house.  That is, if the reviewer house rejects the bill, there will be no further discussion 
about it.  Therefore, a bicameral agreement in the fundamental merit of the bill is still necessary.  
Finally, the issue dealt with in a rejected bill may not be proposed during the same legislative 
session (one calendar year) unless such proposal is supported by an absolute majority of the 
members of the Chamber or the Senate (Art. 67 of the Constitution). 
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  In Brazil, the President of the Republic holds partial (or line-item) and total (or package) 
veto powers (Art. 66 of the Constitution).  Presidents sanction bills passed by the Congress if 
they concur.  When presidents consider bills to be unconstitutional or contrary to public interest, 
they may veto them partially or in entirety.  Formally, a presidential veto triggers an installment 
of a joint committee of the National Congress composed of three deputies and three senators.  
The committee must produce a report on the veto within twenty days of its installation (Arts. 
104-106 of the Common Rules of the National Congress).  With or without a report by the 
committee, by Constitution the National Congress must determine, with secret voting in a joint 
session, whether or not it shall overturn the presidential veto within 30 days of the date of the 
acknowledgement of the veto.  Even though a presidential veto is examined in a joint session of 
the Chamber and the Senate, votes take place sequentially beginning in the Chamber.  If the 
Chamber votes in favor of overriding a presidential veto, then a vote in the Senate follows.  It 
requires an absolute majority of votes in each house to override a presidential veto. 
 In reality, a joint committee to examine a presidential veto is rarely installed, and the 
National Congress almost never convenes to vote on a presidential veto within the constitutional 
deadline of 30 days.  Rather than convening a joint session for an examination of each single 
veto, many presidential vetoes are voted together in a single session.  The president’s allies in the 
legislature also make sure that presidential vetoes are not overturned by the Congress and try to 
postpone the consideration of vetoes until there is a consensus enough to uphold them.  This 
strategy has worked well thus far: of 453 presidential vetoes recorded since October 1988, 
Congress has defeated only thirteen vetoes.   
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 3.3.3. Presidential Decree 
 
 
 Instead of the normal route to propose a statutory change described in the previous 
section, Brazilian presidents have frequently chosen to issue a presidential decree called medida 
provisória (or provisional measure).  Article 62 of the 1988 Constitution stipulates, “In case of 
relevance and urgency, the President of the Republic may adopt provisional measures with the 
force of law.”  However, because of the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes “relevance 
and urgency,” successive Brazilian presidents have exercised this constitutional prerogative to 
effect immediate policy change.  The number of presidential decrees issued (and re-issued) by 
Brazilian presidents is indeed impressive.  President Sarney (1985-90) issued and reissued 147 
provisional measures,30 President Collor (1990-92) 159, President Franco (1992-94) 505, and 
President Cardoso (1995-98, 1999-2002) 5,401 decrees.  President Lula issued 124 presidential 
decrees thus far in less than two years of his presidency, averaging more than five decrees per 
month (Subchefia para Assuntos Jurídicos, Casa Civil da Presidência da República).  Frustrated 
with the frequent use of decrees by the president and their coverage, Congress attempted to 
regulate and restrict this powerful presidential power, which culminated in Constitutional 
Amendment No. 32 of 2001.   
 Under the original 1988 Constitution, presidents issued decrees for almost all areas 
regulated by ordinary and complementary laws.  Provisional measures were effective for thirty 
days.  Upon the publication of a provisional measure, the president was to notify the National 
Congress immediately, which would then convene for a special joint session within five days to 
examine and vote on the decree.  If Congress neither approved the decree by converting it into 
                                                 
30 The number of provisional measures issued and reissued by President Sarney is for the period 1988-90 since this 
presidential instrument is an invention of the 1988 Constitution. 
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 law nor rejected it, the measure was to lose its effectiveness from the date of its issuance.  If 
Congress rejected the decree or it lapsed because the legislature failed to manifest its position by 
means of voting, it was Congress’s responsibility to regulate legal relations arising from the 
termination of the decree.  However, as in the case of presidential vetoes that also call for joint 
sessions, joint committees to examine presidential decrees were almost never established and the 
National Congress rarely voted on provisional measures within the constitutionally determined 
thirty-day deadline.31  As such, Brazilian presidents issued and re-issued decrees until they were 
converted into law or rejected by Congress.     
 In 1995, this mighty presidential prerogative suffered a setback.   Constitutional 
amendments of economic liberalization in 1995 included a new article (Art. 246) forbidding the 
adoption of provisional measures for the regulation of any constitutional provision that had been 
an object of constitutional amendment since 1995.  Yet, only with a constitutional amendment of 
2001 did far-reaching changes in the regime of provisional measures come into existence.  
 The new rules established by the 2001 constitutional amendment prohibit the adoption of 
presidential decrees over matters related to rights, codes, and budgets.  It is also banned the use 
of decrees for areas reserved for regulation by complementary law, the organizations of the 
Judicial Branch and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and subjects that have already been passed 
by Congress and await presidential sanction or veto.  Moreover, reissuing of provisional 
measures by the president is forbidden.  Instead, provisional measures are now valid for sixty 
days, and are automatically renewed only once if Congress fails to vote on them expeditiously.   
The new rules also provide that the failure to vote on provisional measures within forty-five days 
                                                 
31 The principal reason for the difficulty of convening a joint session of the National Congress is that such session is 
always extraordinary.  It is difficult to schedule an extraordinary session.  Even when it is scheduled, many deputies 
and senators fail to show up in a joint session, making it unable to deliberate due to a lack of a quota.   
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 triggers a suspension of deliberation of all other legislative activities in the respective house until 
final voting occurs. 
 With respect to the congressional examination of presidential decrees, the National 
Congress no longer meets in a joint session to consider them.  An installment of a joint 
committee of the Chamber and the Senate is still required to examine provisional measures and 
issue a report thereon before their submission to floor voting in each house (although it remains 
rare to install such a committee).  However, the new rule establishes that the examination of 
presidential decrees be initiated in the Chamber of Deputies, followed by a deliberation in the 
Senate.   The significance of this new rule should not be underestimated.  By conferring on the 
Chamber the prerogative to initiate the consideration of provisional measures, the new rule 
instituted the Chamber’s supremacy vis-à-vis the Senate in the deliberation of presidential 
decrees.  The Chamber, now as the initial house for deliberating decrees, retains the last word on 
the text of new legislation arising from the appreciation of provisional measures.  On the other 
hand, while the Senate may still modify the text sent by the Chamber, there is no mechanism to 
guarantee that the lower house honors the upper house’s amendments once the bill returns to the 
initial house.  However, the Senate may reject provisional measures and thus bury them in its 
archive. 
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 3.4. DEPUTIES AND SENATORS CONTRASTED 
 
 
 In addition to formal rules and informal practices, the characteristics of the members of 
Congress may shape their preferences and strategies.  This section depicts contrasts in the 
electoral mandates and political profiles of deputies and senators. 
 Formally, federal deputies are representatives of the people and senators represent the 
states and the Federal District (Arts. 45 and 46 of the Constitution).  Deputies are elected by 
proportional representation in each state via an open-list rule by which voters vote for either 
individual candidates or parties.  The Chamber of Deputies is composed of 513 members.  
District magnitudes vary from eight to seventy (i.e., Sao Paulo).  The caps on the lowest and 
highest numbers of representation are the cause for serious malapportionment even in the 
Chamber that represents people rather than states.32  The minimum age to run for a deputy’s seat 
is twenty-one.  Deputies’ terms of office are four years and reelections are allowed.  Most 
deputies seek reelection but the average turnover rate in the Chamber has been about 50%.  In 
addition, many deputies run for mayoral elections that occur in the mid-term of the four-year 
legislative period.  Therefore, most deputies run for elections at least every four years and those 
with ambitions for municipal executive offices face another election within two years of their 
election to the Chamber.   
 Moreover, because of the open-list nature of the electoral system, cultivating personal ties 
with constituencies is highly important to get elected.  Since states are at-large electoral districts, 
deputies may seek votes anywhere in their states.  However, most deputies concentrate their 
                                                 
32 For example, according to the 2000 census, the least populous state (Roraima) had a population of 324,000 and 
eight federal deputies while the most populous state (Sao Paulo) had a population over 37 millions and seventy 
deputies (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 2000).  These numbers translate into 40,500 persons 
represented per deputy in Roraima versus 528,571 persons represented per deputy in Sao Paulo.   
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 campaigns on the discrete geographical areas that Ames (1995, 2001) calls bailiwicks.  
Delivering pork to those informal districts is a key campaign strategy for many deputies.  Thus 
many deputies tirelessly lobby in ministries to execute the programs that they authored when 
elaborating annual federal budgets.  Furthermore, many deputies believe that their elections to 
the Chamber were the fruit of their personal appeals and that their parties contributed little, if 
any, to their elections.  Of thirty-four incumbent deputies I interviewed during 2003-04, only six 
(of whom three deputies were members of the Workers’ Party) responded that their parties 
contributed more than they personally did to their elections.  In comparison, eleven claimed that 
their elections depended only on their personal attributes and that their parties made no 
contribution.33  In short, electorally motivated deputies tend to view the distribution of 
geographically separable goods as attractive and useful campaign strategies.  Since they operate 
in relatively short time horizons—facing new elections at least every four years and for some 
every two years (if they run for municipal elections and are defeated), they must deliver pork to 
their constituents fairly quickly.   
 In contrast to the members of the Chamber of Deputies, senators enjoy long tenure.  
Senators are elected for eight-year terms by a statewide majoritarian system.  Each state and the 
Federal District have three representatives to the Senate, totaling eighty-one members in the 
house.  The Senate’s seats are renewed every four years, electing one or two representatives 
alternately.  The minimum age to run for a Senate’s seat is thirty-five years.   
 The Senate is indeed the house of federation.  In the 49th Congress (1991-94), twenty-two 
members (27.2%) of the Senate had administered their states as state governors or vice-
governors before joining the house.  In the 50th (1995-98) and 51st (1999-2002) Congresses, the 
                                                 
33 Those interviews were conducted from November 4, 2003 through May 12, 2004.  They include members of the 
PMDB (5), PSDB (7), PT (4), PFL (7), PP (4), PL (3), and PTB (4).   
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 state representation in the Senate by ex-governors and ex-vice governors increased to thirty-one 
and twenty-eight members (or 38.3% and 34.6%), respectively (Lemos and Ranincheski 2002).  
Moreover, between 1987 and 1999, 6 percent of the senators on average had been former 
ministers of the federal government, compared with 2.5 percent of the deputies with ministerial 
experience.  Furthermore, 14 percent of the senators had headed public institutes and enterprises 
with administrative autonomy and their own budgets (Lemos and Ranincheski 2002).  The 52nd 
Congress (2003-2006) is hosting an ex-president of the republic and an ex-vice president of the 
republic.  Therefore, in addition to being the house of federation, the Senate is also the house of 
ex-administrators.   
 The fact that the Senate is the house of ex-governors and ex-administrators, combined 
with their long tenure, has certain implications for lawmaking.  First, most senators are political 
elites par excellence with high name recognition nationally and within their own states.  Their 
privileged status may make the government strategy of co-optation through distribution of posts 
and resources less efficient and effective with senators than with deputies.34  Senators’ long 
tenure security also makes them less susceptible to electoral pressures than deputies whose 
electoral cycles are much shorter than the senators’.  Second, senators, as ex-governors and 
administrators, tend to be more sensitive to issues of fiscal and administrative responsibilities 
than deputies.  As former administrators of states and ministries, many senators have first-hand 
experiences of the need for a fiscal balance and adjustment.  Thus, proposals aimed at fiscal 
adjustments and administrative efficiencies may be easier to pass in the Senate than in the 
Chamber.  Subsequent case studies explore these points. 
                                                 
34 Deputies with career profiles similar to those of senators (i.e., former ministers and governors) should also tend to 
be more independent than other deputies.  Among the deputies that I interviewed during 2003-04, deputies with such 
career profiles consistently weighed their personal beliefs more than the opinions of presidents and governors of 
their states and party orientation when asked about the factors that influence their parliamentary activities.  The 
responses by deputies with other career trajectories to the same question varied considerably. 
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  Finally, proposals that alter federal relations may encounter severe resistance in the 
Senate.  Although both deputies and senators can be considered delegates of states (Samuels 
2002), senators tend, due to the at-large statewide electoral districts, to be more explicit about 
protecting the interests of the states they represent because of their constitutional role as 
representatives of states and because of their particularly close ties with state governments.  
Furthermore, the interests of the northern, northeastern, and central western regions, with a 
combined population of 42% of entire Brazil, are overrepresented in the Brazilian Congress, 
especially in the Senate.  Those three regions have 257 votes (50.1%) in the Chamber and 60 
votes (74.1%) in the Senate.  Therefore, those three regions with 42% of the Brazilian population 
can block any legislation certainly in the Senate, if not in the Chamber (see Backes 1999).   
 
 
 
 
3.5. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 This chapter discussed formal legislative rules and informal practices under the 1988 
Brazilian Constitution.  It showed that the Chamber and the Senate possess constitutionally equal 
legislative prerogatives, but their powers vary depending on the type of a bill considered and 
which house initiates the process.  The president, with the power to propose and veto legislation 
and issue decrees, is also a key player in the legislative process.  In addition, the chapter 
compared Brazilian deputies and senators in terms of their political trajectories and electoral 
mandates.  The open-list rule electing deputies and short electoral cycles motivate many deputies 
to seek pork and patronage and make them vulnerable to cooptation by the government.  In 
contrast, longer tenure and political visibility tend to make senators more independent legislators.
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  Subsequent case studies (Chapters 5-7) examine the implications and propositions 
generated from a brief review of the political profiles of senators and deputies.  But before 
moving to case studies, I will present in the next chapter a quantitative study of legislative 
dynamics in the Brazilian Congress.   
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 4. CHAPTER 4: BICAMERALISM AND THE DYNAMICS OF LAWMAKING IN 
THE BRAZILIAN CONGRESS: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 This chapter tests the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 regarding bicameral 
divergences, various decision rules, the impatience of the actors to approve bills, and bicameral 
sequence.  I explain why the analyses of roll calls and approved bills are not sufficient in 
understanding legislative dynamics.  I argue that greater attention should be given to analyzing 
the timing of legislation as well as legislative outcomes.  I offer the event history method as an 
alternative way to analyze the dynamics of legislative successes and failures.   
 
 
 
 
4.1. MEASURING LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY 
 
 
 As I stated at the beginning of this dissertation, legislative capacity has at least two 
aspects that need to be considered.  One relates to the efficiency aspect of legislative capacity, 
that is, the degree to which a passage of a bill requires additional negotiations between and 
among legislative actors.  Those negotiations may involve the strategies of persuasion, alteration 
in the text of legislation, logrolling, and/or co-optation through the distribution of pork and 
appointive posts, but the degree of difficulties in negotiation is usually correlated with the time it 
takes until a bill gets voted (if it is ever voted).   
 The other aspect of legislative capacity has to do with legislative outcomes, i.e., if a 
proposed policy change is approved or gridlocked.  In this chapter, I differentiate legislative 
gridlock from policy gridlock.  I consider policy gridlock broadly: it occurs when the status quo 
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 policy continues to prevail even though a change of a policy is desired by society.  Policy 
gridlock may arise because there is no formal action toward a change of the policy (e.g., no bill 
has been submitted in Congress regarding the policy) for one reason or another.  Policy gridlock 
may also result from legislative gridlock.  Legislative gridlock occurs when a policy change is 
proposed and yet the bill does not find a way to become law because Congress either rejects it or 
simply fails to vote on it, or because the president vetoes the bill passed by the legislature.   
 Many scholars of legislative politics have proposed alternative ways to evaluate 
legislative capacity.  One way to assess legislative capacity is to count the number of laws 
enacted per certain intervals.  Mayhew (1991) and subsequent research inspired by his work uses 
this method.  Mayhew identified 267 significant laws enacted per Congress from 1946 to 1990 in 
order to investigate whether “legislative effectiveness” falls during a divided government 
compared with a period during a unified government in the United States (Mayhew 1991: 34).  
His careful research and regression analysis show that the U.S. Congress and government 
produce as many important laws under a divided government as under a unified government.   
 Binder (1999, 2003) improved Mayhew’s widely used method to measure legislative 
productivity of the U.S. Congress.  By claiming that Mayhew’s measure of gridlock lacks a 
denominator, Binder (2003: 35) defines legislative gridlock as “the share of salient issues on the 
nation’s agenda that is left in limbo at the close of a Congress.”   Binder uses daily editorials of a 
major national newspaper (New York Times) to reconstruct the political agenda for each 
Congress, which serves as the denominator of her “gridlock score,” i.e., the percentage of failed 
legislation on the political agenda by the close of a Congress.  Measuring this way, Binder finds 
that both a divided government and bicameral disagreements significantly increase the incidence 
of legislative gridlock.   
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  In the study of Brazilian legislative politics, Figueiredo and Limongi (2001) conducted an 
elaborate analysis of bills made into law by examining who proposed them.  The authors argue 
based on the data they meticulously collected that presidents, who proposed a predominant 
majority of laws passed by Congress, dominate Brazilian legislative processes.  Although 
Figueiredo and Limongi made a valuable contribution to understanding law production in Brazil, 
their data unfortunately do not include bills that were not converted into law, and thus Binder’s 
critique of Mayhew’s research (that it lacks a denominator) is also applicable to Figueiredo and 
Limongi’s study.35  In fact, Ames’s (2001) work casts some skepticism as to how powerful 
Brazilian presidents are in lawmaking.  Ames surveyed news media to identify the legislative 
agenda of each president in post-authoritarian Brazil and traced the fate of every issue on the 
agenda.  The tables Ames constructed demonstrate that Brazilian presidents have faced 
difficulties in passing bills in Congress: many executive bills that did pass were scratched and 
required side payments for their approval, and some others were abandoned.   
 More generally, there are various deficiencies with the method of counting the number of 
bills passed by Congress as an approach to determine legislative capacity.  First, the counting 
method underutilizes the information on the nature of bills and their legislative processes.  That 
is, by summing up different types of bills over a legislative period, it disregards information such 
as policy areas and different decision rules associated with the examination of those bills that 
may influence legislative production and gridlock.  Second, aggregating the number of bills 
passed per Congress also neglects the efficiency side of legislative capacity by not taking into 
account the time it takes until bills get approved or rejected.  However, the timing issue is often 
of crucial concern to many policymakers and political scientists.  Many care not only whether a 
                                                 
35 Similar work can be found in Siavelis (2002) on Chile and Casar (2002) on Mexico. 
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 bill will be passed but also how fast it will be passed.36  Then, the aggregation method misses an 
important piece of information in an analysis.  Furthermore, counting approved bills per 
Congress may not be an appropriate way to capture the dynamics of bill approval and gridlock in 
legislatures like Brazil’s whose archival rules are more complex than their U.S. counterpart.  As 
opposed to the U.S. Congress, where all bills not voted within a two-year legislative period are 
terminated, in Brazil bills that do not reach final voting within a four-year legislative period may 
be terminated or carried over to the next legislative period.  Some important and controversial 
bills stay in Congress for many years, even decades.  Thus the timing of approval or rejection as 
well as final outcomes should be of great analytic interest.   
 Another approach frequently adopted in the study of legislative behavior and efficiency is 
the analysis of roll call votes.  Research on the U.S. Congress has used roll call data extensively 
(e.g., Cooper, Brady, and Hurley 1977; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Aldrich 1995; Poole and 
Rosenthal 1997).  In Latin America, the democratization of authoritarian regimes has opened up 
new areas of legislative research, including the analysis of roll call votes, in recent years (e.g., 
Ames 2001; Figueiredo and Limongi 1995; Jones 2002; Carey 2002; Morgenstern 2004).  
Generally, those studies seek to explain legislative behavior of the members of Congress and 
parties, executive-legislative relations, and legislative capacity, and have revealed interesting 
patterns of legislative behavior in Latin American countries.   
 While roll call research has burgeoned in Latin America, this approach to legislative 
politics has at least two major limitations.37  First, since roll call data only reflect votes that 
reached the floor, we cannot learn from such data about the issues that never come up to a vote.  
To the extent that many bills do fail to reach the floor, roll call data are biased samples of 
                                                 
36 For example, there is a cost in delaying the adoption of legislation aimed to improve the fiscal balance as deficits 
grow in its absence. 
37 See Ames (2001: 188-204) for more discussion on the limitations of roll call data. 
71 
 legislative decisions.  In addition, most bills that do reach the floor are voted symbolically (e.g., 
voice vote), without recording how legislators vote.  Second, roll call data do not reflect the costs 
of bringing bills to a vote.   Roll call votes are really the final stage of frequently protracted and 
cumbersome legislative processes.  Negotiations to ensure the approval of a bill, involving side 
payments, bargains, and logrolls, almost always take place before floor voting.  In other words, 
roll call data fail to spot the essence of politics.   
 Rather than aggregating the passages of bills per Congress or using roll call votes, I 
analyze the fates and histories of individual bills proposed to the Brazilian Congress since the 
promulgation of the 1988 Constitution.  Specifically, I consider significant bills for the 
subsequent quantitative analysis.  I define a significant bill as one that is regarded at least by a 
legislative body of origin where it is proposed as worthy of pursuing given its internal rules of 
decision-making and the policy agenda.  In practical terms, this means that I consider all 
executive and judiciary proposals submitted to the Brazilian Congress.  With respect to 
congressional proposals, the data set includes all bills that were approved at least by the house of 
origin.  That is, all the congressional bills considered here were approved by the Chamber of 
Deputies if proposed by a deputy or approved by the Senate if proposed by a senator.  Put 
differently, I consider only those bills that cleared the first hurdle of approval at least in the 
legislative body of origin, be it the Executive, Judiciary, Senate, or Chamber of Deputies.  As 
stated above, this method allows me to focus only on those bills that are regarded as, at least by a 
house or branch of origin, important enough to pursue, and I can safely eliminate those bills that 
were proposed for the sake of proposing (which many members of Congress do).  The “history” 
of each of those bills was traced until July 31, 2004, on which date it was “right-censored” if a 
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 bill had not been approved, rejected, withdrawn, or sent to an archive.38  I will discuss the data 
set in greater details in Section 4.3. 
 
 
 
 
4.2. ESTIMATING LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY: THE MODEL 
 
 
 In this chapter I examine the dynamics of legislative approval and gridlock in the 
Brazilian Congress.  I posited seven hypotheses in Chapter 2 as follows. 
H1: The greater the distance of policy preferences between the two chambers, the greater is the 
likelihood of gridlock.   
 
H2: Impatience reduces the propensity for legislative delay. 
 
H3: Legislative delay is positively related to the duration of legislation proposed.   
 
H4: Holding the levels of impatience constant, the house that initiates a bill compromises less 
than the reviewing house in the content of legislation over which they are bargaining. 
 
H5: Bills initiated by the lower house are more likely to have speedy approval than bills initiated 
by the upper house. 
 
H6: Legislative gridlock increases with the number of votes required to pass legislation. 
 
H7: Legislative delay and immobility are more likely under symmetric bicameralism than in 
asymmetric bicameralism. 
 
I test six of these hypotheses (H1, H2, H3, H5, H6, and H7) using event history analysis in this 
chapter.  I will examine H4 in a case study chapter (Chapter 7) because it requires a close look at 
the evolution of the text of the bill over which the two houses bargain. 
                                                 
38 Right-censoring of data occurs when the full history of the cases are unobserved.  In my data set, many bills were 
still being examined in Congress as of July 31, 2004 at the close of the data set.  Rather than excluding those 
pending bills, which would cause a selection bias, I recorded their histories until the close of the data set.   
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  In the past, scholars estimated legislative delay and gridlock using cross-tabulations, 
linear regressions, and/or logit or probit models (e.g., Figueiredo and Limongi 1996; Mayhew 
1991; Krehbiel 1998; Binder 1999, 2003).  Since we are interested in estimating the time until 
the deliberation of a bill is concluded in Congress (commonly referred to as a survival time, 
denoted as T), we might be tempted to fit an ordinary least-squares linear regression model 
,0 ε++= XBBT   ),0(~ 2σε N
where X is a vector of covariates expected to influence the duration of bills in Congress.  
However, it turns out that this approach to survival times is problematic.  First, the linear 
regression model may predict negative values although survival times are always positive.  
Second, we may not have observed the entire spans of bill examination in Congress by the time 
of a data analysis.  If we exclude pending cases from the analysis, in addition to a loss of 
information, our estimation may be tainted by a selection bias.  Moreover, regressing covariates 
on time tells nothing about the outcomes of deliberation.  But if we use a binary outcome (for 
example approved = 1 and otherwise = 0) and run a standard logit or probit regression, 
information on the process leading up to the event is ignored.  As discussed in the previous 
section on the limitations of roll call data, this is a great loss of information because most of the 
real things of politics—bargaining, persuasion, deal-making, etc.—occur before the final stage. 
 The most serious problem with using a linear regression model to analyze survival data 
rests on the assumption regarding the distribution of the residuals, ε (Cleves, Gould, and 
Gutierrez 2002, 2).  The normal distribution of error terms assumed in linear regression models 
often does not hold for survival data.  While OLS is noted for its robustness to deviations from 
normality, according to Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez (2002, 2), “[t]he problem is that the 
distributions for time to an event might be quite dissimilar from the normal—they are almost 
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 certainly nonsymmetric, they might be bimodal, and linear regression is not robust to these 
violations.” 
 Event history analysis (also referred to as survival or duration analysis) is a more 
appropriate approach to analyze duration data such as the life-span of bills when one’s research 
question pertains to both the timing and outcomes of social phenomena.39  The goal of this 
chapter is precisely that, i.e., to evaluate the impact of the covariates on the Brazilian Congress’ 
decisions on important bills and their timings.  A brief review of event history analysis may be 
useful. 
 Event history analysis is concerned with the time until an occurrence of an event.  Let T 
be a nonnegative random variable denoting the time to an occurrence of an event.  The hazard 
rate, h(t), is the instantaneous rate of an event’s occurrence, i.e., the probability that an event 
occurs at a particular point in time, given that the case has survived until t: 
t
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The hazard rate can also be expressed as 
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where f(t) is the failure function, or the rate at which cases fail,  and S(t) is the survivor function, 
or the probability of the cases surviving beyond time t.  
 Performing an event history analysis involves choosing among alternative models to 
parameterize possible time dependency in the data.  Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) 
recommend a semi-parametric model developed by Cox (1972).  The advantage of the Cox 
model compared to alternative parametric models (such as exponential and Weibull models) is 
                                                 
39 See Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) for a comprehensive review of event history analysis.   
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 that it estimates the effects of the covariates on the hazard rate without specifying the distribution 
of the baseline hazard function (that is, duration dependency).  The hazard rate in the Cox model 
is specified as  
)exp()()( 0 XthXth β= , 
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function left unparameterized, and βX is a vector of covariates 
and regression parameters.  The Cox model is a proportional hazard model, namely 
.
)exp(
)exp(
)(
)(
xm
xj
m
j
X
X
Xth
Xth
β
β=  
This means that the hazard ratio of the covariates Xj and Xm is constant over time. 
 Cox regression estimates are obtained by maximizing the conditional probability of 
failure, or an event’s occurrence.  Let R(ti) be the number of cases that are at risk of failing at 
time ti.  The probability that the jth case will fail at time Ti is given by 
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The Cox partial likelihood function is derived by taking the product of the conditional 
probabilities,  
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where K is the number of observed failure times and δi is the censoring indicator taking 0 if a 
case is right-censored and 1 if it is not censored.  Estimates of the β are obtained by maximizing 
the natural logarithm of L(β), 
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  The above model is appropriate when only one type of events exists or when there is no 
substantive interest in differentiating various forms of events that cases are at risk of 
experiencing.  However, the modes of bill termination in Congress—whether congressional 
deliberation ended in the approval or rejection of a bill—and not just the durations of 
deliberation, are of great interest for students of legislative politics.  “Competing risks” models 
can be used to examine multiple modes of risks such as bill approval and rejection.  The novel 
element of competing risks models is risk-specific hazard rates hk(t|βk, Xk) where k = 1,…,r 
possible events that a case is at risk of experiencing.  A competing risks model can be specified 
using the latent survivor time approach. 40   
 The latent survivor time approach assumes that there are K specific events that a case is at 
risk of experiencing but only the incidence of the first event is observed.  For example, if we 
observe a rejection of a bill in Congress, we would not observe its approval that might eventually 
occur were it continue to stay in Congress.  The likelihood function of a sample of size n and k 
specific outcomes is given by 
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Yet, since the shortest failure time is observed (i.e., { }rik TTT ,...,min= ), the likelihood function 
can be expressed as 
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Then we define a censoring indicator ikδ = 1 if i failed due to risk k, and 0 otherwise (i.e., the 
observation is right-censored).  Adding ikδ to the likelihood function,  
                                                 
40 Diermeier and Stevenson (1999) use the latent survivor time approach in their analysis of cabinet duration.   
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This approach assumes conditional independence of competing risks. 
 The goal of this quantitative analysis is to estimate risk-specific hazard rates of bill 
deliberation in the Brazilian Congress by identifying a set of covariates that influence them.41  
There are multiple modes of terminating bill examination in the Brazilian Congress.  A bill may 
be approved or rejected.  But many bills actually do not reach the final stage of deliberation but 
are aborted in the process.  For example, some bills are withdrawn by their sponsors, and others 
are declared impaired due to the approval of similar bills.  However, the most common cause of 
termination of deliberation other than approval or rejection is a reorganization of pending bills at 
the beginning of a new Congress when a number of pending bills are dispatched to an archive.42   
Thus, although there are various modes of bill termination, the more theoretically interesting 
cases are approvals and rejections.  Hence, the subsequent analysis will focus on the discussion 
of the causes and timing of bill approval and rejection.  However, the reader should be reminded 
that the information on all forms of bill termination as well as pending bills is used to estimate 
the hazards of approval and rejection. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 The regression analyses in this chapter focus on the passage and rejection of bills in the Brazilian Congress.  The 
bills approved by Congress may be subsequently sanctioned or vetoed by the nation’s president.  An analysis of the 
determinants of presidential vetoes and veto overrides by Congress is beyond the scope of this chapter.  Such 
analysis would require different models and additional variables.   
42 The author of a bill may appeal the decision to the executive board of the house.   
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 4.3. DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: DATA AND 
OPERATIONALIZATION 
 
 
4.3.1. The Dependent Variable 
 
 
 The dependent variable is the timing and outcome of bill examination in the Brazilian 
Congress.  The legislative data set I constructed includes proposals for constitutional amendment 
and two types of statutory bills—ordinary and complementary.43  As discussed previously, the 
data set includes all executive and judiciary proposal submitted to the Brazilian Congress from 
October 5, 1988 (the promulgation of the current constitution) through December 31, 2003.  
With respect to congressional proposals, the data set includes all bills submitted during the same 
period and subsequently approved at least by the house of origin.  In total, the data set contains 
3,066 bills that meet those criteria.   
 Using the Senate’s and Chamber’s online legislative databases and information obtained 
through the Senate’s Subsecretaria de Informações, I recorded the “history” of each of those 
bills.  The data include information on (1) the date in which the bill was introduced in Congress; 
(2) its sponsor; (3) the type of the bill (i.e., ordinary bill, complementary bill, or constitutional 
amendment proposal); (4) the house that examined the bill first; (5) the time (in days) it spent in 
Congress; and (6) its final outcome.  There are several modes of bill termination in the Brazilian 
Congress.  First, using the classification employed by Congress, I classified the bills into (a) 
approved, (b) rejected, (c) impaired, (d) withdrawn, and (e) pending.  Impaired (or prejudicado 
in Portuguese) bills include bills terminated due to the reorganization of the legislative agenda at 
                                                 
43 I thank Fernando Limongi for sharing Cebrap’s legislative dataset.  I benefited from their coding schemes in 
constructing my dataset.   
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 the beginning of a new Congress, approval or rejection of another bill dealing with the same or 
similar subject, and other reasons.  Most bills that were terminated before their examinations in 
the floor occurred because of the reorganization of the legislative agenda or approval or rejection 
of related bills.  I then created a new category for bill termination other than approval or rejection 
by adding together impaired and withdrawn bills.  Hence, there are four classifications of 
outcomes in the data set: approved, rejected, terminated without approval or rejection, and 
pending.  The histories of those bills were traced from their introduction to Congress to their 
termination, or in the case of pending bills until July 31, 2004, on which date they “exit” the data 
set. 
 The data set does not include budgetary bills because they follow calendar deadlines.  
Also excluded from the data set are presidential decrees.  Although Brazilian presidents use 
decrees frequently as a means of lawmaking, they are different from other types of bills in that 
decrees enact policy change immediately upon their issuances and are submitted a posteriori to 
the Congress for examination.44  Furthermore, the examination of presidential decrees in 
Congress must adhere to constitutionally determined deadlines and thus are not suited for event 
history analysis.  Tables 4.1 and 4.2 provide descriptive statistics of the proposals used for the 
subsequent analysis.   
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Therefore presidential decrees are technically not “bills.” 
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 Table 4.1: Life-Span of Bills by Their Types (in days) 
 
 
 No of Bills Mean Median Min Max
Ordinary 2842 1498 1162 2 5777
Complementary 119 1417 713 20 5630
Constitutional 
Amendment 105 1204 964 11 4629
All Bills 3066 1485 1140 2 5777
 
 
 
Table 4.2: Outcomes and Life-Span of Bills in Congress (in days) 
 
 
 No of Bills Mean Median Min Max
Approved 1344 759 509 2 5155
Rejected 416 1376 1257 41 4282
Other 
Termination 373 1864 1828 7 4830
All Bills* 3066 1485 1140 2 5777
*The figures include censored and non-censored cases.  There are 933 censored bills. 
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  Table 4.1 presents the number of bills by type and the time until they exit the data set.   
The figures include both censored and non-censored cases.  There are 2,842 bills of ordinary law 
included in the data set.  Their median time is 1,162 days (or over 3 years), with the minimum of 
2 days and the maximum of 5,777 days (or nearly 16 years).  Those figures demonstrate that 
there is much variation in the bills’ life-span.  The bills with 5,777 days of recorded time were 
still pending in Congress as of July 2004, indicating that certain bills stay in Congress for an 
awfully long time without any decision.  Both bills of complementary law and constitutional 
amendment follow similar patterns.  There are 119 complementary law bills and 105 
constitutional amendment proposals with their respective median times being 713 and 964 days.  
The greater mean time compared to the median time for all these three types of bills suggest that 
the survival times are skewed towards those that stayed in Congress for extended periods.   
 Table 4.2 shows the life-span of bills in Congress by their outcomes.  The data reveal that 
approved bills have the shortest life-span of the three bill types.  There are 1,344 approved bills 
with the mean and median survival times of 759 and 509 days, respectively.  Although the 
Brazilian Congress passed more than half of the approved bills in less than two years, it took 
much more time to pass some bills—it could take as long as 5,155 days (or 14 years)—that it 
eventually approved.  Compared to approved bills, the bills that were eventually rejected or 
terminated for other reasons tend to stick in Congress much longer.  For example, the median 
number of days in Congress for rejected bills (n = 416) is 1,257, which is 2.5 times as much as 
the mean number of days for approved bills.  Finally, the data set contains 933 censored cases.   
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 4.3.2. The Independent Variables 
 
 
 The covariates included in the analysis are as follows.  H1 predicts a greater likelihood of 
legislative gridlock as bicameral divergences increase.  Brazil’s multiparty system poses a 
challenge to a researcher in measuring the degree of bicameral divergence over time.  For 
example, there is no simple and meaningful way to calculate the difference between the partisan 
compositions of the Senate and the Chamber as it would be possible in a two-party system.  
However, Brazilian legislative parties do tend to cluster together into two camps: one supporting 
the president and the other acting as opposition to the president’s government.  Therefore, as an 
alternative to a bipartisan difference, I use the percentage difference in seat shares of the parties 
in the presidential coalition in the Senate and in the Chamber (labeled INCONGRUENCE) to 
measure the degree of bicameral divergence.  This measure, of course, is not perfect and it 
assumes that the members of the parties in the presidential coalition have similar preference 
portfolios with respect to important legislation.  A better alternative would be to use ideological 
information of the individual members of Congress.  However, no such data are available for 
both houses that meet the exigencies of time intervals necessary to perform an event history 
analysis with time varying covariates (including bicameral divergence).  Hence, I opted to use 
“practical” preferences of the members of Congress.  After all, there are reasons for political 
parties and their members to be in the president’s support coalition and many of them try to vote 
with the government whenever possible.   
 Since presidents are important legislative actors in Brazil, I created another measure of 
legislative preferences that take into account the congruence of the president and the two 
legislative houses.  PRESIDENTIAL BICAMERAL MAJORITY is a dummy variable and takes 
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 the value of 1 when the president has majorities in both the Senate and the Chamber, and 0 
otherwise.  Both incongruence and presidential bicameral majority are measures of legislative 
preferences. I expect that the larger values of incongruence increase the risk of bill rejection and 
that presidential bicameral majorities raise the chance of bill approval.  I obtained the 
information on the partisan compositions of the Chamber and the Senate through the Chamber’s 
Secretaria-Geral da Mesa and Centro de Documentação e Informação, and the Senate’s Relatório 
da Presidência.  I used records on the changes in party affiliations of individual members of 
Congress in order to have accurate accounts of the size of each party in Congress over time.  
Appendix 4.1 of this chapter provides information on the parties in presidential coalitions.   
 Figure 4.1 displays the shares of the seats held by the parties in the presidential coalition 
in the Chamber and the Senate from October 1988 to July 2004.  Although no presidents 
achieved legislative majorities solely with their own parties, many presidents did attain 
coalitional majorities.  The only minority presidents during this period were President Collor 
(1990-92) and President Lula (2003-Present) during his first two quarters.  The figure also 
reveals that Brazilian presidents had greater coalitional majorities in the Senate than in the 
Chamber except for Lula whose bases of support were much smaller in the upper house than in 
the lower house.  Finally, the figure points out that the largest bicameral discrepancies in the 
sizes of presidential coalitions occurred during the presidencies of Franco and Lula and the 
beginning of Cardoso’s first term. 
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Figure 4.1: Size of Presidential Coalitions in the Chamber and Senate, 1988-2004 
(Shares of Seats Held by Parties in Presidential Coalitions) 
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  For decision rules and bicameral types (hypotheses 6 and 7), I use dummy variables that 
represent supermajority-symmetric bicameralism (i.e., constitutional amendment proposals) and 
absolute majority-asymmetric bicameralism (i.e., bills of complementary law).  Proposals for 
constitutional amendments require a three-fifth majority in favor of the proposals in each house 
of Congress and they shuttle between the two houses until the Chamber and the Senate agree on 
the exact texts.  In contrast, complementary law requires an absolute majority of votes in each 
house and the initiating house has the last word on the text of the bill.  The base category is 
simple majority-asymmetric bicameralism (i.e., bills of ordinary law).  I refer the reader to Table 
4.1 for the descriptive statistics of those bills.  It should be more difficult to approve a bill under 
supermajority-symmetric bicameralism than under absolute and simple majority-asymmetric 
bicameralism.  Likewise, the chances of bill approval should be lower for bills examined under 
an absolute majority rule than under a simple majority rule. 
 The data analysis examines two factors that may elevate the level of impatience among 
legislative actors, which is the subject of hypothesis 2.  First are legislative and presidential 
elections.  Elections may increase legislative activities because legislators and the president’s 
allies in Congress are likely to wish to deliver results to their constituencies when facing 
upcoming elections.  Legislative elections, which occur in October of every four years, also 
coincide with the end of legislative periods.  I coded 1 for the quarter in which legislative and 
presidential elections take place and three quarters prior to it.  Based on the impatience 
hypothesis, I expect that legislative productivity generally increases in pre-electoral periods 
compared to non-election years.  However, there is a possibility for an alternative hypothesis.  
Since most Brazilian legislators campaign locally and prefer to stay close to their constituencies 
during election years, their presence in the capital tends to diminish during campaign periods.  
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 As such, legislative productivity may actually decline during election years.  If such is the case, 
the hazards of legislative elections will be lower both with respect to approval and rejection of 
bills. 
 The second operationalization of impatience employs an economic variable.  Many 
developing countries experience severe economic problems rather frequently.  I expect that 
politicians’ and policymakers’ imperatives to promptly cope with economic difficulties become 
elevated during times of economic crises.  One of the chronic economic problems that Brazilian 
governments have faced is inflation.  As such, I use monthly inflation rates as a measure of 
economic problems and interact it with bills proposing economic policies.  Economic policy 
bills’ hazard rate should be significantly positive only when inflation rates become ‘very high.’  
Rather than arbitrarily deciding the threshold for very high inflation, I will leave the data to 
determine such level and limit my prediction to describing a general pattern.  The relationship 
between inflation rates and the chances that economic policy bills will be approved should 
exhibit the behavior described in Figure 4.2.   At low inflation rates, being an economic policy 
bill does not increase its chance of approval (indicated by a discontinuous line).  However, as 
inflation rates rise, the probability that economic policy bills will be approved increases.  
Inflation data are obtained through the Central Bank of Brazil.   
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Figure 4.2: Hypothesized Relationships between the Hazards of Economic Policy Bills 
and Inflation 
 
 
 
 Hypothesis 3 pertains to the anticipated duration of legislation.  I assess the impact of the 
expected duration of legislation by including a dummy variable representing bills proposing a 
temporary policy change rather than a permanent one.  Temporary policy changes include those 
with pre-determined expiration dates (e.g., provisional taxes) and those that are subject to 
periodic re-examinations (e.g., minimum wages).  In total, 103 bills are coded as temporary 
legislation.  The relative ease of bargaining is expected to facilitate the approval of bills 
proposing temporary change compared to those proposing permanent change.   
 Hypothesis 5 is about the impact of the sequence of deliberation.  It states that the bills 
whose examination begins in the lower house have higher chances of approval than the bills 
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 initiated by the upper house.  I coded 1 for those bills which the Chamber was the first house to 
deliberate, and 0 if the Senate was the initial house to examine.    
 Finally, the data analysis takes into account the following factors.  First, the extant 
literature (e.g., Figueiredo and Limongi 2001) on Brazilian legislative politics indicates that the 
executive is the principal agent of legislation.  Thus, I include dummy variables for 
congressional and judicial proposals, having executive bills as the base category.  Second, the 
beginning of each legislative period may represent changes in preferences with respect to status 
quo policies as new members join Congress and some old ones leave it.  Turnover rates of the 
members of Congress in Brazil are quite high, especially in the Chamber of Deputies, where 
reelection rates have been only slightly over 50 percent in the last two decades.   Hence, I coded 
1 for the first year of each four-year legislative period and 0 otherwise.  Third, in addition to 
economic policy, the data analysis includes policy areas concerning administrative issues, rights 
and codes (such as civil and penal codes), political and institutional questions, and tributes (such 
as renaming a highway honoring a famous politician).  The base category is social policy.  
Finally, the models are estimated with a series of dummy variables representing different 
administrations since the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution.   
 
 
 
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics of Incongruence and Inflation 
 
 
 Mean Minimum Maximum 
Incongruence 9.11 0.36 24.83 
Monthly Inflation 10.3 -0.28 75.22 
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  Incongruence and inflation variables are time-varying covariates.  For computational 
convenience, continuous variables are first recorded on monthly bases, next summed up for each 
quarter, and then divided by three.  That is, both incongruence and inflation rates are monthly 
averages over a quarter.  Inconguence has a mean of 9.11 ranging from 0.36 to 24.83.  Monthly 
inflation rates ranged from –0.28 percent to 75.22 percent during October 1988 through July 
2004 with an average of 10.3 percent.   
 
 
 
 
4.4. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
 
 Table 4.4 presents the results of a Cox competing risks model of bill approval and 
rejection in the Brazilian Congress. The first column is a “pooled” model that does not 
distinguish among the ways in which bills’ deliberations were terminated, be it approval, 
rejection, withdrawal, or otherwise.  It is provided as a reference.  The more interesting findings 
are found in the second and third columns where the effects of covariates are estimated 
separately for bill approval and rejection.  As explained in Section 4.2, a hazard rate is the 
instantaneous rate of an event’s occurrence, i.e., the probability that an event (i.e., bill approval 
or rejection) occurs at a particular point in time, given that the case (i.e., a bill) has survived until 
t.   
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 Table 4.4: Cox Competing Risks Model of Bill Approval and Rejection 
 
 
 Pooled Approval Rejection 
Bicameral Incongruence 0.03**** 0.02 0.04** 
Presidential Bicameral Majority -0.09 0.72*** 0.50 
Supermajority/Symmetric 0.07 -0.09 -0.33 
Absolute Majority/Asymmetric -0.01 0.23 -0.47 
Congressional Election -0.14 -0.25* 0.64* 
Presidential Election 0.07 0.28** -0.90** 
Beginning of Legislature 0.52**** 0.31**** 0.91**** 
Congressional Proposal -0.82**** -0.99**** 1.29**** 
Judicial Proposal 0.53**** 0.66**** -- 
CD First House 0.41**** 0.95**** -0.54**** 
Temporary Change 1.39**** 1.51**** -0.40 
Inflation -0.002 -0.003 -0.01 
Inflation*Economic 0.01**** 0.01** 0.02** 
Economic -0.04 -0.07 0.08 
Administrative 0.28**** 0.26*** 0.19 
Rights & Codes -0.18** -0.41**** 0.11 
Tribute 0.64**** 0.90**** -0.06 
Political-Institutional -0.02 -0.14 0.10 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -15165 -9592 -2868 
N 52950 (2133) 52950 (1344) 52950 (416) 
Note: * = p ≤ 0.1, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01, **** = p ≤ 0.001.  Entries are coefficients.  Significance tests used a 
two-tailed test and robust standard errors.  There is no rejected judicial proposal.  Coefficients are estimated with 
various government dummies (not shown in the table). 
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  As predicted, bicameral incongruence has a positive and significant effect on bill 
rejection.  The hazard ratio can be obtained by exponentiating the coefficient, exp(0.04) = 1.04.  
Since the values of incongruence ranges from 0.36 to 24.83 and their corresponding hazard ratios 
from 1.01 to 1.58, going from the minimal value of bicameral incongruence to that of the 
maximal value raises the risk of bill rejection by 56.4 percent.45  In other words, when the 
difference in the shares of seats held by presidential coalitional parties in the two houses grows 
from 0.36 percent to 24.83 percent, the probability that a bill gets rejected at a given moment 
increases by 56.4 percent.  Bicameral incongruence has no statistically significant impact on bill 
approval, however.  This finding suggests that bicameral incongruence is an important 
determinant of bill rejection but has no influence on bill approval.   
 What does affect the chances of bill approval is the congruence of the three legislative 
actors operationalized as presidents having majorities in both houses of Congress.  When 
presidents hold bicameral majorities, the likelihood of bill approval increases by 105% compared 
to when they lack such majorities.  However, such majorities do not influence the hazard of bill 
rejection.   
 Counter to the hypothesis, decision rules/bicameral type variables do not have 
statistically significant effects on bill approval or rejection.  This finding is surprising given that 
extant work has demonstrated the propensity of supermajority rules to cause legislative gridlock 
(e.g., Krehbiel 1996, 1998; Brady and Volden 1998).  The non-significance of those variables 
may be due to the possibility that overcoming the initial hurdle of approval in the legislative 
body of origin under supermajority rules is very difficult and that once that barrier is surpassed, 
the likelihood of bill approval under supermajority rules in subsequent stages may become 
                                                 
45 Percentage change in the hazard rate is calculated by .100*)(% )(
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 indistinguishable from that under less rigid rules.  On the other hand, a recent study by Binder 
(2004, 72) shows that the propensity of a supermajority rule (filibuster threats in the U.S. Senate) 
to cause legislative gridlock ceases to be significant when that variable is entered simultaneously 
in her model with other explanatory variables such as bicameral differences and partisan 
polarization.  König’s (2001) research on German bicameralism also did not find evidence that 
would support differential effects of “strong” and “weak” bicameralisms.  In any event, the 
effects of bicameral types and legislative rules warrant further exploration. 
 Turning to the impatience variables, the estimation results of electoral periods are 
interesting in that they point to opposite effects of presidential and legislative elections.  That is, 
the hazard of bill approval decreases during legislative election periods whereas it rises during 
presidential election years (with the coefficients of -0.25 and 0.28, respectively).  In contrast, the 
hazard of bill rejection increases during legislative election years but diminishes during 
presidential election years (with the coefficients of 0.64 and -0.90, respectively).  Since these 
findings may be artifacts of not separating years in which presidential and legislative elections 
occurred concurrently from the periods in which presidential and legislative elections were non-
concurrent,46 I re-estimated the models by including an interaction of presidential and legislative 
elections to capture any effects that concurrence or non-concurrence of elections may have on 
legislative activities.  However, I did not find any substantial changes in the coefficients of the 
election variables.47  (The estimation results are found in Appendix 4.2.)    
                                                 
46 Presidential and legislative elections became concurrent from 1994.   
47 When the Cox models are re-estimated with the interaction variable representing concurrent elections, he results 
for the approval model indicate that the coefficients of the electoral variables cease to be significant although the 
directions of the signs remain the same.  The rejection model with the interaction variable also did not produce 
substantively different results than the model without it.  The coefficient of non-concurrent legislative elections 
(0.79) is positive and significant, but when both concurrent and non-concurrent legislative elections are jointly 
considered, its coefficient is no longer significant.  On the other hand, the coefficient of non-concurrent presidential 
elections is not significant but the additive effect of concurrent and non-concurrent presidential elections is negative 
and significant with a coefficient of –1.06.   
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  The puzzle really lies in the effects of legislative elections because the findings for 
presidential elections are consistent with the theoretical prediction.   The findings of legislative 
elections, however, are not consistent with either the impatience hypothesis or the alternative 
hypothesis.  If the impatience hypothesis were correct, legislative elections’ coefficient would be 
positive (but it is negative and significant) for bill approval.  If the alternative hypothesis (that 
legislative activities decline during legislative election years because legislators are on campaign 
tours) were right, then the coefficient for bill rejection should also be negative (but it is positive).  
One of the possible explanations to account for these findings may be that legislators are more 
eager to reject and postpone the approval of the bills that would adversely affect their 
constituencies, hence the positive coefficient for bill rejection and the negative coefficient for bill 
approval.  This possibility will be explored in case studies. 
 Another measure of impatience is inflation rates.  The interaction of inflation rates and 
economic policy bills is positive and significant, suggesting that inflation raises the hazard of bill 
approval and rejection in the economic policy areas.  Figure 4.3 shows conditional hazard ratios 
of economic bills (the y-axis) at various inflations rates (the x-axis).  The solid lines indicate 
where hazard ratios are significant at least at the p = 0.1 level and the discontinuous lines are 
those that do not achieve statistical significance.  Note that the hazard ratios are only significant 
at higher inflation rates (monthly inflation rates of 10% or higher for rejection and 25% or higher 
for approval), confirming the hypothesis that only economic crises, but not economic problems, 
compel politicians and policymakers to work more efficiently in approving and rejecting bills.  
The results also show that the chances of economic policy bills being approved and rejected 
grow progressively higher as inflation rates become elevated.  For instance, the likelihood that 
economic policy bills will be approved is 24 percent higher than that for social policy bills (i.e., 
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 the base category) when a monthly inflation rate is 25 percent; however, at a monthly inflation 
rate of 75 percent, such likelihood is 120 percent greater for economic policy bills compared to 
social policy bills.  .   
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Figure 4.3: Conditional Hazard Ratios of Economic Bills at Various Inflation Rates 
 
 
 
 As expected, bills proposing a temporary change have a higher hazard of being approved 
than those proposing a permanent change.  A bill proposing a provisional change is 3.54 times 
more likely to be approved than a bill proposing a permanent change.  This finding suggests the 
relative ease of bargaining in striking an agreement when one proposes a short-term change 
rather than a long-term change.   
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  With respect to the effects of bicameral sequence, when the Chamber of Deputies is the 
first house to deliberate (and pass) a bill, it has a much higher chance of being approved 
subsequently (180 percent higher) and a lower risk of being rejected (42 percent lower) 
compared to when the Senate is an initiating house on a given day.  These findings support 
hypothesis 5.  Although they give evidence for a sequential advantage of being examined in the 
lower house first, however, the estimation results indicate that congressional bills as a whole do 
not fare very well.  Congressional proposals face a hazard of approval 63% less than executive 
bills, while the hazard of rejection of congressional proposals are 3.62 times higher than that of 
executive bills.   
 Finally, the beginning of a legislative period induces greater legislative activities in both 
approving and rejecting bills.  These findings are consistent with the expectation that 
fundamental changes in the institutional legislative preferences occur at the beginning of each 
Congress due to the departure of many former incumbent legislators and the arrival of new ones.   
 Figure 4.4 shows baseline survivor and hazard functions for the approval and rejection 
models retrieved from the analysis.  Those functions represent when the values of binary 
variables equal zero and those of continuous variables are held at their means.  In general, 
approval and rejection hazards follow the same pattern: the hazards of approval and rejection are 
low at the beginning but increase monotonically as time progresses.  Survivor functions also 
suggest that bills that are eventually rejected tend to stick longer in Congress than bills that are 
eventually approved. 
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Figure 4.4  Baseline Survivor and Hazard Functions for Approval and Rejection Models 
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 4.5. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Much too often scholars studying newly democratized presidential regimes have focused 
on their executives in analyzing legislative politics.  In recent years, research that does examine 
legislatures has begun to appear.  However, most of those studies tend to model bicameral 
legislatures as single-chamber congresses.  Using the Brazilian legislative data, Chapter 4 
demonstrated that bicameral divergences are consequential for the legislative capacity of a 
transitional presidential democracy.  In particular, bicameral incongruence raises the risk of 
legislative gridlock but the president having (coalitional) majorities in both houses of Congress 
speeds up legislative approval.  Modeling bicameralism explicitly in legislative research 
enhances a better understanding of the dynamics of lawmaking. 
 The next three chapters closely examine several important legislative issues that have 
been debated in post-authoritarian Brazil. While quantitative studies are informative of general 
patterns, detailed case studies allow for closer examinations of strategic interactions between the 
nation’s executive and its bicameral legislature as well as the evolution of the contents of 
legislation as a result of those interactions.   
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 Appendix 4.1: Parties in the Presidential Coalition 
 
 
Sarney 
 
Collor  
Mar 90 
Franco  
Oct 92 
Franco 
Aug 93 
Cardoso 
Jan 95 
Cardoso 
May 96 
Cardoso 
 Mar 02 
Lula  
Jan 03 
Lula  
Jun 03 
Lula  
Dec 03 
PFL PDS PFL PP PFL PPB PPB PT PT PT 
PMDB PFL PTB PFL PTB PFL PTB PC do B PC do B PC do B 
 PTB PMDB PTB PMDB PTB PMDB PL PL PL 
 PRN PSDB PMDB PSDB PMDB PSDB PPS PPS PPS 
 PSC PSB PSDB  PSDB  PSB PSB PSB 
       PV PV PV 
       PSC PSC PSC 
       PSL PSL PSL 
       PDT PDT PMDB
       PTB PTB PP 
       PMN PMN PTB 
        PMDB  
        PP  
 
  
Note: The months indicate when there was a change in the composition of the parties supporting the president.  The 
parties in bold fonts are presidents’ own parties. 
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 Appendix 4.2:  Re-estimation of Cox Competing Risks Model 
 
 
 Approval Rejection 
Bicameral Incongruence 0.02 0.04* 
Presidential Bicameral Majority 0.72*** 0.52 
Supermajority/Symmetric -0.09 -0.33 
Absolute Majority/Asymmetric 0.23 -0.47 
Congressional Election -0.18 0.79** 
Presidential Election 0.42 0.51 
Concurrent Election -0.21 -1.57 
Cong + Concurrent Election -0.40 -0.78 
Pres + Concurrent Election 0.21 -1.06*** 
Beginning of Legislature 0.32**** 0.93**** 
Congressional Proposal -0.99**** 1.29**** 
Judicial Proposal 0.66**** -- 
CD First House 0.95**** -0.54**** 
Temporary Change 1.52**** -0.40 
Inflation -0.002 -0.01 
Inflation*Economic 0.01** 0.02** 
Economic -0.07 0.07 
Administrative 0.26*** 0.19 
Rights & Codes -0.41**** 0.11 
Tribute 0.90**** -0.06 
Political-Institutional -0.14 0.10 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -9592 -2868 
N 52950 (1344) 52950 (416) 
Note: * = p ≤ 0.1, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01, **** = p ≤ 0.001.  Entries are coefficients.  Significance tests used a 
two-tailed test and robust standard errors.  There is no rejected judicial proposal.  Coefficients are estimated with 
various government dummies (not shown in the table). 
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 5. CHAPTER 5: THE REFORM THAT NEVER ENDS: PENSION REFORM IN 
BRAZIL 
 
 
 
 
 “We know that the margin of 413 allies [in the 
Chamber] is an illusion.” Deputy José Aníbal, 
Leader of the PSDB in the Chamber, commenting 
the difficulties in approving pension reform during 
the Cardoso government (1996).48
 
“The Senate should act on behalf of national 
sentiment by approving a new proposal that 
radically eliminates all the privileges maintained by 
the Chamber.” Luiz Carlos Santos, Brazilian 
Minister of Coordination of Political Affairs (1996). 
49
 
 
 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 This chapter analyzes pension reform under the Cardoso and Lula governments.  Pension 
reform has often been discussed in Brazil as a constitutional reform.  Although both presidents 
managed to approve constitutional amendment bills, the reforms that eventually came out of 
Congress were far short of what the governments originally intended.  The deficiencies in the 
Cardoso reform led Lula to undertake another pension reform in 2003.  This chapter will 
highlight the difficulties of passing controversial legislation under a qualified majority rule, 
especially in the system with weak party discipline as Deputy José Aníbal’s comment above 
                                                 
48 “Líderes ameaçam isolar parlamentares disidentes,” Estado de São Paulo, May 24, 1996, A4. 
49 Comment on the defeats in the Chamber of Deputies of the key provisions of social security reform proposed by 
the Cardoso government (quoted in Folha de São Paulo, May 25, 1996, 1-4).  The Cardoso government and Senate 
leaders sought to resurrect the essence of the reform in the Senate.   
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 indicates.  It will also demonstrate the striking impact that impatience (Alesina and Drazen 1991) 
has on the timing of a proposal’s passage.   
 I will probe in particular three hypotheses developed in Chapter 2.  Hypothesis 1 states 
that bicameral incongruence of policy preferences increases the likelihood of gridlock.  I will 
draw upon the career profiles of the members of each house and their partisan composition to 
locate the Senate and Chamber on the pension policy spectrum.  The passage of reform should be 
less difficult when both houses favor pension reform than when neither or either house objects to 
it.   
 Hypothesis 6 concerns voting quotas: the likelihood of gridlock increases with the 
number of votes required to pass legislation.  Both Cardoso’s and Lula’s pension reforms 
required constitutional revisions, and as such they needed supermajority (three-fifths) votes.  The 
degree of concessions that had to be made in order to pass the reform bills, in addition to the 
voting outcomes, will be evidence for the difficulty of passing a reform under a supermajority 
rule compared to a simple or absolute majority rule.   
 Finally, since the problem of the Brazilian pension system has been mainly considered a 
problem of public finance, the nation’s economic conditions are likely to influence the degree of 
legislators’ patience with additional delays in the passage of the reform.  The deterioration in 
economic conditions (or expectations thereof) should elevate impatience, which, per hypothesis 
2, is likely to lead to the reform’s passage.   
 This chapter is organized as follows.  First, I provide an overview of the pension system’s 
problems.  Next, I discuss pension reform under the Cardoso government, followed by an 
examination of pension reform proposed by the Lula government.  In the last section I compare 
the hypotheses against evidence.   
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5.2. PROBLEMS WITH THE PENSION SYSTEM IN BRAZIL 
 
 
 The 1988 Brazilian Constitution established a very generous public pension system.   It 
instituted special privileges for narrow segments of the population such as public servants, 
judges, teachers, and the members of Congress.50  The eligibility criteria were based on years of 
service (i.e., how many years a worker worked before retirement) rather than years of 
contribution (i.e., how many years a worker paid social security taxes before retirement).  
Retirement by years of service combined with what is known in Brazil as proportional retirement 
(aposentadoria proporcional) permitted retirement with the right to receiving pensions as early 
as at the age of 49.  The pension system also allowed the accumulation of salaries and retirement 
benefits, which in effect encouraged early retirement in one position in order to seek another post 
in public service; the worker would then work for a few years to be eligible for additional 
pension benefits.  The pension problem was especially severe in the public sector in which 
pension payments for retired public servants were equal to the last salary (often with a raise of 5-
20% upon retirement) (integralidade).  In addition, there were automatic adjustments of benefits 
whenever there were changes in the wages and benefits in their former posts (paridade).  Neither 
of these arrangements exists in any other pension system in the world (Amaro 2004, 5).51   
                                                 
50 Those privileges include (but not limited to) early retirement, retirement at the full value of the last salary, special 
pension regimes distinct from the general pension systems, and so forth. 
51 According to a specialist in the Senate, one of the major problems that the 1988 Constitution brought in to the 
Brazilian pension system was the introduction of paridade.  Before 1988, paridade did not exist and the country’s 
high inflation eroded the values of pensions, making it difficult to live on them after retirement.  This experience 
was the primary motivation for the inclusion of the automatic adjustments between pensions and remunerations of 
retired and active civil servants.  Author’s interview with Gilberto Guerzoni, Specialist in Pension System for Public 
Servants in the Senate’ Consultoria Legislativa, April 27, 2004.   
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  By the mid-1990s, these problems caused serious pressures on the financial sustainability 
of the pension regime.  From 1988 to 1994, high inflation, which eroded the real values of 
payments, made it possible for the system to keep up with the promises embraced in the 
Constitution.  However, the Real Plan launched in 1994 ended the cycle of hyperinflation in 
Brazil.  Ironically, the success of the stabilization plan made visible the distortions of the pension 
system that had been hidden under the mask of chronicle high inflation (Pinheiro 2004, 123).  As 
Figure 5.1 shows, the payments and revenues of the social security regime was more or less 
balanced until 1995.  From that time on, social security deficits spiraled.  In 2003, the Brazilian 
social security system ran a deficit of R$31.5 billion (or approximately 2 % of GDP).   
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Source:  Anuário Estatístico da Previdência Social, Ministério da Previdência Social. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Brazilian Social Security System Deficits, 1990-2003 (in R$ million) 
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 In terms of the payments of pension benefits for retired civil servants, which are paid 
from the government’s budget, such expenditures were more than 20 percent of the federal 
government’s total net revenue in 1997 and 19.6 percent in 1998 (Ministério da Previdência 
Social 2005).   In 2002, there were nearly 944,000 pensioners on the federal government’s 
payroll for whom it paid R$31.7 billion.  In the same year, the government received only R$3.2 
billion in pension contributions from 883,000 active servants (Amaro 2004, 6).  The budget 
situation was even worse for many state governments, which administer pension benefits for 
their retired employees.52  Between 1997 and 2001, 22 of the 26 states and the Federal District 
spent over 10% of their total net revenues on pension benefits.  Pension payments of ten states 
exceeded 20% of total net revenues.  The state of Rio Grande do Sul spent a record 38.6% of its 
net revenue on pension payments in 2000.  Therefore, pension reform has been of great interest 
not only to the federal government but also to state governments.  Those governments regarded 
the problem of the pension system principally as that of finance and not so much as a social 
question.  As such, they formulated reform proposals designed to increase contributions while 
decreasing payments.   
 
 
 
 
5.3. PENSION REFORM UNDER CARDOSO: COOPERATIVE SENATE, 
RECALCITRANT CHAMBER 
 
 
5.3.1. The Positions of the Chamber and Senate on Cardoso’s Proposal 
                                                 
52 Each of the federal, state, and municipal governments is responsible for providing pensions for its retired 
employees.   
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  Arguing that the existing pension system was unsustainable, the government of President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso established pension reform as one of the pillars of the constitutional 
reforms embarked in 1995.  The government’s proposed constitutional amendment submitted to 
the National Congress in March 1995 had the following objectives (see Appendix 5.1 for 
details).   
1. Unify the rules of the pension regimes for the public and private sectors;  
2. Remove from the Constitution the details of pension regimes (“deconstitutionalization”).  
Eligibility criteria and formulae for calculating pension benefits were to be regulated by 
ordinary and complementary laws, which could be approved by simple and absolute 
majority votes, respectively, and would be subject to presidential vetoes, rather than by 
constitutional amendments, which require a three-fifths majority and cannot be vetoed;   
3. Make it the exclusive competence of the executive branch to initiate laws pertaining to 
the finance of the social security system; 
4. Elevate the eligibility criteria by introducing a minimum age for retirement with pension, 
replacing years of service with years of contribution, and ending proportional retirement; 
5. Eliminate special privileges for public employees, teachers, judges, and legislators;  
6. Demand contributions to the pension system from the recipients of pension benefits and 
non-profit and religious institutions; 
7. Allow the disclosure of financial information of individuals who owe social security 
taxes; and  
8. Modify the provisions of universal and free public health service. 
 The viability of pension reform depended upon the willingness of the Congress to pass 
the executive proposal.  As stated previously, since pension reform was a constitutional reform, 
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 it required a supermajority in each house.  The legislative parties supporting President Cardoso’s 
government held more than a majority seats in both the Chamber and the Senate.  Initially, the 
government had “only” a little over 50 percent of the seats in the Chamber, but by 1996, 
primarily as a result of the migration of deputies to government-supporting parties, this figure 
increased to more than 70 percent.  In reality, not all deputies in the government coalition voted 
with the government all the time.  According to one estimate (DIAP 1998, 18), the Cardoso 
government was able to count on the consistent support of 296 deputies (or 57.7%), 12 short of 
the votes needed to approve constitutional amendments.  The votes of the remainder of the 
deputies in the coalition were subject to negotiation.  In contrast, the government had a more 
solid base of support in the Senate, retaining a consistent support of well over 70 percent of the 
senators.   
 The size of leftist parties linked to unions and civil servants were also greater in the 
Chamber than in the Senate.  The leftist parties held about 100 seats (or 20%) on average in the 
lower house during 1995-1998 and were staunch opponents of the pension reform proposed by 
the Cardoso government.  In addition, the Chamber is generally more vulnerable to pressure 
groups than the Senate because deputies face more frequent elections and many of them have 
narrow constituencies tied to specific geographic areas or special interests.  The groups that 
would be affected by the pension reform engaged in extensive lobbying in the Congress, 
especially in the Chamber, trying to convince their representatives to vote against the reform.   
 By contrast, leftist parties in the Senate, holding only slightly over 10 percent of the seats, 
did not constitute a meaningful obstacle to the government’s initiative.  Senators’ long tenure 
(eight years) also gave them relative insulation from pressure groups.  Moreover, as ex-
governors and ex-administrators, many senators were more susceptible to the idea of the need to 
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 undertake a reform of the pension system that was also causing administrative and financial 
difficulties for state governments.53   
 Figure 5.2 exhibits the ideal points of the Cardoso government, Senate, and Chamber 
inferred from the original proposal, career profiles of the senators and deputies, partisan 
compositions, and anecdotal evidence.   Given the three-fifth majority rule to consider a 
constitutional amendment, the 308th deputy and 49th senator were the pivotal voters of each 
house, and the Chamber’ and Senate’s inferred ideal points reflect the positions of these 
legislators.  The existing pension system (SQ) was very “generous” in the pension payments and 
eligibility criteria.  The government desired to tighten the eligibility criteria, demand 
contributions from groups formerly exempt from such coverage, and reduce the values of 
pension benefits.  Most senators agreed with the essence of the government’s proposal with some 
reservations.  In the Chamber, the deputies with critical votes were not the government’s 
loyalists or opponents; they were those whose votes were conditional upon the nature of the 
government’s proposal and largesse.  The unpopular nature of the pension reform (because it 
imposed immediate costs on politically active groups) led those deputies to take a position 
against most of the items on the government’s proposal, although many understood that some 
reform would be inevitable in the near future. 
 
 
 
SQ
more
generous
less
generous
GOVSenateChamber
 
 
                                                 
53 Author’s interview with Senators Eduardo Azeredo (PSDB-Minas Gerais), June 9, 2004, and César Borges (PFL-
Bahia), May 3, 2004. 
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 Figure 5.2: Positions of the Government, Senate, and Chamber on Pension Reform under 
Cardoso 
 
 
 
 Several features of the pension reform should be highlighted.  First, although the Cardoso 
government was the proposer of the reform, it was not a veto player.  In constitutional revisions, 
the federal government may submit proposals; however, it does not have a formal veto power.  In 
contrast, the Chamber and the Senate were veto players.  An enactment of a constitutional 
amendment requires the concurrence of the two legislative houses.  Second, both houses held the 
power not only to veto but also to add and change the proposal.  Third, given the unanimity rule 
between the two houses and the location of the status quo, the actual reform should occur 
between the Chamber’s and Senate’s ideal points.  On the other hand, had there only been the 
Chamber, the pension reform should have resulted in the location of its ideal point.  Fourth, 
between the ideal points of the Chamber and Senate should bicameral bargaining over the 
location of new policy occur.  And finally, navette was the rule of bicameral conflict resolution.  
In other words, the proposal had to shuttle between the two houses until both houses agreed on 
the same text.   
 
 
5.3.2. The Government Meets Resistance: The First Round in the Chamber 
 
 
 The Cardoso government sent the pension reform proposal on March 17, 1995 to the 
Chamber of Deputies.  As anticipated, the proposal encountered enormous resistance in that 
house.  Although the government used every possible resource available to them to conquer 
resistance at each step of examination in the Chamber, it nonetheless suffered defeats on many 
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 occasions.  The pension reform proposal was passed by the Chamber in the end, but without its 
core. 
 The first government defeat occurred in the Constitution, Justice, and Editing Committee 
(CCJR).  Arguing that the government proposal included diverse items that should not be treated 
in a single bill, the CCJR’s reporting officer, Deputy Roberto Magalhães (PFL-Pernambuco) 
divided it into four distinctive bills, contrary to the government’s intention to implement a 
broader reform of the social security system.  Those four bills were subsequently examined 
separately, and two of them (one dealt with the proposal power of social security bills and the 
other financial disclosures) were rejected by the CCJR.  One that foresaw changes in the heath 
care system was withdrawn by the government in November.  Only the bill concerning the 
pension reform survived the CCJR.  In order to pass the bill in the committee, however, the 
government had to concede on the social security contributions that it intended to levy from 
pension recipients and humanitarian and religious organizations.   
 The Cardoso government continued to face tremendous difficulties in the special 
committee (CESP) on pension reform installed to examine the merit of the proposal in 
September 1995.  First, the reporting officer of the CESP, Deputy Euler Ribeiro (PMDB-
Amazonas) did not accept many of the government’s arguments regarding the reform.  Ribeiro 
argued for the need to maintain public servants’ rights to retire with full salary and automatic 
adjustment of their pension benefits.  He also sought to maintain special retirements for rural 
workers, judges, and teachers of 1st through 8th grades and an early retirement for women.  In 
addition, Ribeiro refused to apply new rules to those already in service.  If the new rules could 
only be applied to those who began to work after the promulgation of the amendment, it in 
practice meant that the pension system would not be altered until at least 2030.  This led Social 
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 Security Minister Stephanes to call Euler’s proposal “totally innocuous, unnecessary, and even 
ridiculous.”54  Only after long and repeated negotiations did Ribeiro and the government reach 
an agreement in which the deputy accepted to accelerate the rules of transition to the new regime 
and remove the right to automatic adjustments of pensions for retired public servants.  Ribeiro 
also reintroduced in his substitution bill a social security contribution by pension recipients that 
had been rejected as unconstitutional by the CCJR.   
 Second, the CESP’s chairman, Jair Soares (PFL-Rio Grande do Sul) troubled the 
government as well.  Although Soares was nominated to the chairmanship by Cardoso’s vice-
president’s party, PFL, he was sympathetic to the opposition’s obstructionist strategies to delay 
the vote of the substitution bill.  The exchange of accusations regarding the conduct of the 
committee within the governistas and between the governistas and the opposition culminated in 
the resignation of Soares as committee chairman.  Assessing that the government had lost control 
of the committee, Cardoso’s prominent ally in the Chamber, Luís Eduardo Magalhães (PFL-
Bahia), using his authority as the president of the house, closed the CEPS without a final vote 
and took the material directly to a consideration in the floor in February 1996.   
 Although the crisis of the CESP led the government to reinforce its effort to mobilize 
votes in favor of its pension reform, it suffered a serious defeat in the floor vote that could have 
forced the government to abandon the proposal.  On March 6, 1996, almost a month after the 
closure of the CESP, Ribeiro’s substitution bill on the pension reform was up for floor voting.  
The final tally was 294 in favor of the bill, 190 opposed, and 8 abstained.  The government 
needed 14 more votes to approve the bill.  Ninety-six deputies in the government coalition did 
not vote with the government, with 40 dissenters from the PMDB, 29 from the PPB, 10 from the 
PFL, 9 from the PSDB, and 8 from the PTB.  Government leaders speculated about the causes of 
                                                 
54 “Para ministro, parecer de relator é’inócuo e ridículo,’” Folha de São Paulo, November 8, 1995, 1-4. 
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 the defeat, attributing them to the upcoming municipal elections in which many deputies were 
mayoral candidates, the negative repercussions of the installation of the parliamentary 
investigation commission on banks, and the possibility of the extinction of the Institute of Social 
Security for the Members of Congress.  However, the most important factor for the defeat in 
their assessment was the general discontent of the governista deputies with the government with 
respect to political appointments and the release of budgetary funds.  In retrospect, the vice-
leader of the government in the Chamber, Arnaldo Madeira, stated, “We erred in the calculation.  
We could not measure the size of dissatisfaction in the government base.”55  The Chamber’s 
President ended the session without proceeding to the next item in line for a vote, the original 
government proposal, which imposed stricter terms of eligibility and benefits and therefore was 
sure to be defeated.  
 The government and its leaders in the Chamber devoted the next few weeks to 
negotiating with dissident deputies.  The government strategies included threats of retaliation to 
dissenters, promises of funding for public works projects, personal telegrams from President 
Cardoso, and the adjustments of the text being elaborated by the new reporting officer, Michel 
Temer (PMDB-Sao Paulo) to make it more acceptable to the rebellious deputies.  In order to 
reverse the votes of dissenters in the PPB—the party that contributed 29 votes to the 
opposition—the government promised one ministerial post and gained the support of the 
pepebista mayor of Sao Paulo with the transfer of R$3.3 billion city debt to the federal 
government.  In addition, two deputies on leave reclaimed their mandates in order to increase the 
margin of favorable votes because their replacements (suplentes) intended to vote against the 
                                                 
55 “Câmara derruba parecer da Previdência.” Jornal do Brasil, March 7, 1996, 4.  
112 
 reform.56  The strategies worked and the proposal was approved by 351 to 139 with 2 
abstentions.  The number of the deputies in the coalition who voted against the proposal 
diminished substantially: 15 from the PMDB, 12 from the PPB, 8 from the PSDB, 2 from the 
PTB, and only 1 from the PFL.  Twenty-one deputies of the PMDB, 17 of the PPB, 7 of the PFL, 
3 of the PTB and 1 PSDB deputy who had voted against the bill in the earlier vote voted in favor 
this time.57   
 Despite its importance, the approval of the basic text was nonetheless only a first victory 
for the Cardoso government because controversial changes were left to be voted separately 
(known as destaque de votação em separado or DVS).  The Chamber voted numerous DVS’s 
and amendments during the next three months in which the government came across a series of 
defeats.  The text finally passed by the Chamber in late June lost most of the core of the 
executive proposal.  Although the approved text did away with the accumulation of pensions and 
retirement by years of work (replacing it with years of contribution), it maintained proportional 
retirement, special rules for a range of categories, and retirement for full salary and automatic 
pension adjustments for public servants.  No minimum age (originally intended to be at 65) was 
established (see Appendix 5.1).  With respect to years of contribution, however, the Chamber 
included in the text a provision that considered a range of years of service equivalent to years of 
contribution.  There were also no new groups from whom the government could levy additional 
social security taxes.   
 
 
                                                 
56 See “Governno ameaça os rebeldes,” Jornal do Brasil, March 7, 1996, 4; “Governo decide votar hoje reforma da 
Previdência,” Jornal do Brazil, March 21, 1996; “Operação de Guerra garante votos ao governo,” Estado de São 
Paulo, March 22, 1996, A5; and “Custo para o Tesouro sera elevado,” Estado de São Paulo, March 22, 1996, A5. 
57 “Operação de Guerra garante votos ao governo,” Estado de São Paulo, March 22, 1996, A5 
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 5.3.3. The Senate as a Savior of Pension Reform 
 
 
 The task of the Senate was to recompose the proposal in order to bring back the 
fundamental changes sought in the original government’s proposal.  The advantage of the 
government in the upper house was obvious.  In addition to the sensitivities of the senators with 
administrative and budgetary issues, the government bloc in the Senate counted 69 of the total 81 
members (or 85%), of which only four regularly voted against the government.  There were also 
no significant pressure groups in the Senate unlike as was the case in the Chamber.58  Therefore, 
the government and the Senate’s and Chamber’s governista leaders started discussing the 
possibility of resurrecting the principal points of the government proposal in the upper house as 
they observed successive defeats in the DVS’s in the Chamber.  The government assessed that 
the end of municipal elections by the time the proposal returned to the Chamber would ease 
pressures on many deputies.  Meanwhile the government would invest in changing the internal 
rules of the Chamber in order to make it more difficult to request DVS’s. 
 In a nutshell, the Cardoso government sought to reestablish the following points in the 
Senate: the end of automatic adjustments of pension benefits of retired civil servants to match 
remunerations of active servants; the end of retirement at last full salary for civil servants; the 
establishment of a minimum retirement age; and taxation of social security contribution on 
pension recipients.59  The government and the reporting officer of the Committee on 
Constitution, Justice, and Citizenship (CCJ) in the Senate, Beni Veras (PSDB-Ceará) worked 
closely in preparing a substitution bill.  Veras restored practically all the fundamental points of 
the original idea of the pension reform by establishing minimum ages, using a clear definition of 
                                                 
58 “Emenda da Previdência recomeça do zero,” Gazetta Mercantil, May 27, 1996.   
59 Author’s interview with Gilberto Guerzoni, April 27, 2004.   
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 years of contribution, ending proportional retirement, allowing taxation on pension benefits, and 
practically terminating retirement at full salary for the public servants who earned more than 
R$1200.  However, Veras did not agree to end paridade (adjustments of pensions and 
remunerations of active public servants).  Veras and other senators also refused to leave many of 
new rules to be regulated by ordinary or complementary laws as the government desired; instead, 
they put almost everything that the government asked in the Constitution.  Although senators 
cooperated with the government in the pension reform, they refused to give it a “blank check” 
(Guerzoni 2004).  
 After various adjustments, Veras’ substitution bill was approved in the CCJ by 16 to 2 in 
July 1997 and in the floor in September by 59 to 12.  Among the members of the government 
coalition, only three PMDB senators voted against the basic text.  In contrast to the negotiations 
in the Chamber, there was not much media coverage regarding releases of public funds or 
nominations on the eve of the floor vote.  Nonetheless, the government suffered three defeats on 
the floor: judges and legislators were allowed to continue to have their own pension regimes and 
an amendment to transform a provisional tax on financial transactions (collected to help finance 
the social security system) into a permanent tax was rejected.   
 
 
5.3.4. The Chamber Accepts Greater Reform 
 
 
 The Chamber received the Senate’s substitution bill in October 1997.  In the first round, 
it took seventeen months until the passage of the proposal in the Chamber, and the text approved 
was so altered that in the government’s point of view, it became ineffective.  This time, the 
Chamber approved the bill in fourteen months and the text approved retained some of the 
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 provisions that the house had rejected in the earlier round.  The comparison of the government 
forces in the Chamber during the 1995-96 and 1997-98 periods indicates no significant change: 
the Cardoso government had about 77 percent of the deputies in its coalition at least numerically.  
There was no indication that party discipline increased during the second period: the media 
reported extravagant uses of resources by the government in both cases to mobilize votes.  The 
municipal elections that led some deputies not to vote for the unpopular reform in 1996 were 
only replaced by legislative elections scheduled in October 1998.   
 However, there are two factors that had changed since the earlier round.  One was the 
alteration in the internal rules of the Chamber by which it became more difficult to force separate 
votes on the items in the proposal.  Second was the threat of an economic crisis that began in 
Asia in 1997 and spread to Russia in 1998.  During 1995 and 1996, the Brazilian economy was 
improving.  However, by 1998, Brazil was under strong economic pressure.  International 
investors speculated that Brazil was next in line for an economic crisis and Cardoso’s pension 
reform was seen as a critical test of the government’s and Congress’ ability to overcome the 
challenge.60  Fiscal adjustment, of which an effective reform of the pension system was essential, 
was the condition for the emergency loan that the International Monetary Fund provided to 
Brazil in the anticipation of speculative attacks on the nation’s currency.  The anticipation of an 
economic crisis in 1998 thus elevated the need to approve an effective reform swiftly.   
 Initially, the examination of the Senate’s substitution bill in the Chamber was as 
tumultuous, if not more, as before.   After the CCJR approved by 35 to 13 the Senate’s bill 
without modifications, a new CESP was created in January 1998 to examine the bill.  However, 
legislative elections were scheduled in October that year, and many deputies in the government 
                                                 
60 Author’s interview with Sandra Cristina F. de Almeida, specialist in the area of pension reform in the Chamber’s 
Consultoria Legislativa, May 6, 2004.   
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 coalition threatened that they would vote against the reform that might hurt them electorally.  As 
was often the case, the PMDB was one of the most divided parties with respect to the pension 
reform: of the 86 PMDB deputies, 35 declared in January that they were against the reform.  In 
the PPB, the number of dissenters was even larger: about a half of the 80 PPB deputies were 
against the reform.61   However, the CESP’s reporting officer, Deputy Arnaldo Madeira (PSDB-
Sao Paulo), produced an analysis in favor of the Senate’s bill and rejected all amendments 
submitted in the committee.  The vote in the CESP that occurred on February 5, 1998 was 
marked by disorder.  Labor unions protested against the reform in the CESP meeting while the 
oppositionists engaged in countless attempts at obstruction and squabbled about how the 
committee’s work was conducted.  The governistas managed to approve the bill after the 
oppositionists withdrew themselves in protest and protesters marched into the plenary and 
invaded the floor.   
 The governistas were afraid of the negative percussions that the protest might have on the 
deputies in the forthcoming floor vote.  In the next week, reports of releases of public funds to 
contain rebels dominated the media coverage.62  The government also agreed to the demand of 
the governistas in the Chamber to remove from the text the provision on the social security tax 
on pensioners.  With the releases of resources and concessions, the Chamber approved the basic 
text of the proposal by 346 to 151 on February 12.  In the next few months, the governistas 
                                                 
61 “Previdência assusta a base governista,” Jornal do Brasil, January 22, 1998, 4. 
62 For example, Folha de São Paulo (February 12, 1998, 1-10) reported that the Cardoso government promised to 
release R$22 million for public works projects benefiting governista deputies’ constituencies.  According to Gazeta 
Mercantile (February 12, 1998, A-14), Planning Ministor Kandir telephoned a government owned bank (Caixa 
Econômica Federal) to hasten the liberation of the funds for deputies’ budget amendments, resulting in the 
distribution of more than R$4 million in only two weeks in February.  Folha de São Paulo (February 13, 1998, 1-4) 
also reported that only in one month before the first round of the floor vote, the PFL, PSDB, PMDB, and PPB 
deputies had 50%, 58%, 43%, and 48% of their total authorized budgets for their amendments released, respectively.  
In addition, the government released additional R$350000 extraordinary funds (not on the budget) during five hours 
before the floor vote on February 11 (O Globo, February 12, 1998, 3).   
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 sought to vote on the polemic items such as minimum ages for retirements in the private sector, 
which they lost in the DVS by just one vote.   
 The beginning of the second round of voting that started in June was equally difficult for 
the government.  With legislative elections only a few months away, the government was 
defeated in an important vote for a 30% discount on pensions over R$1200 that would deal with 
the problem of retirement at full salary and was critical to improve fiscal balance.  The 
government forces suspended the remainder of votes in order to avoid further defeats.     
 The Chamber resumed voting of the pension reform proposal in November 1998 after 
nearly five months of postponement.   By that time, Brazil was facing an imminent economic 
crisis.  The country’s international reserves that amounted nearly US $75 billion in April 
dwindled to US $41 billion by November (see Figure 5.3).  Brazil’s crawling peg exchange rate 
regime was under constant attacks.  The government raised interest rates to close to 40 percent 
annually in order to protect the exchange rate arrangement and prevent capital flight, but 
international reserves continued to decline.  Thus under strong economic pressures, the Chamber 
voted on the opposition’s DVS on the creation of supplementary funds for federal, state, and 
municipal public servants who earned more than R$1200.  The creation of supplementary funds 
for public servants was an important beginning to impose a ceiling on pension benefits 
equivalent to the one in the private sector.  Government leaders argued that the approval of this 
provision was important because it served as a signal to the international financial market that 
the Brazilian Congress was capable of passing fiscal adjustment measures and that the country 
would overcome the crisis it was confronting.63  In contrast to the earlier rejection of the 
discounting of pensions, this provision was approved by an overwhelming majority of 343 in 
favor to 125 opposed with 8 abstentions.  The PSDB leader, Deputy Aécio Neves claimed that 
                                                 
63 “Governo conquista primeira vitória,” Jornal do Brasil, November 5, 1998, 3. 
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 the defeat of the DVS was facilitated because legislators interpreted the vote as the first step of 
much needed fiscal adjustment.  The remainder of the votes proceeded rather smoothly and 
quickly and Constitutional Amendment No. 20 was promulgated in December 1998, just one 
month before Brazil devalued its currency. 
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  To recapitulate achievements and failures, after the Chamber’s disfigurement of its 
pension reform proposal, the Cardoso government tried to reestablish it in the Senate where the 
government had a reliable majority.  The parts that it attempted to resurrect were paridade 
(which the Senate did not accept) and integralidade, minimum ages, and social security taxes on 
pensions.  Taxation on pensions, a 30 percent discount on pensions (partial solution for the 
problem of integralidade), and minimum retirement ages in the private sector were once again 
rejected in the Chamber.  However, minimum retirement ages for public servants and a creation 
of a supplementary fund for them (partial solution for the problem of integralidade) were 
approved upon the proposal’s return to the Chamber.  Three factors were particularly important 
to understand Cardoso’s pension reform.  First, the extent of the pension reform was possible 
because the Senate’ preference was aligned closer to the executive’s rather than the Chamber’s.  
Second, a qualified majority rule makes it particularly difficult to approve unpopular measures.  
Although more than a majority of deputies voted with the government, the government lost in 
various provisions because vote tallies fell short of three-fifth majorities required for 
constitutional reform.  Third, the imminence of an economic crisis helped a rather swift 
conclusion in 1998 of the votes and the approval of some of the provisions rejected earlier. 
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 5.4. PENSION REFORM UNDER LULA: FRIENDLY CHAMBER, TOUGH SENATE 
 
 
5.4.1. The Positions of the Chamber and Senate on Lula’s Proposal 
 
 
 Cardoso’s pension reform left many problems unresolved, and all levels of government 
continued to struggle to pay for pension benefits from their scarce resources.  In 1999, the 
Ministry of Social Security estimated that the total fiscal impact of the pension reform for the 
next twelve months would be R$7.7 billion in reducing the deficit.  However, even with the 
reform, the fiscal balance of the general social security regime for the private sector deteriorated 
(see Figure 5.1) and the government expenditures to finance pensions for retired public servants 
and their families continued to increase.  The federal government spending on pension benefits 
in 1998 was R$20.5 billion.  By 2001, it reached R$28.1 billion, an increase of nearly 40 percent 
from 1998 (See Table 5.1).  State governments’ expenditures on their retired employees similarly 
continued to rise.   
 
 
 
Table 5.1: Government Expenditures on Pension Benefits (in R$ million) 
 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Federal Government 19,514 20,466 23,060 24,468 28,104 
State Governments Total 15,788 17,714 17,935 23,793 24,644 
Note: State governments total includes Federal District.  These figures represent government expenditures on 
pension benefits for retired public servants and their families and do not include pension payments for the retirees in 
the private sector.   
Source: Anuário Estatístico da Previdência Social, Ministério da Previdência Social. 
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  In a historic reversal of the PT’s staunch and constant opposition to Cardoso’s pension 
reform, new President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva proposed in 2003 another reform that was 
practically equivalent to that of its predecessor.  Since most of the outstanding problems were 
found in the pension regime for public sector employees, Lula’s reform plan focused on that 
sector.64  Overall, the Lula government sought the following changes in the system (see 
Appendix 5.2 for details).   
1. The end of retirement at full last salary (integralidade) and adjustments of pension 
benefits of the retired servants to changes in the remunerations of active servants 
(paridade); 
2. Establishment of a ceiling on pension benefits for retired public servants; 
3. Taxation on pension benefits to contribute to the social security system; and 
4. Creation of supplementary pension funds for public servants.65   
All of these items had also been proposed by the Cardoso government in 1995 and opposed by 
Lula’s party, PT.  
 The approval in the Chamber of the pension reform was expected to be facilitated by the 
fact that former staunch opponents of such reform, including the PT, were now in the 
government pursuing the reform.  Moreover, the 2002 elections made the PT the largest party in 
the Chamber in the 52nd Congress surpassing the PMDB and PFL.  Although not all members of 
the party concurred with the Lula government’s pursuit of the pension reform, with threats of 
punishment for undisciplined behavior, most were expected to follow the government’s and 
                                                 
64 Most of the remaining issues with the pension system for the private sector were dealt with by ordinary and 
complementary laws during Cardoso’s second term.   
65 Supplementary funds approved in the constitutional amendment during the Cardoso government did not exist as 
of 2003 due to lack of regulations by statutory regime. 
122 
 party leadership’s orientation to support the reform.  It would also be difficult to oppose a 
program of the government led by the leaders of their own party.   
 Lula’s team in the Planalto (presidential palace) also sought, successfully, to incorporate 
the PMDB and PP (formerly PPB) in the government’s legislative base to aid in “governability,” 
although oppositionist factions persisted in those two parties, especially in the PMDB.  
Therefore, even though the Lula government started as a minority government, by the end of the 
second quarter, it was supported by parties that in total controlled over 70 percent of the 
Chamber’s seats.  Also differently from the experience of the Cardoso government, the 
opposition parties, primarily the PFL and PSDB that promoted a pension reform previously, did 
not intend to launch fierce opposition to Lula’s pension reform.  In fact, most PSDB members 
and many PFL members supported the reform in order to maintain consistency.   
 In contrast to the Chamber, opposition forces were stronger in the Senate and, even after 
the incorporation of the PMDB in the coalition, the Lula government did not have a comfortable 
qualified majority in the upper house.  However, except for the reasons of partisan politics, there 
is no evidence to suggest that average senators’ positions to the pension reform had changed 
since the Cardoso era.  Hence the Senate should be generally in favor of the pension reform.  
Figure 5.4 is a graphical representation of the positions of the government, Chamber, and Senate.  
I place the Senate slightly to the left of the Chamber in order to take into account possible 
partisan effects.  The important point to notice is that the preferences of all three actors tend to 
converge, particularly relative to their positions during the Cardoso government.   
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Figure 5.4: Positions of the Government, Senate, and Chamber on Pension Reform under 
Lula 
 
 
 
 Finally, Lula’s pension reform proposal was discussed in a context of economic urgency.  
Weary about the Lula government and the PT reputation of being radical opponents of neoliberal 
economic policy and their ability to govern the country, business communities both inside and 
outside Brazil closely watched the fate of the pension reform as a test of the credibility of the 
new government to undertake changes necessary to put the country back on the growth path.  
Two thousand three began with the continual depreciation of the Brazilian currency and high 
interest rates set at over 25 percent annually.  My interviews with congressional leaders, both in 
government and in the opposition, and their staff confirmed that such concern was present 
throughout the congressional debates.66  The goal of the Lula government was to approve the 
constitutional amendment as soon as possible, by the end of 2003 at the latest, in order to signal 
positive news to the international market.  Therefore, the examination of the pension reform 
proposal occurred under high impatience, which should lead to a swift passage of the bill. 
 
 
                                                 
66 Author’s interviews with Deputy Sigmaringa Seixas, then Vice Leader of Government on December 18, 2003, 
Deputy Jutay Junior, then Leader of the PSDB on January 29, 2004, and Meiriane Nunes Isidorio, specialist in the 
pension system for the private sector, and Gilberto Guerzoni, specialist in the pension system for public servants, 
both in the Senate’ Consultoria Legislativa, April 26 and 27, 2004, respectively.   
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 5.4.2. Examination in the Chamber 
 
 
 On April 30, 2003, President Lula, accompanied by 27 governors, 10 mayors of state 
capitals, and 22 ministers, personally handed in to the Brazilian Congress two proposals for 
constitutional amendments.  One was tax reform, and the other, pension reform.  Determined to 
achieve a speedy approval of those bills in the legislature, Lula’s Chief of Staff, Minister José 
Dirceu, demanded absolute support of PT members and other parties in the governing coalition 
while seeking to expand the government’s support in Congress.  The largest resistance to the 
reform was likely to come from within the traditional left in government for whom unions and 
public servants had been important constituencies.  Therefore, the government strategies 
centered on imposing discipline in voting with threats of punishment (including expulsion) and 
simultaneously seeking opposition parties’ support for the reform.  In addition, the government 
used the power of the purse and appointments to increase margins of votes.   
 The Chamber’s CCJR approved the government proposal practically unaltered on June 5 
by an overwhelming majority of 44 in favor versus 13 opposed.  Before the votes, the governista 
leaders discharged eleven members of the committee who were against all or parts of the reform 
and replaced them with government loyalists in order to ensure its victory.67   The governistas 
also rejected five DVS’s that sought changes in the text. 
 The examination in the special committee (CESP) occurred under intense pressure by 
civil servants and judges protesting against the pension reform inside and outside the Congress 
and Planalto.  The traditional left of the PT and PC do B intensified their criticisms against the 
government proposal while the PTB, PMDB, and PP demanded ministerial posts and other 
                                                 
67 For example, “under the largest pressure” from his party, Deputy Roberto Magalhães, who had once presided the 
CCJ and was against taxation on pension benefits, was discharged from the committee by the PTB leader 
(Magalhães 2004). 
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 nominations that had been promised to them.  Initially, the Lula government refused any 
negotiations to alter the fundamental points of the proposal.  However, strong resistance by many 
deputies in the coalition and the judges of the Supreme Federal Court (STF) made the 
government concede on the issues of integralidade (maintained only for current public servants 
who meet certain requirements) and pensions for the families of deceased servants (no discount 
up to R$1058).  The governista deputies, however, insisted on maintaining paridade for current 
servants, and despite the government’s opposition, Deputy José Pimentel (PT-Ceará), reporting 
officer of the CESP, included in his substitution bill adjustments of pensions to the 
remunerations of active servants to be determined by law.  With those modifications in the 
proposal, the parties in the government coalition, with the exception of the PDT, imposed 
discipline in the vote and discharged likely dissenters to ensure its approval.68  The CESP 
approved the Pimentel report by symbolic voting on July 23 amidst uproar by public servants.  
Of the twelve parties represented in the committee, only three (PFL, PDT, and Prona) voted 
against it.   
 The vote on the floor was scheduled for August 5.  The calculation of the votes by 
governista leaders indicated that the government did not have sufficient votes to approve the text 
without alteration.  The members of the PT, PSB, PC do B, PMDB, and PL reported to the 
leaders that it would be difficult to vote with the government.69  The lack of sufficient votes 
forced the Lula government to concede further in the questions of the “sub-ceiling” (subteto) on 
the salaries of state judges (increased from 75% of the remunerations of the STF ministers to 
85.5%), pensions for the families of deceased servants (no discount up to R$2400), and taxation 
on pension benefits (exempt up to R$1200).  The government also sought governors, especially 
                                                 
68 “Governo reage à greve de juizes e acelera a reforma,” O Globo, July 23, 2003.   
69 “Mudança de última hora,” Correio Brasiliense, August 6, 2003. 
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 of the opposition PSDB and PFL, to convince deputies from their states to vote in favor of the 
reform.  Furthermore, it reaffirmed its intention to offer ministerial posts to the PMDB after the 
passage of the proposal.  There were also distributions or promises of the distributions of public 
funds to reward legislators who voted in favor of the proposal.70
 In the end, the basic text of the proposal was approved by 358 to 126, 50 votes more than 
the minimum 308 to pass a constitutional amendment.  However, the final tally also showed that 
this victory was precarious.  In total, 63 deputies in the coalition defected in the vote, including 
three petistas who voted against it and other eight who abstained.  This would have left the 
government with only 296 votes, falling short by 12 votes to pass the proposal.  The votes from 
the opposition were crucial for the approval of the text.  The PSDB, whose leadership 
recommended a favorable vote, contributed 29 votes to its approval, and the PFL, whose 
leadership recommended a contrary vote but allowed its deputies to vote as they wished, gave 33 
votes.71
 Although the government managed to approve the basic text of the proposal in the 
Chamber, it still needed to bring together at least 308 votes necessary to maintain controversial 
provisions of the reform in each DVS.  Violent demonstrations by public servants following the 
passage of the basic text, which mobilized 50,000 people and caused destructions of the 
Chamber’s property, made it even more difficult to approve the polemical items.  An agreement 
was reached in emergency meetings of Chamber leaders and the government in which the 
                                                 
70 The media reported that R$1.3 billion of investment allocated for year 2002’s “restos a pagar”(to be paid) was 
dispersed by November 7, 2003.  Most of the dispersions were concentrated in the months of July, August, and 
September during which the Chamber voted pension and tax reforms.  It also reported that the majorities of the 
deputies who received funds for their budget amendments voted in favor of the pension reform.  PSDB and PFL 
deputies who helped to approve the pension reform also received twice as much resources from the Lula government 
as those who voted against it.   See Correio Brasiliense, “Clientelismo à moda petista,” December 2, 2003, and 
“Verbas para agradar a oposição,” January 20, 2004.   
71 Author’s interview with Deputy Jutay Junior, then Leader of the PSDB, January 29, 2004, and Deputy José Carlos 
Aleluia, then Leader of the PFL, December 4, 2003.       
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 government conceded once again to increase the sub-ceiling of the salaries of state judges and 
the exemption from social security taxation of pension benefits.  Minister Dirceu also requested 
assistance of pro-government PFL Senators Antonio Carlos Magalhães and Roseana Sarney 
(daughter of José Sarney, ex-President of the Republic and then President of the Senate) to 
change the votes of pefelista deputies against the party’s orientation to vote against the 
controversial provisions, especially the taxation on the pensions of retired servants.  With the 
support of the segments of the opposition, the government managed to defeat all the DVS’s.  The 
most polemical question, the taxation on the retired servants, was approved, however, with only 
326 votes in favor, just 18 votes more than required.  The Chamber approved the proposal in the 
second round on August 27.  Although the proposal suffered certain modifications, it took only 
four months to pass the lower house.   
 
 
5.4.3. Examination in the Senate: Emergence of “PEC Paralela” as a Solution to 
Stalemate 
 
 
 The government’s euphoria with the passage of the proposal in the Chamber ended 
shortly.  The Senate received the proposal from the Chamber on August 28, and the 
oppositionists and certain members of the parties in the government coalition in the house soon 
began to express their dispositions to alter the text.72  Opposition forces were stronger in the 
Senate than in the Chamber, and the Lula government did not have sufficient votes to approve 
the proposal.  The opposition had 33 of the 81 senators, a number enough to block the approval 
                                                 
72 For example, the PFL leader, Senato José Agripino, declared: “This was a temporary submission of a proposal 
that will return to the Chamber.  The text will certainly be amended here in the Senate.”  The PSDB leadership in the 
Senate also took a more oppositionist stance than its counterpart in the Chamber.  Newly elected Petista Senator 
Paulo Paim, with a background in union movements, also stated: “If the Senate does not discuss such an important 
issue, it loses its reason for existence.  The text, as it is now, will not pass.”  See “A rebelião dos senadores,” 
Correio Brasiliense, August 29, 2003.   
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 of a constitutional amendment proposal, which requires at least 49 votes.  The Lula 
government’s coalition had only 48 senators, and at least four PT senators were opposed to the 
reform as it came from the Chamber.  Therefore, the Lula government needed the votes of the 
opposition parties and the PMDB to pass the reform in the Senate, even more so than in the 
Chamber.  Moreover, the government needed to avoid new alterations in the text of the proposal 
in the Senate, which would cause a significant delay in the promulgation of the amendment due 
to a return of the proposal to the lower house for yet another examination.  This was the 
fundamental problem of the government in the Senate.  
 The deliberation of the proposal generated heated discussions both in the CCJ and the 
floor of the Senate.  The principal points of contestation were taxation on pensioners, rules of 
transition, adjustment of pension benefits (paridade), salary ceilings, the compulsory retirement 
age for public servants, and the return to a state-managed insurance for work-related accidents 
(which had been privatized during the Cardoso government and thus was opposed by PFL and 
PSDB senators).  One study based on a survey of 69 of 81 senators indicated that only 16 percent 
of the senators were in favor of the taxation on pensioners as it was in the text; 55 percent of the 
senators saw the need to expand categories of exemption to include retired servants with 
advanced age.73  Seventy-one percent of the senators disagreed with the sub-ceilings of salaries 
for each branch of state government.  Nonetheless, the reporting officer of the CCJ, Senator Tião 
Viana (PT-Acre), rejected in his report all of the more than 300 amendments submitted to the 
committee, generating strong reaction by both oppositionist and governista senators alike.  The 
approval of the bill without any adjustments was highly unlikely in front of such a great majority 
of senators disagreeing with the terms of the pension reform.   
                                                 
73 The survey was conducted between September 29 and October 6, 2003 by the Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos 
Políticos and reported in “Maioria do Senado rejeita contribuição de inativos, diz pesquisa,” Folha de São Paulo, 
online version, October 8, 2003.   
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  The solution proposed by Viana to resolve the impasse was what came to be known as a 
“parallel amendment” (PEC paralela).  Viana proposed to create a new constitutional 
amendment in which the senators would change the terms of the pension reform now in 
discussion while maintaining the existing proposal unaltered.  Put simply, the parallel 
amendment was a proposal to modify the constitutional amendment that still did not exist.  For 
the parallel amendment to be effective, however, the Senate must approve the Chamber’s 
substitution bill as it was and depend upon the “good will” of the government and the Chamber 
to pass the parallel amendment.  The opposition parties, suspicious about the government’s 
commitment, initially rejected the proposal and challenged its legality.  However, it was well 
received by governista senators who insisted on moderating the terms of the pension reform but 
desired not to break with the government.  The CCJ approved the Viana report on October 7.  
 Despite the victory in the CCJ, the government still did not have enough votes to approve 
the proposal in the floor.  The simulation of votes brought by Senator Roseana Sarney (PFL-
Maranhão) on November 11 indicated that in the best of scenarios, the government had only 49 
votes, including those of the opposition, in favor of the proposal.74  The government could not 
put the material on vote with such a tight margin since any “accident” could defeat the pension 
reform.  The governistas in the Senate had to postpone the proposal’s vote.   
 The strategies of the governistas to increase favorable votes included an appeal to state 
governors, especially of the opposition parties, to influence the votes of the senators of their 
states and parties.  The three senators of Bahia, all of the PFL, were considered secure votes in 
favor of the reform because the state was already levying social security taxes from retired 
servants and the Bahia governor was one of those who lobbied tirelessly for the taxation in the 
proposal.  Moreover, the leader of the PFL Bahia was Senator Antonio Carlos Magalhães, then 
                                                 
74 “Previdência corre risco no Senado,” Correio Brasiliense, November 12, 2003.   
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 Lula’s major ally in the legislature.  The President of the Senate, José Sarney, also promised two 
PFL votes from Maranhão.75   The greatest uncertainties were found in the PSDB and PMDB.  
After the divulgation of Roseana Sarney’s vote count, the eight PSDB governors immediately 
had a meeting with PSDB senators in which they decided to support the pension reform by 
allowing the party’s senators to vote however they saw the most appropriate.76  The opposition 
PDT, which had five senators, imposed discipline and instructed members to vote against the 
proposal.  In order to change the votes of the PMDB senators, the government directly negotiated 
with the PMDB governor of Rio Grande do Sul, who had insisted on eliminating salary sub-
ceilings in states and promised the party’s leader in the Senate that the government would 
accelerate ministerial reform in which two posts would be given to the party.  Finally, in order to 
contain dissidents within the PT, President Lula personally telephoned Senator Paulo Paim on 
the eve of the vote to assure him that the parallel amendment would be approved swiftly in the 
Chamber.77   
 Roseana Sarney reported to the Senate’s president a new mapping of votes on November 
24.  The time appeared opportune for floor votes: it indicated that the proposal would be 
approved with between 53 and 55 votes.78  The Senate voted the proposal on November 26.  The 
final tally was 55 votes in favor to 25 opposed.  The parties in the government coalition gave 42 
favorable votes; the PSDB and PFL together provided 13.  In separate votes on the polemical 
                                                 
75 Those are Rosenana Sarney’s  and Edison Lobão’s.   
76 The PSDB’s leader, Senator Artur Virgílio, recommended a contrary vote in the floor not because of the party’s 
opposition to the reform (the PSDB in fact supported the reform) but as a protest to “the government’s disrespect to 
the opposition.”  The senator specifically cited the episode in which over 400 amendments proposed both in the CCJ 
and the floor to improve the reform were rejected by the government (Author’s interview, April 22, 2004).  
However, the PSDB chose to liberate the votes of the members in order for the proposal to pass the Senate.  
Therefore, Senator Eduardo Azeredo, who understood the necessity of the reform as a former governor of Minas 
Gerais (1995-98), for example, was able to vote for the reform despite the fact that he was the PSDB’s vice-
president (Author’s interview, June 9, 2004).   
77 Author’s interview, April 29, 2004.   
78 “A vez da Previdência no Senado,” Correio Brasiliense, November 25, 2003. 
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 provisions, the Senate rejected the return of a state-managed insurance for work-related accidents 
but approved all other items promised to be modified by the parallel amendment.  The Senate 
approved the proposal in the second round of voting on December 11, followed by the approval 
of the parallel amendment proposal four days later.  Lula’s pension reform was promulgated on 
December 19, 2003, after 233 days of deliberation in Congress.   
 
 
 
 
5.5. CONCLUSION: RETURNING TO HYPOTHESES IN LIGHT OF EVIDENCE 
 
 
 For the Cardoso government, it took nearly four years to pass a pension reform proposal 
in the Brazilian Congress and the reform that emerged out of the Congress effected much less 
changes than what the government proposed originally.  In contrast, Congress approved the Lula 
government’s pension reform proposal in less than a year.  In addition, the fundamental items of 
Lula’s reform proposal suffered only minor adjustments.  In this concluding section, I will revisit 
the hypotheses in light of evidence, which will explain the differences between Cardoso’s and 
Lula’s pension reforms.   
 
 
 
Table 5.2: Summary of Hypotheses and Evidence 
 
 
 Preference 
(H1) 
Impatience 
(H2) 
No of votes 
required 
(H6) 
Predicted 
outcome 
Predicted 
time in 
congress 
Actual 
outcome 
Actual 
time in 
congress 
Cardoso’s 
Reform 
Divergent Low?High 3/5 Minimum 
reform 
Long Medium 
reform 
1369 days 
Lula’s 
Reform 
Convergent High 3/5 Full reform Short Full 
reform 
233 days 
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 Three hypotheses were particularly relevant in Chapter 5.  Table 5.2 summarizes the 
hypotheses and findings.  The preference hypothesis (H1) states that bicameral divergences of 
preferences increase the likelihood of gridlock.  The preferences of the Senate and the Chamber 
with respect to the pension reform during the Cardoso’s term were divergent.  Although 
anecdotal evidence shows that most members of both houses considered some reform was 
necessary, they disagreed on the extent of the reform.  Deputies desired a very small, less painful 
(thus less effective) reform whereas senators supported a more radical reform in line with the 
government’s proposal.  By contrast, the Senate’s and Chamber’s preferences were relatively 
convergent with respect to Lula’s pension reform due mainly to the historic reversal of the 
positions of the parties of the left.  Therefore, the bicameral preferences during the two periods 
suggest that there was a greater chance of gridlock for Cardoso’s reform than for Lula’s reform.   
 Evidence provides support for the preference hypothesis.  The Chamber and the Senate 
approved Lula’s proposal virtually intact, involving only minor adjustments in the terms of key 
provisions.  This compares with the struggle of the Cardoso government in passing the proposal 
in the Chamber.  Cardoso’s reform was not only defeated in some of the principal items of the 
reform; the entire reform proposal was once rejected on the floor of the Chamber whose 
members’ preferences were far from those of the senators (and thus that of the president).  Only 
political maneuvering of the legislative process saved Cardoso’s proposal in the lower house.   
 It is important to note, however, that the divergent preferences of the lower and upper 
houses—distant from each other but both located to the right (the less generous side) of the status 
quo—allowed for a greater extent of reform than what would have been possible if the president 
had faced only the lower house during the Cardoso government.  Since the president had no veto 
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 power, had there been only the Chamber of Deputies, its most preferred position (closer to the 
status quo) would have prevailed.  In fact, the proposal approved by the Chamber in the first 
round of deliberation was so shattered that government leaders thought it became innocuous.  
The return of some of the fundamental provisions was possible only because the Senate, with its 
preference close to the government’s, reinstated them in the proposal sent back to the Chamber, 
which examined under pressure of an impending economic crisis and accepted most of them that 
time.   
 The bargaining hypothesis (H2) maintains that impatience reduces delays in legislation.  
The pension reforms in Brazil were considered primarily a question of public finance.  Thus, 
economic contexts in which the issue was debated affected the levels of impatience of legislative 
actors.  Cardoso’s pension reform began in the environment of economic improvement, and as 
such, it entailed prolonged negotiations.  The reform was enacted only when those actors 
perceived that an economic crisis was imminent.  On the other hand, adverse economic situations 
marked Lula’s inauguration in 2003.  Legislative actors understood that the approval of the 
pension reform was a necessary step to restore Brazil’s credibility in the eyes of international and 
domestic investors.  Hence, Lula’s pension reform was examined in a context of high 
impatience.  A comparison of the time until the passage of the proposals by the Cardoso and Lula 
governments is really striking: while it took 1369 days for Cardoso’s proposal to pass the 
Brazilian Congress, Lula’s reform was promulgated in only 233 days from its submission to the 
legislature.  This provides strong support for the bargaining hypothesis. 
 Finally, the voting quota hypothesis (H6) predicts a greater probability for gridlock as the 
number of votes required to pass legislation increases.  Both Cardoso’s and Lula’s pension 
reforms were constitutional amendment proposals, and thus they required three-fifth majorities in 
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 both houses of the legislature.  Anecdotal evidence shows that the governments did not have to 
give as many concessions as they actually did had the proposals been examined under simple or 
absolute majority rules.  Both Cardoso and Lula (especially the former) were forced to bargain 
with legislators by attenuating the proposed changes, funding deputies’ pork projects, and 
promising nominations in order to increase the margins of votes to secure comfortable three-fifth 
majorities.  Moreover, the Cardoso government had more than an absolute majority votes even in 
the cases where it was defeated.  These findings are consistent with the voting quota hypothesis.   
 Chapter 5 thus provides strong evidence to support the preference, impatience, and voting 
quota hypotheses.  The two case studies demonstrated the difficulties of passing unpopular 
legislation under divergent bicameral preferences, low impatience, and supermajority rule.  The 
next chapter probes a case in which proposed legislation was desired by almost all legislators but 
its passage involved significant delays in Congress.   
 Although Lula had a greater success than Cardoso in maintaining pension reform’s key 
provisions, many legislators and government officials agree that the issue would have to come 
back to the legislative agenda in the next few years.79  The Lula government repeatedly stated 
that the reform was not perfect but one that was politically possible.  Moreover, in the process of 
negotiating with Congress, the government had to concede on various modifications to make the 
proposal more amenable.  As a result, although the 2003 reform is expected to reduce deficits in 
pension payments, it will continue to draw upon significant portions of government budgets.  
Figure 5.5 exhibits the estimated need for the financing of pensions for retired civil servants 
(executive and judiciary) over time with and without the 2003 reform (Ministério da Previdência 
Social 2004).  The figure shows that the reform reduced the estimated costs of financing 
                                                 
79 Author’s interview with Deputy Delfim Netto (PP-Sao Paulo), March 3, 2004 and Senator Eduardo Azeredo 
(PSDB-Minas Gerais), Jue 9, 2004. 
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 compared to the estimated costs of financing without it.  The estimated savings over 20 years 
between 2004 and 2023 amount to R$49 billions.  However, the data also demonstrate that the 
estimated deficits will remain very high exceeding R$12 billion every year in the next 20 years.  
Indeed, pension reform appears to be a reform that never ends, a difficult issue that future 
presidents also must face.   
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Source: Ministério da Previdência Social (2004, 65). 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Estimated Deficits in the Pension Benefits for Retired Civil Servants with and 
without the 2003 Reform, 2004-2023 
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 Appendix 5.1: Comparative Table of Pension Reform under Cardoso 
 
 
Social Security 
System in Force 
(1995) 
Gov Proposal 
(March 1995) 
Chamber 
(July 1996) 
Senate 
(October 1997) 
Chamber (Const’l 
Amendment No. 20) 
(December 1998) 
Eligibility     
Years of service at 
35 (m), 30 (f) 
Years of 
contribution  
Years of 
contribution but a 
range of time of 
service is 
considered time of 
contribution 
Years of contribution Years of contribution 
Proportional 
retirement at 30 (m), 
25 (f) based on 
years of service 
No proportional 
retirement allowed 
Proportional 
retirement at 30 
(m), 25 (f) based on 
years of 
contribution 
No proportional 
retirement allowed 
No proportional 
retirement allowed 
Special rules of 
retirement for rural 
workers, judges, 
teachers, and 
legislators 
Removal of 
special rules for 
rural workers, 
judges, teachers, 
and legislators 
Special rules of 
retirement for rural 
workers, judges, 
teachers, and 
legislators 
maintained 
No special rules for 
university professors.  
Special rules 
maintained for rural 
workers, judges, 
teachers, and 
legislators 
No special rules for 
university professors, 
judges, and legislators.  
Special rules 
maintained for rural 
workers and teachers 
Practically no 
minimum age for 
retirement due to 
eligibility resulting 
from proportional 
retirement and years 
of service 
Universal 
minimum age for 
retirement to be 
set at 65 
No minimum age 
established 
Minimum age is 60 
(m) and 55 (f) 
Minimum age is 60 
(m) and 55 (f) for 
public servants. No 
minimum age for the 
private sector 
Social security 
contribution 
    
No SS tax for 
pension recipients 
Demand SS tax 
from pension 
recipients 
No SS tax for 
pension recipients 
Demand SS tax from 
pension recipients 
No SS tax for pension 
recipients 
No SS tax for non-
profit and religious 
institutions 
Demand SS tax 
from non-profit 
and religious 
institutions 
No SS tax for non-
profit and religious 
institutions 
No SS tax for non-
profit and religious 
institutions 
No SS tax for non-
profit and religious 
institutions 
Benefits     
Accumulation of 
pensions or pensions 
with salaries for 
public office 
permitted 
Accumulation of 
pensions or 
pensions with 
salaries for public 
office not 
permitted 
Accumulation of 
pensions or 
pensions with 
salaries for public 
office not permitted 
Accumulation of 
pensions or pensions 
with salaries for 
public office not 
permitted 
Accumulation of 
pensions or pensions 
with salaries for public 
office not permitted 
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 Appendix 5.1 (continued). 
 
 
Benefits for retired 
public employees 
equal their last 
remunerations (often 
with retirement 
bonus) 
(integralidade) 
No integralidade 
or retirement 
bonus. Creation of 
a supplementary 
fund for public 
employees 
Integralidade or 
retirement bonus 
maintained 
Integralidade 
maintained up to 
R$1200, beyond 
which a 30% 
discount is applied. 
Creation of a 
supplementary fund 
for public employees 
Creation of a 
supplementary fund 
for public employees 
Automatic 
adjustments between 
pension benefits of 
retired public 
employees and 
remunerations of 
active public 
employees 
(paridade) 
No paridade Paridade 
maintained 
Paridade maintained Paridade maintained 
Other     
Legislation 
pertaining to 
pension system may 
be proposed by the 
government or 
legislators 
Proposal of 
legislation 
pertaining to 
pension system is 
exclusive 
competence of the 
government 
Status quo 
maintained 
Status quo 
maintained 
Status quo maintained 
Disclosure of 
financial 
information of 
individuals owing 
social security taxes 
not allowed 
Disclosure of 
financial 
information 
permitted 
Status quo 
maintained 
Status quo 
maintained 
Status quo maintained 
Universal and free 
public health service 
Universal and free 
public health 
service will be 
changed (to be 
determined by 
ordinary law) 
Status quo 
maintained 
Status quo 
maintained 
Status quo maintained 
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 Appendix 5.2: Comparative Table of Pension Reform under Lula 
 
 
Government Proposal 
(April 2003) 
Chamber 
(August 2003) 
Senate (Constitutional 
Amendment No. 41) 
(December 2003) 
Calculation of benefits (end of 
integralidade) 
• Current public servants: average 
of contributions over entire 
service 
• Future public servants: average 
of contributions up to the 
R$2400 ceiling 
Calculation of benefits  
• Current public servants: 
integralidade maintained for 
servants who complete certain 
requirements; otherwise, average 
of contributions over entire 
service 
• Future public servants: average of 
contributions up to the R$2400 
ceiling 
Calculation of benefits  
• Current public servants: 
integralidade maintained for 
servants who complete certain 
requirements; otherwise, average 
of contributions over entire 
service 
• Future public servants: average 
of contributions up to the R$2400 
ceiling 
Adjustment of benefits (end of 
paridade): adjusted to inflation 
Adjustment of benefits: servants 
who are qualified for integralidade 
will have partial paridade, 
determined by law; otherwise 
adjusted to inflation  
Adjustment of benefits: servants 
who are qualified for integralidade 
will have partial paridade, 
determined by law; otherwise 
adjusted to inflation 
Benefits for the families of 
deceased servants: discounted at 
least by 30% 
Benefits for the families of 
deceased servants: discounted by 
30% if it exceeds R$2400 
Benefits for the families of 
deceased servants: discounted by 
30% if it exceeds R$2400 
Benefit ceiling for private sector: 
R$2400 
Benefit ceiling for private sector: 
R$2400 
Benefit ceiling for private sector: 
R$2400 
Benefits for early retirement by 
transitional rule discounted by 5% 
for each year 
Benefits for early retirement by 
transitional rule discounted by 3.5% 
(if retire by 2005) and 5% for each 
year 
Benefits for early retirement by 
transitional rule discounted by 3.5% 
(if retire by 2005) and 5% for each 
year 
Salary ceiling for public servants: 
remunerations of the ministers of 
Federal Supreme Court (union), 
governors (states), and mayors 
(municipalities) 
Salary ceiling: remunerations of 
STF ministers (union) and mayors 
(municipalities). Three sub-ceilings 
exist for states: judiciary (90.25% 
of STF ministers), executive 
(governor’s salary), and legislature 
(deputies’ salaries) 
Salary ceiling: remunerations of 
STF ministers (union) and mayors 
(municipalities). Three sub-ceilings 
exist for states: judiciary (90.25% 
of STF ministers), executive 
(governor’s salary),and legislature 
(deputies’ salaries) 
Incentive to stay in service after 
fulfilling requirements for 
retirement: 11% increase in salary 
Incentive to stay in service after 
fulfilling requirements for 
retirement: 11% increase in salary 
Incentive to stay in service after 
fulfilling requirements for 
retirement: 11% increase in salary 
Social security contribution by 
retired servants: 11% over R$1058 
for currently retired and 11% over 
R$2400 for future retirees 
Social security contribution by 
retired servants: 11% over R$1440 
for currently retired and 11% over 
R$2400 for future retirees 
Social security contribution by 
retired servants: 11% over R$1440 
for currently retired and 11% over 
R$2400 for future retirees 
No states or municipalities are 
allowed to levy social security 
taxes at a rate less than that of 
Union 
No states or municipalities are 
allowed to levy social security taxes 
at a rate less than that of Union 
No states or municipalities are 
allowed to levy social security taxes 
at a rate less than that of Union 
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 Appendix 5.2 (continued). 
 
 
Minimum age: 60 (m) and 55 (f) Minimum age: 60 (m) and 55 (f). 
Current civil servants may use 
transitional rules for early 
retirement 
Minimum age: 60 (m) and 55 (f). 
Current civil servants may use 
transitional rules for early 
retirement 
Creation of supplementary 
pension funds for future retirees 
Creation of supplementary pension 
funds for future retirees 
Creation of supplementary pension 
funds for future retirees 
State-managed insurance for 
work-related accident 
State-managed insurance for work-
related accident 
Maintained privatization 
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 6. CHAPTER 6: CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME: THE CONGRESS 
CONFRONTS THE PRESIDENT 
 
 
 
 
 “[A]t that moment [in 2001], it was necessary to 
approve the proposal that…was being examined by 
the Federal Senate for the third time after six years 
of deliberation [in Congress]….We can affirm that 
[the adoption of the text of the Chamber of 
Deputies]…was a correct decision made given the 
circumstance that the approval of the constitutional 
amendment regarding presidential decree authority 
could not be postponed.”  Senator José Jorge 
(2003).80
 
 
 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 This chapter examines the attempt by the Brazilian Congress to restrict presidential 
decree authority.  Brazil’s 1988 Constitution grants the president the power to issue a decree with 
the force of law called provisional measure (medida provisória or MP).  Successive Brazilian 
presidents have amply exercised this powerful prerogative as a means to force immediate policy 
change.  The rampant usage of the decree power by the presidents elevated tensions in executive-
legislative relations, and most members of Congress agreed that this presidential authority must 
be restricted and regulated.  However, only in 2001—after thirteen years of coexistence with 
MPs—did Congress pass a measure to limit presidential decree authority.  Why did it take so 
                                                 
80 A quote from Proposta de Emenda à Constituição (Proposal for Constitutional Amendment) No. 27 of 2003 
submitted by Senator José Jorge and others regarding presidential decree authority.   
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 long for the Brazilian Congress to approve the bill that was supported by almost all members of 
Congress?    
 The recent literature on executive decree authority has spurred discussions about whether 
decrees represent delegation of authority to the executive by the legislature or usurpation by the 
executive of such a prerogative from the legislature (see, for example, a collected volume by 
Carey and Shugart 1998).  The widespread use of executive decrees by Brazilian presidents has 
stimulated research in this area as well.  For example, Reich (2002) argues that executive decree 
in Brazil is a rational delegation of authority by the legislators who allow the president to use 
decrees in a broad rage of policy areas and then oversee the president’s use of decrees by 
amending them, case by case.  Pereira, Power, and Rennó (2005) caution such a generalization 
and instead maintain that presidents’ reliance on decrees depends upon broader political contexts 
in which they operate.   
 This chapter contributes to the literature on executive decree authority by showing that 
the lack of a congressional action to limit presidential decree power is not always evidence for 
legislators’ implicit or explicit approval of the unrestrained use of this presidential power.  In 
Brazil, the delay in the congressional action to curtail such power reflected problems with 
bicameral bargaining.  Although almost all members of Congress—both deputies and senators 
alike—agreed that presidential decree power should be restricted and regulated, they disagreed 
on two points: the extent to which decree power should be restricted; and which of the legislative 
house should review decrees first, thus retaining final words.   
 In the bargaining literature, the difficulty of negotiations is a function of two key 
variables.  First, the distance between the actors’ ideal points indicates the degree of compromise 
necessary to reach an agreement: the greater the distance between the ideal points, the greater the 
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 difficulty to change policy.  Second, the impatience of the actors—the desire of actors in 
negotiation to strike a deal sooner than later—influences the timing of the conclusion of an 
agreement and the division of the burdens and benefits of the final outcome.  In this chapter, I 
thus examine two variables—preferences and impatience—to analyze how they affected the 
politics of an institutional change in Brazil.   
 The organization of this chapter takes the following format.   First, I present the problems 
with presidential decree authority in Brazil.  I then discuss the first congressional attempt to limit 
decree power during the President Collor era.  Next, I analyze the second congressional attempt 
during President Cardoso’s terms, which culminated in the 2001 constitutional amendment on 
decree power.  In the conclusion, I assess the hypotheses in light of evidence.   
 
 
 
 
6.2. THE PROBLEMS: THE 1988 CONSTITUTION AND PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 
AUTHORITY IN BRAZIL 
 
 
 The 1988 Constitution gave birth to a powerful legislative instrument called the 
provisional measure to the Brazilian president in a democratic regime.  The inception of this 
presidential decree authority was somewhat of a historical contingency.  After the end of a long 
military rule in 1985, the National Congress elected in 1986 met as a constituent assembly 
(ANC-Assembléia Nacional Constituinte) during 1987-88 to draft a new constitution for the 
country.  Most participants of the constituent assembly were eager to dismantle the remains of 
the authoritarian rule, and the much hated decreto-lei, the executive decree power used by the 
military government, was one of them.  Despite the zeal of former authoritarian opposition to 
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 bring decreto-lei to an end, however, the new constitution kept presidential decree authority 
under a different name.  
 Although no one argued to retain the decreto-lei of the authoritarian era, many ANC 
members were not ready to deprive the nation’s executive of all and any form of extraordinary 
measures.  Brazilian presidents had decree power even before the military rule.  Moreover, the 
country was undergoing severe and recurrent economic crises in the 1980s, which provided some 
justification to equip the executive branch with emergency measures to readily address difficult 
and urgent situations.  
 Then Deputy Nelson Jobim (PMDB-Rio Grande do Sul) was a leading advocate of 
provisional measures.  Jobim and his collaborators proposed to include in the Brazilian 
constitution a provision modeled after the Italian regime of executive decree authority (Article 
77 of the 1947 Italian Constitution) almost word by word.  The importation of this Italian 
institution was justified on the ground that Brazil would adopt a parliamentary system, which in 
1987 appeared to be very likely.  The advocates of executive decree authority maintained that 
abuses of such power by the executive would be constrained in a parliamentary regime, because 
if the government decreed without an explicit or at least implicit consent by the parliament, it 
would fall with a vote of no confidence.  However, the presidentialists eventually triumphed over 
the parliamentarists, with the final decision on the form of government to be left for the 
constitutional revision that was to take place in five years.  The language for a parliamentary 
regime was henceforth removed form the constitution, yet the ANC did not remove with it the 
executive decree authority.  
 The provisional measure is enshrined in Article 62 of the 1988 Constitution.  For such a 
controversial executive instrument, Article 62 was oddly brief and vague, especially considering 
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 the degree of details specified in other constitutional provisions.81  Originally, Article 62 read as 
follows: 
In case of relevance and urgency, the President of the Republic 
may adopt provisional measures with the force of law and shall 
submit them to the National Congress immediately.  If Congress is 
in recess, a special session shall be called to meet within five days. 
Sole paragraph—Provisional measures shall lose effectiveness 
from the date of their issuance if they are not converted into law 
within a period of thirty days from their publication.  The National 
Congress shall regulate the legal relations arising therefrom. 
 
Power (1998: 220) aptly summarizes the problems with Article 62. 
Article 62 of the 1988 Constitution is an invitation to chaos.  In 
three striking ways, the article is a lesson in how not to draft a 
constitutional provision.  First, on the issue of who is to define 
“urgency and relevance,” its language is ambiguous.  Second, 
Article 62 places no restrictions on which policy areas are subject 
to presidential decree.  Third…whether a president may renew an 
expired MP—the Constitution is silent altogether.   
 
The ambiguity of Article 62 allowed the Brazilian presidents to interpret the article self-
servingly.   
 The first president who employed this decree authority was President Sarney.  As the first 
one to use the decree power, Sarney also set controversial precedents to be followed by his 
successors (Power 1998).  One relates to what constitutes “urgency and relevance.”  The 
intention of the constitutional drafters to include this phrase was to restrict the application of 
presidential decrees only to extraordinary circumstances.  However, Sarney did not take the 
urgency and relevance requirement seriously and issued MPs to regulate emergency and non-
                                                 
81 Recall that Sartori called the Brazilian Constitution a telephone catalogue.  The Brazilian Constitution was (and 
still is) extremely detailed indeed.  For example, it specified from a ceiling on the nation’s real interest rates to social 
security contributions. 
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 emergency situations alike.  For example, the first decree that Sarney issued was a fishing 
regulation, which could have been sent to Congress in the form of a regular bill.   
 The second precedent that President Sarney created in the use of decrees concerns the 
question of what to do with lapsed MPs.  Sarney assigned his chief legal advisor, Saulo Ramos, a 
complete study of the regime of provisional measures.  The study, published in Diário Oficial in 
June 1989, concluded that re-issuing expired MPs was not unconstitutional.  Hence Sarney began 
re-issuing lapsed decrees on which Congress did not act within thirty days.  The nation’s 
Supreme Federal Court later ruled that it was not unconstitutional to re-issue lapsed decrees.  
From that time on re-issuing of expired decrees became a common practice.  In short, Sarney’s 
practice created important precedents to be followed; the study and the Supreme Court ruling 
gave juridical justification for it. 
 The first serious attempt by Brazilian legislators to limit the abuses of decree power by 
presidents occurred in the early 1990s.  Immediately after Fernando Collor de Mello sworn in the 
presidency in March 1990, he signed many MPs to introduce his economic stabilization plan.  
The president justified his reliance on decrees on the ground that economic stabilization needed 
shock treatments.  However, the president also used decrees in implementing controversial 
measures anticipating opposition in the legislature and society.  In June 1990, President Collor 
challenged the limit of his authority and congressional tolerance.  He issued a new decree (MP 
190) to replace the old one that the Brazilian Congress explicitly rejected only one day before.  
This act was immediately condemned by legislators and jurists, and the prosecutor-general took 
the case to the Supreme Court, which defeated MP 190 in a unanimous vote.  Despite public 
condemnation of the abuses of decree authority, however, MPs remained as the president’s most 
preferred tool of governance.  Opposition in Congress mobilized and a momentum developed 
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 that seemed to bring an end to the abusive use of decrees by the president.  However, the impetus 
slowly dissipated and President Collor suffered impeachment in 1992 before seeing his decree 
authority restrained by Congress.   
 The departure of Collor from the presidency did not diminish the executive’s reliance on 
MPs as the primary tool of governance.  Table 6.1 is the summary of MPs issued and re-issued 
by each government since Sarney.  The monthly issuance of new MPs per government was 
relatively stable over time, averaging between 3 and 5 MPs per month per government.  
However, the number of MPs re-issued per government multiplied over time.  Sarney re-issued 
less than one MP per month.  Collor re-issued 2.3 MPs per month.  The per month re-issuance 
rate surged dramatically during Franco’s government, exceeding 13 MPs per month.  During 
Cardoso’s first term, it increased even more, averaging 35 re-issued MPs per month, or more 
than one per day.  This tendency only exacerbated during Cardoso’s second term until September 
2001 during which the president re-issued more than 78 MPs per month.     
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 Table 6.1: Presidential Decrees in Brazil, 1988-2001 
 
 
 
Sarney 
03/88-03/90
Collor 
03/90-10/92
Franco 
10/92-12/94
Cardoso I 
01/95-12/98 
Cardoso II 
01/99-09/01
Total 147 159 505 2609 2690 
Original  125 89 142 160 103 
Average per Month 5.21 2.92 5.26 3.33 3.12 
Reissued 22 70 363 2449 2587 
Average per Month 0.92 2.3 13.44 35.44 78.39 
Converted into Law 96 74 71 130 98 
Rejected 9 11 0 1 1 
Source: Presidência da República, Brazil. 
 
 
 
 In 1995 Fernando Henrique Cardoso was sworn in, ready to undertake the economic 
restructuring that was in his campaign platform.  Cardoso, a former leading critic of presidential 
decree authority, did not hesitate to use MPs as a measure to pursue his policies.  The new 
president’s alarming behavior led to two key developments in Congress in 1995.  First, when 
Congress passed the constitutional amendments regarding economic reform that year, it included 
a provision vetoing the use of presidential decrees over matters that were subject to the 
constitutional amendments since 1995 (Article 246).  The members of Congress viewed this 
limitation as imperative because the executive was intent on “deconstitutionalizing” the nation’s 
economic and social security systems, thereby policy changes in those areas could be pursued by 
altering statutory regimes.  Without that prohibition, legislators were afraid that the executive 
would resort to decrees in order to bypass lengthy discussions and cumbersome negotiations with 
Congress.  Another significant development was the resurgence of keen interest in limiting 
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 presidential decree authority.  Serious concerns about the unrestrained use of decrees by the 
executive led to the creation of special committees both in the Chamber and in the Senate to 
study the restriction and regulation of the powerful presidential prerogative.  Section 6.4 
addresses this case.   
 To summarize, in the post-1988 Constitution era, presidential decree authority has always 
been a very controversial executive instrument.  It may not be too much of an exaggeration to 
affirm that it has been the single most important constant source of executive-legislative 
tensions.  From Sarney to Lula, the short history of post-authoritarian Brazil has proved that 
presidents, once in office, do not hesitate to use this powerful and contentious prerogative to 
legislate.  This is true even for Cardoso and Lula, who were once staunch opponents of decree 
authority before becoming presidents.  The widespread use of MPs has irritated even presidential 
allies in Congress.  It has also created judicial problems.  Paulo Costa Leite, former President of 
the Superior Court of Justice, along with six ministers of the Court, declared in 2000 that the 
frequent use of provisional measures was causing juridical instability.  He said, “In a figurative 
language, applying ordinary law is like wandering in the swamp because a law that is in force 
today is applied and the next day a judge is surprised by the fact that part of the law is suddenly 
revoked by a provisional measure.”82  Indeed, it seemed that a near consensus existed from the 
early 1990s both in Congress and society that presidential decree authority should be rigorously 
restricted and regulated.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82 “Ministros do STJ criticam excesso de MPs.” Estado de São Paulo, August 22, 2000, p. A-7. 
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 6.3. CHALLENGING DECREE AUTHORITY UNDER COLLOR: THE JOBIM BILL 
 
 
 The first real threat to limit presidential decree authority emerged in 1990.  Within a 
matter of few days of his inauguration, it became clear to the members of Congress that the new 
president, Fernando Collor de Mello, backed by a high popularity among citizens but lacking 
majorities in Congress, was intent on pursuing his agenda through decrees.  The minority 
president did not hesitate to employ MPs even with unpopular and sensitive matters such as 
freezing bank accounts and imprisoning suspected tax evaders.  Many proposals to limit 
presidential decree power were thus submitted, and one of them made a significant advance in 
Congress.  This bill was authored by no other than Deputy Nelson Jobim, who was the primary 
architect of provisional measures in the 1988 Constitution.  Jobim argued that it was necessary to 
modify the regime of provisional measures in order to “attend to juridical and political questions 
of the present moment in the Brazilian history” (Jobim 1990).  The criticisms and worries on the 
excess of decrees mounted not only in Congress but also among societal actors including an 
attorneys’ association and labor unions, who felt decrees closed off the venues of their influence 
in the political processes.83   
 
 
6.3.1. The Jobim Bill and the Preferences of the Chamber, Senate, and President 
 
 
 Jobim submitted a bill of complementary law on April 9, 1990 in the Chamber of 
Deputies.  The Jobim bill sought to regulate the conditions under which the president could use 
decree power.  The principal changes proposed addressed major concerns of legislators and 
society.  First, it required that the president justify urgency and relevance for decrees.  In case 
                                                 
83  “Excesso de medidas leva entidades à mobilização.” Jornal de Brasília, May 10, 1990, 4. 
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 Congress determined that a decree was not justifiable in terms of urgency and relevance, it would 
be converted into a bill of ordinary law.  Second, the bill sought to forbid the use of MPs on a 
number of areas including: (1) materials regulated by complementary laws and constitutional 
amendments; (2) those related to political, civil, and economic rights, nationality and citizenship; 
(3) budgets and taxation; (4) the organization of the Judiciary and Prosecuter’s Office; (5) areas 
of exclusive competence to the National Congress; and (6) the subjects already rejected by 
Congress.  Third, it permitted only one renewal of MPs (Article 9).   
 The Jobim bill was a bill of complementary law, which had several implications for the 
legislative process.  First, the passage of the bill by Congress required an absolute majority of 
votes in each house of Congress.  Second, roll call votes had to be used for all voting, which 
would force legislators to take clear positions on the issue.  Third, the Chamber, as the initiating 
house, would have the final say on the legislation should bicameral disagreements arise on the 
specifics of the bill.  Finally, as opposed to the cases of constitutional amendments, which do not 
depend upon presidential sanction for promulgation, the president had the power to veto (or 
sanction) bills of complementary law.   
 Although Congress could overturn presidential vetoes with absolute majorities in both the 
Chamber and the Senate (i.e., the same quota as required for the passage of complementary law 
bills), two features of veto sessions made it difficult to override presidential vetoes.  One is that 
vetoes are examined in bicameral joint sessions and the lack of a quorum in one house impedes 
an opening of a joint session.  The other feature is that veto sessions are always extraordinary 
sessions.  The president of Congress must find time that does not interfere with normal sessions 
of both houses and is convenient for more than a majority of deputies and senators.  Thus, 
scheduling a veto session is a difficult task.  In practice, most vetoes are examined in a hasty 
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 manner after several months or years have passed and the momentums have waned, and as such 
Congress rarely overturns them.  These features made President Collor an effective veto player 
and not simply a nominal holder of veto power.   
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Figure 6.1: The Preferences of the Chamber, Senate, and President Collor on MP 
 
 
 
 Figure 6.1 depicts the positions of President Collor, the Chamber and the Senate with 
respect to the regime of decree authority inferred from bicameral partisan compositions and 
media coverage.  The figure locates their positions in a single dimension that runs from no 
restriction on decree authority to its termination.  Since the original 1988 Constitution was 
ambiguous about the limits of MP authority, and since Brazilian presidents interpreted the 
constitution self-servingly in the use of MPs, I placed the status quo (SQ) at the point where 
there is little restriction.   
 President Collor is positioned at the location of the status quo because he opposed any 
changes that would diminish MP authority.  Collor resisted most Article 9 of the Jobim bill, 
which limited the renewal of decrees to only once, and the prohibition of the use of MPs in 
taxation and budgetary matters.  Initially, Collor refused to negotiate with Congress.  Collor and 
his aides argued that the Jobim bill was unconstitutional because Article 62 of the Constitution 
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 that defined provisional measures did not mention their restrictions or regulations by 
complementary law.  Collor threatened that he would veto the bill if Congress approved it, and 
should Congress overturn the presidential veto, the government would take the case to the 
Supreme Federal Court.   
 In the Chamber, the Jobim bill was supported by all major opposition parties (PMDB, 
PSDB, PT, PDT, and others), which altogether constituted a comfortable majority of more than 
60% of the members of the Chamber.  In addition, many members of government parties, the 
PRN (Collor’s party) and PFL, supported the measure at least in principle.  In the Senate, the 
opposition forces also held more than a majority seats and they were in favor of limiting 
presidential decree authority.  Although government parties increased seat shares in the Senate 
over time, they never attained a majority during Collor’s term.  Thus, I place the Chamber and 
Senate, or their median voters to be more precise, to the right of the status quo favoring 
restrictions on MP authority.  The Senate is positioned slightly to the left of the Chamber 
because Collor’s support base in the upper house was larger than in the lower house.   
 
 
6.3.2. The Deadlock of the Jobim Bill 
 
 
 Collor’s veto threat did not dissuade the Chamber’s oppositionists from pursuing the 
Jobim bill.    In June 1990, the Chamber’s Constitution, Justice, and Editing Committee (CCJR) 
approved the Jobim bill on constitutional and juridical grounds.  Upon the party leaders’ petition, 
the Chamber also adopted an urgency procedure.  On March 6, 1991, the Jobim bill was 
scheduled for a floor vote.  Two hours before the beginning of the vote, the government finally 
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 admitted defeat and abandoned an intransigent posture of not negotiating and accepted to 
concede in certain points in order to lessen damages to the president’s authority.   
 During the pre-vote bargaining, the Collor government asked to remove the limitations 
on renewal and taxation from the text.  In exchange, it allowed the members of the government 
parties to freely vote.  The opposition did not accept these demands; however the government 
earned sympathy of the majority of deputies in the coalition.84  This government strategy 
worked.  Although the Chamber approved the basic text of the Jobim bill by an overwhelming 
majority of 415 to 13, the government was able to force separate votes (known as destaque de 
votação em separado or DVS) for the provisions on taxation and reissuing of decrees and 
subsequently defeated the former by 210 in favor of prohibition and 167 against it.  The 
opposition had needed to garner at least 252 (absolute majority of 503 total votes) votes in favor 
of the change.   
 The defeat in the DVS of taxation compelled the opposition to reassess the likelihood of 
success with the vote on Article 9 (MP’s renewal).  In the next two weeks, the PMDB’s leader 
led the opposition in obstructing the vote in the fear that they did not have sufficient votes to 
approve the provision.  Without Article 9, which the opposition considered the essence of the 
Jobim bill, the bill would be innocuous.  At the same time, Collor and his Chamber allies worked 
diligently to defeat Article 9.  In order to reduce hostility in the largest opposition party, PMDB, 
which controlled 112 of 503 seats in the lower house, Collor met with former president and then 
Senator José Sarney (PMDB-AP) to lessen the possibility that a group linked to the ex-president 
support the limitation on the re-issuing of decrees.  The government’s leader, Deputy Ricardo 
                                                 
84 “Governo liberou deputados.” Jornal do Brasil, March 6, 1991, 6. 
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 Fiuza (PFL), meanwhile repeated that the president would veto the bill should Congress pass it 
with Article 9.85   
 The repeated veto threat and the change in the government’s attitudes toward the issue 
led many members of the government parties and some members of the opposition parties to 
reconsider their strategies.  The possibility of a defeat in the key provision led the opposition to 
seek a negotiation with the government by offering to allow re-issuing of decrees twice instead 
of once.  However, Collor, convinced of his victory, rejected the deal.86  Without a deal, the 
opposition lost in the vote on the renewal of MP just by five votes.  
 The opposition soon declared that it would try to restore in the Senate the provision 
limiting the re-issuing of decrees.  As in the Chamber, Collor lacked a majority in the Senate.  
The Senate presidency was also controlled by a peemedebista senator, Mauro Benevides, who 
announced a fast examination of the Jobim Bill in the upper house.  In search of opposition 
members’ support, Collor’s allies in the Senate warned that the approval of Article 9 would 
cause ungovernability and generate open confrontation with the government.  However, the 
PMDB leadership defied and, in an unprecedented move, the party’s national executive voted to 
impose discipline in the vote on the bill.  By mid-April 1991, the opposition estimated that it had 
53 of 81 votes on its side, including 24 from the PMDB, 10 from the PSDB, 6 from the PDT, 7 
from the PTB, 3 from the PFL, and 1 from each of the PSB, PT, and PDS.87  In the first 
oppositionists’ victory in the Senate, the Constitution, Justice, and Citizenship Committee (CCJ) 
approved the report prepared by Senator Pedro Simon (PMDB-Rio Grande do Sul) resurrecting 
Article 9 and the prohibition of decrees on tax-related materials, both defeated earlier in the 
Chamber.   
                                                 
85 “Limitação de MPs fica sem acordo.” Correio Brasiliense, March 20, 1991, 4. 
86 Ibid.  
87 “Senado pode limitar as MPs.” Correio Brasiliense, April 17, 1991, 4. 
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  Acknowledging that the strategy of persuasion was not sufficient, President Collor sought 
to conquer votes by establishing more amenable relationships with state governors.  In order to 
influence the votes of senators from northeastern states, the government renegotiated their states’ 
debts and promised new lines of credit.  Collor also substantially reduced the use of MPs to 
demonstrate that he would refrain himself from using MPs even in the absence of formal 
restrictions.88   
 In late April, the PMDB leader, Senator Humberto Lucena, proposed to party leaders to 
sign a petition for an immediate vote of the Jobim bill in the floor (urgência urgentíssima), but 
the government leader in the Senate, Marco Maciel, refused to do so.  Without a special 
deliberation of urgency, the bill would have to go through the slow and normal legislative 
process.  Opposition leaders admitted, for the first time, that the approval of the Jobim bill might 
be difficult.  Three PTB senators of the seven who had supported the Jobim bill earlier were no 
longer committed to it.89  The government also intensified pressure on other opposition senators.  
Then in May 1992, a massive corruption scandal hit Collor and his government, leading to the 
president’s impeachment in September 1992.  With the removal of the president, the anti-decree 
thrust also dissipated.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
88 “Senado testa nova política de Collor.” Jornal do Brasil, April 21, 1991, 2. 
89 “Dissidências enfraquecem a oposição.” Correio Brasiliense, April 24, 1991, 3. 
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 6.4. LIMITING DECREE AUTHORITY UNDER CARDOSO: CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT 
 
 
6.4.1. Overview 
 
 
 Brazil saw in 1995 the revival of congressional movements to limit presidential decree 
authority.  In just two weeks of his inauguration in 1995, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
signed one new decree and re-issued twelve old ones, embarking on the path to breaking the 
record number of MP re-issuance.  The discontent with the abusive use of this constitutional 
instrument was generalized both among legislators of government and opposition parties alike.  
There were those who supported a termination of the instrument and others who wanted to 
impose limits on its use.  The long line of decrees awaiting examination had also congested the 
congressional agenda.  The advocates of restrictions on decree authority in Congress believed 
that the absence of clear rules ended up transforming MPs into an instrument practically without 
limits.   
 Many legislators also acknowledged that the existing mechanism to examine MPs was 
not functioning effectively.  Under the 1989 Resolution No. 1 of the National Congress (1997), 
presidential decrees were examined in the following sequence.  First, after a reading of a decree, 
a mixed committee would be created consisting of seven deputies and seven senators in order to 
examine its constitutionality.  In practice, this committee was almost never installed.  Second, 
deputies and senators, if desired, would submit amendments to the committee within five days 
and the committee’s reporting officer would prepare an analysis of the decree and amendments 
to be voted in the committee.  However, the reporting officer in practice reported directly to the 
floor in the joint session of the National Congress without having the committee’s prior 
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 approval.  If the reporting officer’s report was favorable with respect to the MP’s 
constitutionality, then the mixed committee (if installed) would prepare a report on its merits and 
the amendments submitted.  The MP would then return to the floor, for examination and voting.  
In reality, due to the lack of a quorum, most MPs were never voted before they expired.  
Therefore, the president would re-issue lapsed decrees successively.  As Table 6.1 shows, the 
problem of re-issuance of decrees multiplied during the Itamar Franco period and was further 
exacerbated with Cardoso.   
 In general, short of terminating presidential decree authority, Brazilian legislators—
senators and deputies and government allies and opposition alike—agreed that at least the 
following changes were needed.   
1. restrictions on the re-issuance of lapsed MPs; 
2. delineation of the areas where the use of MPs would be banned; and 
3. adoption of a new mechanism to examine MPs in Congress. 
However, disagreements existed as to: (a) the duration of an MP’s validity; (b) specific areas 
over which MPs must not be used; and (c) new rules of examination.  These disagreements and 
the Senate-Chamber rivalry over their versions of the proposal caused significant delays in the 
passage of the constitutional amendment proposed in 1995, which shuttled back and forth 
between the two chambers a few times before its adoption.   
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Figure 6.2: The Chamber’s and Senate’s Positions on Presidential Decree Authority circa 
1995-97 
 
 
 
 Figure 6.2 depicts the positions of the Chamber and Senate with respect to the regime of 
presidential decree authority based on the bills they were studying separately during 1995-97.  In 
1995, the Chamber and the Senate both separately and independently began drafting proposals 
for constitutional amendment to alter the regime of MP authority by creating special ad hoc 
committees to study the subject.  The Senate voted and approved its bill in 1997 and sent it to the 
Chamber.  The Chamber’s bill was ready for a floor vote when the lower house received the 
Senate’s bill.  Figure 6.2 is based on those two bills.   
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  Although the actual debates included many different areas of MP (which will be 
discussed later), there were two fundamental differences in the two houses’ bills.  The first is the 
extent to which MP authority should be restricted.  This included the substantive areas where 
MPs could not be used and an MP’s duration.  This dimension is represented in Figure 2 by the 
x-axis.  The existing MP regime had almost no restrictions on its application, and as such the 
status quo is placed at the far left of the continuum.  The Chamber’s bill included many areas, 
such as civil, political and economic rights, in which MPs were not allowed.  It also permitted an 
MP’s renewal only once but extended its validity from 30 days to 60 days.  The Senate’s version 
had various overlaps with the Chamber’s bill, but it had less substantive areas where MPs were 
forbidden.  In addition, the Senate’s bill proposed to extend an MP’s validity to 90 days, 
renewable only once.  Therefore, the Chamber overall desired greater restrictions on MP 
authority than the Senate.   
 The other significant bicameral difference rested in the new rules to examine presidential 
decrees (the y-axis in the figure).  Under the existing system, deputies and senators met in joint 
committees and joint sessions to examine MPs.  This arrangement ostensibly gave equal power 
to the Chamber and the Senate in the examination and voting of MPs.  However, the sequential 
nature of voting even in joint sessions—in which the Chamber voted first on an MP and its 
amendments and the Senate voted only up or down on the text approved by the lower house—
gave the Chamber a greater influence in the MP’s outcome.  The Senate proposed to change the 
rules of MP’s examination by installing a system of separate examination based on the principle 
of alternation between the lower and upper houses in initiating the process.  Under the new rules, 
the house that initiated the examination of an MP would have the last word.  And since the two 
houses would alternate in the initiation of the examination, the new system would overall give 
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 equal power to the Chamber and Senate.  The Chamber, however, was not prepared to accept a 
reduction in its power.  Many deputies had considered that the examination of MPs should 
follow the same rules as other executive bills in which their considerations would always begin 
in the lower house with its last word prerogative.  Short of that, the Chamber preferred to 
maintain joint sessions, thus retaining some advantage over the Senate in the MP’s examination.  
In order to force Congress to vote MPs in a timely manner, the Chamber proposed a new rule 
that would suspend all deliberative sessions until they were voted.   
 Different from the previous attempt to control presidential decrees, Congress this time 
sought to alter presidential decree authority through a constitutional amendment.  The adoption 
of a constitutional amendment eliminated certain problems that the Jobim bill had encountered, 
such as the constitutionality issue and the president’s veto threat.  However, it entailed other 
challenges—that the Senate and Chamber had to adopt exactly the same text; that the bill must 
be shuttled between the two housed until they adopted the same text; and that the voting quota 
for the approval of a constitutional amendment was much higher, requiring a three-fifth majority 
in each house.   
 In Figure 6.2, the winset of the status quo (the set of points that can defeat the status quo), 
denoted W(SQ), includes the points on and inside the intersection between the indifference 
curves of the Chamber and Senate.  The president, whose ideal point coincided with SQ, was not 
a veto player (at least formally), and as such no indifference curve was drawn for him.  Although 
any point in W(SQ) can theoretically defeat SQ, the new policy that is eventually adopted is 
likely to be found in the shaded area bounded by a line segment extending upward from the 
Senate’s ideal point (because any point to the left of that line segment will be farther from the 
ideal points of both houses) and another line segment extending downward from the Senate’s 
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 ideal point (because any point below that line segment will be farther from the ideal points of 
both houses).  Hence, bicameral bargaining should occur in the shaded area.   
 As discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, the Chamber and Senate possess equal constitutional 
prerogatives in the examination and adoption of constitutional amendments.  Therefore, the 
location of a new MP regime to be adopted, i.e., whether it would be closer to the Chamber’s or 
the Senate’s ideal point, depended upon the levels of impatience.  In the constitutional reform of 
the MP regime, one factor that raised the level of impatience was the risk that the bill might be 
aborted in the next round of negotiation.  Another factor was changes in the environment, such as 
an outbreak of scandals, that likely elevated the need to pass a reform long awaited by legislators 
and society.  These factors determined the timing and location of the new MP regime in Brazil.   
 
 
6.4.2. The Senate’s Version—The First Round 
 
 
 On February 16, 1995, immediately after the opening of the 50th Congress, Senator 
Esperidião Amin (PPR-Santa Catarina) presented a constitutional amendment proposal no. 
1/1995 to the Senate.  The proposal included restrictions on the areas in which provisional 
measures could not be used, denied reissuing of a lapsed decree within the same year, and 
extended the validity of a decree from 30 to 60 days.  The proposal was immediately sent to the 
CCJ, and the committee’s reporting officer, Senator Josaphat Marinho (PFL-Bahia), voted in 
favor of the material.  Observing the revival of congressional movements to limit MP authority, 
President Cardoso met with Senate President José Sarney and eight other senators from 
Cardoso’s coalition parties, the PMDB, PFL, and PSDB, to develop a new formula to reduce the 
massive flow of decrees into Congress.  By the agreement, the Senate would prepare a new 
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 constitutional amendment proposal that would limit the use of decrees to the economic, financial, 
and defense areas.  In exchange, it would allow the president to make administrative changes, 
such as the creation and extinction of ministries and public organs, without having to submit bills 
to Congress.90  On May 8, 1996, Senate President Sarney created a special committee (comissão 
especial or CESP) to consolidate six proposals circulating in the house treating the same subject.   
 The cooperative relationship between Cardoso and the Senate changed when the 
president signed a decree in which he secretly included a policy that had been rejected by the 
Chamber earlier in that year.91   The Senate reacted immediately, threatening to vote on the 
Jobim bill right away.  Although Cardoso’s Minister of Political Coordination, Luiz Carlos 
Santos, managed to appease the tensions, senators’ irritation with the government’s foul tactic 
resulted in a proposal that was more stringent than Cardoso was willing to accept.   
 The CESP proposal extended the validity of provisional measures from 30 to 60 days but 
forbade its renewal in whole or part.  If Congress failed to vote within 60 days, the decree would 
be converted into a regular bill (projeto de lei) examined in a slow and normal process in the 
Chamber and the Senate.  It also determined that MPs not be issued within the same year over 
the subjects already rejected by Congress.  The proposal also prohibited the use of MPs in the 
areas of taxation and the penal code.   
 The substitution proposal adopted by the CESP was then analyzed in the CCJ.  The CCJ’s 
reporting officer, Senator José Fogaça (PMDB-Rio Grande do Sul), presented a new substitution 
bill and an accompanying proposal for a resolution of the National Congress revoking Resolution 
no. 1 of 1989 and offering new rules for the examination of MPs.  The Fogaça proposal 
maintained a decree’s validity of 60 days and the prohibitions of its renewal and of application to 
                                                 
90 “Emenda restringe MPs e desobriga governo.” Folha de São Paulo, March 17, 1995, 1-7. 
91 The MP was on the minimum wage but Cardoso included in it a creation of a social security contribution by 
retired public servants, which had nothing to do with the minimum wage policy. 
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 the penal code as proposed by Marinho.  The principal departures from the CESP proposal 
included establishing a permanent mixed committee to examine MPs, separate examination and 
voting in the Chamber and Senate floors based on the principle of simple alternation in initiation, 
and the adoption of the urgency rule in case 60 days had passed without a final vote.  In addition, 
the Fogaça bill added the areas reserved for complementary law to the list of fields where MPs 
may not be used but dropped taxation from the list.  In December 1996, the CCJ approved 
Fogaça’s substitution proposal by 13 to 7.  The seven senators who voted against the Fogaça bill 
did so because they either preferred the CESP proposal or wanted much stricter restrictions, and 
not because they were against the idea of restricting decree authority.   
 On March 12, 1997, the CCJ’s substitution bill was ready for an inclusion in the 
deliberative session, but Cardoso’s loyal allies in the Senate requested that the material be 
returned to the CCJ for reexamination.  They emphasized that certain changes in the proposal 
were necessary to harmonize the texts being examined separately in the two houses of Congress 
in order to expedite the eventual passage of the amendment by Congress.  Senator Fogaça and 
Deputy Aloysio Nunes Ferreira, the reporting officer in the Chamber, were discussing the 
convergence of the proposals being examined in each house (Senado Federal 1997a).  The 
Senate presidency approved the petition and returned the material to the CCJ.  This also gave the 
government time to negotiate terms with party leaders in the Chamber and the Senate.   
 The final version up for a floor vote in April included more areas in which decrees were 
not allowed (adopted from Deputy Aloysio Nunes’ substitution bill in the Chamber) but 
extended their validity to 90 days instead of 60 and allowed for one renewal (per the 
government’s demand).  In addition, it maintained a separate and sequential examination of 
decrees with the alternation of initiation between the Chamber and the Senate (per the Senate’s 
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 preference).  Fogaça called this new system of alternation “a celebrated, extraordinary, and very 
important conquest of the Senate” (Senado Federal 1997b).  The proposal also allowed the 
president to use administrative decrees (decreto, not medida provisória), which would not 
require congressional approval, to manage administrative matters of government.  It also 
determined that MPs issued before the promulgation of the amendment would stay in force until 
the National Congress voted or the president revoked them.  The appendix to this chapter 
elaborates on the details of the proposal approved by each house of Congress at each sequence.  
The Senate approved the proposal by 57 votes in favor and 7 votes opposed with 2 abstentions.  
The PSDB, PFL, PMDB, and PTB, as well as the government’s leader in the Senate 
recommended a favorable vote for the proposal.  The PPB liberated its members’ votes.  The 
opposition bloc recommended a favorable vote for the text conditional upon the changes it 
sought to make in separate votes (DVS’s) on controversial provisions.   
 One of the contested provisions of the new proposal was the extended validity of 90 days 
with a possibility of one renewal.  Proponents of the new arrangement—mostly Cardoso’s 
allies—argued that it would give a reasonable time for Congress to examine MPs.  Its 
opponents—opposition senators and some dissenters of government parties—contended that it 
would make Congress an institution that would simply rubber stamp the executive’s decrees 
since it would be difficult to reject them after their six months in force.  Therefore, the 
opposition forced a separate vote on the renewal clause, in which it lost by 50 votes in favor and 
15 against, thus maintaining the renewal clause.  The government, however, lost in one of the 
DVS’s pertaining to the extent to which the government could exercise its new administrative 
decrees.  In the vote on whether the government could use administrative decrees to create 
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 ministries or public organs, Cardoso’s allies lost by 3 votes.  The proposal passed the second 
round of voting on May 14, 1997, 57 to 12.   
 
 
6.4.3. The Chamber’s Version—The Second Round 
 
 
 When the new Senate president, Antonio Carlos Magalhães (PFL-Bahia) declared that the 
war against the excess of provisional measures was nearing, the new president of the Chamber, 
Michel Temer (PMDB-São Paulo) agreed.92  This, with the prior agreement reached between 
Senate and Chamber leaders that led to the modification of the Fogaça substitution bill, raised an 
expectation that the Senate’s proposal would see a quick approval in the Chamber.  However, 
when the Chamber received the Senate’s proposal in May 1997, there was another proposal 
intended to regulate and restrict presidential decree authority.  This proposal was submitted in 
February 1995 and had already been approved by the Chamber’s CCJR and CESP.  Therefore, 
with the arrival of the Senate’s proposal in the Chamber, there were two bills dealing with the 
same subject, one originated in the Senate, and the other in the Chamber.   
 Subsequent debates in the Chamber focused on which text should be voted and, 
consequently, adopted.  As in the upper house, President Cardoso enjoyed a comfortable 
majority in the Chamber with the parties in alliance controlling more than 70 percent of the seats 
(at least numerically, without discounting frequent defections by some deputies).  However, both 
Cardoso’s friends and opponents in the Chamber desired to limit presidential decree power.  “We 
approved everything that the government wanted.  Now we will vote on the bill that will 
discipline the use of provisional measures,” announced the PFL leader, Inocêncio Oliveira.93  An 
                                                 
92 “Congresso limitará edição de MPs.” Jornal de Brasília, February 24, 1997, 3. 
93 “Aliados se unem à oposição para limitar uso de MP.” Jornal de Brasília, February 28, 1998, 2.  
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 ex-leader of government in the National Congress, Deputy Germano Rigotto (PMDB-Rio 
Grande do Sul), concurred; “It (a new constitutional amendment) will bring to an end the 
successive reissuing of decrees as it happed with the Real Plan, which was issued 20 times 
before its approval by Congress.”94  While governistas insisted on using the Senate’s text, 
oppositionists were adamant about continuing with the more stringent Chamber’s text and thus 
imposing more limits on the president.   
 Main differences between the Senate’s bill and the Chamber’s version included the 
duration of the validity of provisional measures.  Senators gave Congress 90 days to examine 
MPs, extendable for 90 more days, without counting the period of congressional recess.  The 
Chamber’s bill allowed only 60 days with a possibility of one renewal for the same period.  The 
Chamber’s text was also more restrictive in that it denied the use of decrees in the areas related 
to detention or confiscation of goods, popular savings, or any other financial properties (due to 
the appalling experience with former president Collor) and the subjects that had been vetoed by 
the president pending congressional action.  It also stated that MPs pertaining to taxation would 
go into effect only in the following fiscal year if and only if Congress converted them into law 
before the end of the year in which they were issued.  Moreover, the Chamber’s text maintained 
that the MPs currently in force be voted on within 180 days of the promulgation of the 
constitutional amendment, while the Senate did not specify a deadline for the examination of the 
pending decrees.  Another important divergence in the two texts was found in the examination of 
decrees in Congress.  The Senate proposed separate examinations with an alternation in 
initiation.  The Chamber maintained deliberation in joint sessions of the National Congress. 
 The strategy of the government leaders in the Chamber was to vote the less stringent 
Senate bill instead of the more rigorous Chamber’s CESP version.  The CCJR approved in 
                                                 
94 Ibid.  
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 October 1997 the Senate’s proposal eliminating the two articles that allowed the president to use 
administrative decrees.  Deputy Luís Eduardo Magalhães (PFL-BA), the government’s leader in 
the Chamber, immediately appealed to the floor and managed to maintain them.  The opposition 
argued that, instead of restricting presidential power, the Senate’s bill would increase President 
Cardoso’s power.   
 On May 19, 1999, the Senate bill was finally up for a floor vote.  The opposition and 
many deputies of the government parties had insisted on voting on the more rigorous CESP’s 
text elaborated in the Chamber.  With the division over the two texts, it was not certain whether 
either of the two texts had 308 (three-fifths) or more votes necessary for its approval.  A deal was 
struck after intensive negotiations in which neither side would emerge as a loser.  The CESP’s 
reporting officer, Deputy Aloyio Nunes Ferreira, presented, verbally, a new substitution bill in 
the plenary based on the special committee’s original report approved before the arrival of the 
Senate bill but also admitted the restoration of administrative decrees for the president found in 
the Senate’s bill.  However, the system of alternation that the senators celebrated was not 
included in the text.  Deputies did not accept the new system that would reduce the Chamber’s 
influence by giving the Senate the last word prerogative half of the times if the upper and lower 
houses alternated the initiation of MPs’ examination.  By the leaders’ agreement, all of the 
parties’ leaderships recommended a vote in favor of the substitution bill and the bill passed by a 
near unanimity: 453 in favor to 1 opposed and 1 abstained.  Although it appears that the 
Chamber almost unanimously accepted the Senate’s bill if one looks only at the roll calls, what 
actually happened was that the lower house, by approving the CESP’s substitution bill, proposed 
to the upper house a much stricter version that was born in the Chamber.   
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 6.4.4. The Senate’s Response—The Third Round 
 
 
 When the Senate received the Chamber’s substitution proposal in June 1999, more than 
four years had passed since the bill was originally proposed.  In the CCJ, Reporting Officer 
Senator Fogaça accepted more restrictions on decrees added by the Chamber.  He also accepted 
the change in the validity of provisional measures from the Senate-proposed 90 days to the 
Chamber-proposed 60 days.  However, Fogaça restored the Senate’s original versions in two key 
aspects over which the lower house made modifications.  One related to the treatment of the 
decrees in force before the promulgation of the amendment.  The Chamber decided that decrees 
be voted within 180 days from the promulgation of the amendment.  The Senate, in contrast, had 
proposed to keep them in effect indefinitely until they were voted by Congress or revoked by the 
president.   
 The other significant source of bicameral disputes rested in the examination of decrees in 
Congress.  The Chamber did not accept the Senate’s proposal of separate deliberations with a 
system of alternation.  However, Fogaça continued to defend voting in separate sessions in order 
to prevent a lack of a quorum in one house from impeding voting in the other house.  In addition 
to that, many senators considered the new arrangement as strengthening the Senate’s power.  In 
the existing arrangement, although votes took place in a joint session, the Chamber voted first on 
the MP and amendments to it if any, and, if approved by the Chamber, senators could vote only 
up or down on what the lower house had approved.  In November, the CCJ unanimously 
approved the Fogaça report, which concluded in favor of the proposal with a substitution bill.  
By that time President Cardoso had signed more than 3,500 MPs. 
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  Eager to impose limits on decree authority quickly, by an accord the CCJ’s substitution 
bill was immediately included in the deliberative session in the Senate.  At the same time, Senate 
leadership sought an agreement with Chamber leadership in order to avoid new alterations in that 
house.  Any new changes in the Chamber would require that the bill be sent back to the Senate 
once again, further delaying the enactment of the new constitutional amendment that a 
significant majority of legislators regarded as urgently imperative.   
 The first round of voting took place on November 17, 1999.  The CCJ’s substitution bill 
was approved with 64 votes in favor.  Not one senator voted against the bill.  Even those PFL 
and PSDB senators who were closely linked with Cardoso did not vote against it; they chose to 
abstain.  Viewing that the limitations on the powerful presidential tool was imminent, President 
Cardoso pressured senators not to approve the bill.  This Cardoso’s strategy backfired and the 
bill was approved with no difficulty in the second round on December 1.  With the defeat in the 
Senate, Cardoso started working with his allies in the Chamber to modify the bill. 
 
 
6.4.5. Economic Crisis, Government Strategies, and the Chamber’s Response to the 
Senate—The Fourth Round 
 
 
 The Chamber received the text approved by the Senate on December 7, 1999.  In the 
CCJ, Deputy Paulo Magalhães (PFL-Bahia), who is a nephew of then Senate President and 
leading advocate of the restrictions on presidential decrees, Antonio Carlos Magalhães, was 
assigned to be the reporting officer.  Magalhães suggested a favorable vote without alterations 
for the admissibility of the Senate’s bill, and the CCJ approved the deputy’s report by a 
unanimous vote in January 19, 2000.  However, the Senate’s substitution bill suffered many 
significant alterations thereafter.   
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  The environment in which the proposal on presidential decrees was discussed had 
changed dramatically in the Chamber since the earlier round, which worked in President 
Cardoso’s favor.  Cardoso had five main issues with respect to the latest text.95  First, as always, 
Cardoso was against the prohibition of an MP’s re-issuance.  Second, the president opposed a 
new rule that would suspend the legislative agenda of the Congress after 45 days of an MP’s 
issuance.  This rule was included in the proposal as a way to expedite the deliberation of decrees 
in Congress.  Third, in exchange for accepting certain limitations on his decree power, the 
president demanded that Article 246 of the Constitution be revoked.  Article 246 barred the use 
of MPs with respect to the issues that had been subjects of constitutional amendments since 
1995.  This restriction had frustrated Cardoso in his pursuit of economic reform.96  Cardoso was 
also against the prohibition of the use of decrees to legislate matters of taxation and the vetoed 
materials pending congressional deliberation.  Cardoso argued that the National Congress was 
too slow in examining presidential vetoes.   
 One of the events—perhaps the most important—that transformed the ambiance in which 
the decree authority was discussed was the currency crisis that hit Brazil in 1999 and led to the 
abandonment of the long-cherished crawling peg exchange rate arrangement.  The episode of the 
currency crisis reminded many of the importance of the government’s ability to act quickly in 
urgent situations.  Hence the leadership of Cardoso’s PSDB in the Chamber worked to postpone 
the voting of the material while seeking to modify the bill.  The PSDB leaders argued 
particularly that Article 246 of the Constitution and the proposed prohibition of MPs on finance 
                                                 
95 See, for example, “Como ficam as MPs” in O Globo, February 22, 2000, 8.  
96 For example, one of the legislative priorities of the Cardoso government was to grant the nation’s central bank 
legal independence.  However, giving central bank independence required a constitutional amendment of Article 
192 pertaining to the financial system.  The fear of losing the ability to decree on materials related to finance had 
deterred the government from pursuing central bank independence, but Cardoso’s economic team recognized that 
central bank independence was necessary in order to increase Brazil’s credibility in front of foreign investors.   
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 and taxation would compromise the government’s ability to govern and would leave the country 
without mechanisms to confront economic crises.   
 The second turning factor was the souring of Chamber-Senate relationships.  The 
Senate’s president at that time was Antonio Carlos Magalhães.  Elected from the northeastern 
state of Bahia on the PFL plate, Senator Magalhães was (and continues to be) known for his 
charisma and also for his erratic personality.  During Cardoso’s first term, Magalhães was one of 
the president’s principal allies in Congress and played an instrumental role in the earlier pension 
reform.  However, the senator’s relationship with Cardoso deteriorated since then and the reform 
of presidential decree authority became his number one priority.  As Magalhães became fixated 
on this agenda, he openly began pressuring the Chamber’s leadership for a swift approval of the 
bill with no alteration to avoid the return of the text to the Senate yet another time.  Magalhães’ 
attitude irritated Chamber leadership and contributed to the deterioration of the relationship 
between the two houses,97 which ironically helped to strengthen support for Cardoso.   
 While Magalhães was pressuring the Chamber for a speedy approval of the text, the 
Cardoso government sought the support of the PMDB, with the help of the Camber President, 
Michel Temer, and with less radical sectors of the PFL, with the help of Cardoso’s Vice-
President Marco Maciel and the head of the PFL, Jorge Bornhausen.  The government evaluated 
that it had recuperated its political capital by successfully controlling public finances and 
containing the spillovers of the currency crisis to other areas.  Cardoso’s team assessed that the 
                                                 
97 For example, When the PSDB’s leader, Deputy Aécio Neves, and Leader of Government in the National 
Congress, Deputy Arthur Virgílio Neto, announced the party’s intention to modify the text of the bill in the 
Chamber, Magalhães suggested that they renounce their mandates if they were not willing to defend the institution 
they represented.  Virgílio demanded that Magalhães respect him and said that “If either one of us must renounce, it 
is him, not me.” (See “A guerra das MPs” in Correio Brasiliense, December 4, 1999, 17).  In another occasion, 
Magalhães pushed hard the Chamber’s party leaders to vote the amendment proposal immediately, provoking the 
Chamber President, Michel Temer, to warn, “The prerogative to put this material for a vote in the plenary is mine” 
(“Divergências atrasan definição de novos limites para edição de MPs.” Estado de São Paulo, January 11, 2000, A-
4).  
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 betterment of the economy should improve the government’s relationship with Congress because 
in a good political-economic scenario, suspension or breakup of the relationship with the 
government would not interest its congressional allies.  Moreover, the year 2000 was a municipal 
election year and a number of federal deputies had ambitions for winning municipal executive 
offices.  Even the PFL’s leader in the Chamber, Inocêncio Oliveira, who was close to Magalhães 
gave a signal that it was possible to make concessions to the government, especially with Article 
246 of the Constitution.98   
 In late February, Cardoso and governista leaders of the PFL, PMDB, and PSDB reached 
an agreement to break the impasse.  According to the agreement announced by Deputy Roberto 
Brant (PFL-Minas Gerais), the reporting officer of the Chamber’s CESP, Article 246 would be 
revoked in exchange for the approval of the proposal.  In addition, the CESP’s former reporting 
officer and then Secretary-General of Government Aloysio Nunes Ferreira proposed a creative 
solution for the controversial question of MPs and taxation.  Thus far, the text pertaining to 
taxation used the Portuguese word tributo, which is a comprehensive term that includes all forms 
of government levies.  Ferreira’s suggestion, which was accepted by those present at the 
meeting, was to substitute the term imposto for tributo.  That way, although a decree to create or 
increase, for example, income tax (imposto de renda) would not go into effect until the following 
year, one that would create or raise fees (taxa) and contributions (contribuição) could have an 
immediate effect at any moment.99  Anticipating opposition in the floor, the government 
promised to issue an MP to release resources before a floor vote in order to secure support for the 
new agreement.  
                                                 
98 “Planalto manobra para conter ACM.” Gazeta Mercantil, January 6, 2000, A-6. 
99 “Acordo das MPs amplia poder de FHC.” Folha de São Paulo, February 23, 2000, 1-8. 
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  In April, Deputy Brant submitted his report to the CESP in favor of the material with a 
substitution bill.  The Brant substitution bill maintained those terms agreed upon by the 
government and governista leaders in the Chamber in the earlier meeting.  The Brant report was 
approved in the CESP with only oppositionist deputies voting against it.   
 The proposal fell into a limbo once again after its approval in the CESP.  Although all 
parties and nearly all deputies still concurred that presidential decree authority needed to be 
restricted and better regulated, the oppositionists did not accept the suppression of Article 246.  
The opposition PDT’s leader, Deputy Miro Teixeira, argued that the elimination of Article 246 
from the Constitution would nullify “all and any benefits that the proposal would bring about.”100  
On the other hand, presidential allies in the Chamber did not concede on the revocation of the 
article.  Neither side had the 308 votes required to approve the proposal.   
 The impasse was finally resolved when the new President of the Chamber, Aécio Neves 
(PSDB-Minas Gerais) personally mediated the disputes between the governistas and 
oppositionists.101  The solution reached was to “freeze” the effects of Article 246.  Instead of 
revoking Article 246 once and for all, the proposal forbade the use of MPs on the issues subject 
to constitutional amendments between 1995 and the promulgation of this amendment.  
Consequently, the president would be able to decree on the materials modified by constitutional 
amendments after the enactment of the amendment on decree power.  Thus, the new proposal 
originally intended to limit presidential decree authority now would also provide an expansion of 
the president’s decree prerogative.  The government gained in enticing oppositionists’ 
concessions also on the issues of taxation, vetoed materials pending congressional deliberation, 
and the expansion of the themes over which the president would be allowed to use administrative 
                                                 
100 “Oposição quer modificar emenda que limita MPs.” Estado de São Paulo, May 29, 2000, A-4. 
101 “Projeto que limita uso de MPs é aprovado.” Folha de São Paulo, June 21, 2001, A-10. 
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 decrees.  In exchange, the opposition managed to maintain in the text almost all the areas where 
they argued that MPs should not be employed.  The final text of the proposal to be voted in the 
floor was produced after various meetings between government and opposition leaders in the 
Chamber, involving many consultations with President Cardoso, Secretary of Federal Revenue, 
and Cardoso’s Attorney General.102  The Senate was not represented in those meetings.   
 The voting took place on June 20, 2001.  A new substitution proposal (emenda 
aglutinativa) including all terms of the accord was submitted to the plenary.  The plan of action 
was first to reject the CESP’s substitution bill in order to avoid approving the Senate’s 
substitution bill, and then vote and approve the new substitution proposal just submitted.  
Chamber President Neves began the voting session stating “[a]ccording to the agreement, party 
recommendations should be a vote against the CESP’s substitution bill” (Câmara dos Deputados 
2001: 30157).  All parties recommended a “no” vote and the bill was rejected 389 to 3.  The 
voting of the alternative proposal immediately followed, which the Chamber passed by 417 to 1.   
 To the senators’ surprise, the proposal approved by the Chamber actually included not 
only those terms of negotiation broadcasted as having reached by governistas and opposition 
deputies but also a change in the rules of MPs’ examination, which was one of the most 
contentious points in the bicameral disputes.  The approved text provided that the Chamber 
initiate the examination of decrees and eliminated the system of alternation proposed by the 
Senate.  This change was “smuggled” into the proposal quietly because it was not part of the 
agreement made in the Chamber.  Then Leader of Government in the National Congress, Deputy 
Arthur Virgílio, revealed in an interview with the author what happended in the floor on the day 
of voting.   
                                                 
102 Ibid. 
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 What happened was what we call “contrabandinho” (or literally 
“little contraband”) of the Chamber.  That provision was changed 
at the last minute….Many deputies in opposition and even in the 
government base wanted to initiate the deliberation of the 
provisional measures in the Chamber.  The Chamber wanted to 
increase its power.103   
 
The Chamber celebrated the approval of the new rule benefiting the house.  Deputy Pauderney 
Avelino (PFL) spoke in the plenary: “It is a considerable victory for this house which will come 
out stronger, once all votes begin in the Chamber” (Câmara dos Deputados 2001: 30176).  If 
approved by the Senate, the new rule would give the Chamber the last word prerogative in the 
examination of decrees.   
 
 
6.4.6. The Senate Accepts the Chamber’s Version—Promulgation of the Amendment 
 
 
 The senators, of course, did not welcome the “little contraband.”  However, at least three 
factors weakened the Senate’s bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the Chamber and elevated the 
senators’ desire to approve the proposal and promulgate the constitutional amendment 
immediately.  First is a series of scandals that hit the Senate in 2001.  The exchange of 
accusations and personal attacks between the two of the most influential members of the Senate, 
Jader Barbalho, then incumbent Senate President, and his predecessor, Antonio Carlos 
Magalhães, culminated in the outbreak of a corruption scandal that ended in Barbalho’s 
resignation.  A new scandal battered the upper house soon after Barbalho’s resignation, this time 
involving Senators Magalhães and Arruda, Cardoso’s key envoy in the Senate, leading their 
resignations.  As such, the Senate lost principal figures of the house in 2001, and when the 
Chamber President Aécio Neves personally delivered the proposal approved by the lower house 
                                                 
103 Interview with the author. April 22, 2004.  Virgílio was Senator and Leader of the PSDB in the Senate when 
interviewed. 
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 in August, the upper house was still in dismay from the successive scandals.  Senators only 
desired to pass the constitutional amendment that they and many sectors of society considered 
necessary to discipline the use of decrees by the president, and they did not wish to be made 
responsible for further delays in its enactment by altering the rules of examination and thus 
sending it back to the Chamber once again.  The Senate needed to recuperate its reputation, not 
damage it further.104   
 There was also a significant risk that the proposal might be aborted if it were returned to 
the Chamber.  In the last round of negotiations, the Chamber’s government leadership came to 
admit that there was a strong possibility that the proposal would not be voted on at least until the 
end of Cardoso’s term, or “never.”105  In addition, the fact that the following year would have a 
general election also increased uncertainties regarding the likelihood that the proposal would be 
approved again should it return to the lower house.  There were rumors that the opposition, 
especially the PT, with the anticipation of Lula’s victory in the upcoming presidential election, 
had lost interest in limiting decree authority.106    
 Finally, there was a threat of intervention by the Supreme Federal Court in this matter.  In 
June 2001, the Court’s president, Marco Aurélio de Mello, criticized congressional delays in 
approving the proposal.  He warned that the Court would take charge of limiting decrees if 
Congress failed to do so promptly b constitutional amendment.107  The Court’s action, should it 
occur, would give the National Congress a stamp of inefficiency and incapacity.  Moreover, 
Congress needed to guard its jurisdictions.   
                                                 
104 The concern for recuperating its image was shown in the CCJ’s report on the proposal.  Senator Osmar Dias, the 
committee’s reporting officer, wrote: “The approval of the limitation to the use of provisional measures, brought by 
the proposal in examination, is an indispensable step for the recuperation of the prestige of the Legislative Power, 
and it cannot be postponed any more” (Senado Federal 2001a).  
105 Comment attributed to the PFL’s leader, Deputy Inocêncio Oliveira. “Aliados adiam votação sobre MPs.” Folha 
de São Paulo, June 7, 2001, A-7. 
106 “Impasse deve adiar proposta que limita MPs.” O Globo, June 5, 2001, 5. 
107 “Presidente do STF ameaça limitar MPs.” O Globo, June 6, 2001, 3. 
177 
  Thus, as soon as the interim president of the Senate, Edison Lobão, received the 
Chamber’s substitution bill, he circulated a communiqué to the members of the house.  It stated 
that the examination of the Chamber’s substitution bill would be limited to those provisions that 
had been modified by that house.  It continued: 
This decision of the Presidency [of the Senate] has the objective of 
avoiding the so-called “ping pong” phenomenon [whereby a bill 
shuttles between the Chamber and Senate indefinitely] that is being 
observed in the deliberation of this proposal, which now will be 
examined for the third time in the Federal Senate, [which is an] 
unprecedented fact in the History of this house (Senado Federal 
2001b; original emphasis was in bold). 
 
 Nevertheless, the reporting officer of the CCJ, Senator Osmar Dias, sought to reinstall the 
system of alternation.  He argued that, if the Chamber always initiated the examination of 
decrees, “the Senate will be a house that simply confirms a provisional measure, which will 
always arrive [in the Senate] at the last moment, without time for a careful examination.”108  Like 
Dias, Senate leaders understood the consequences of approving the Chamber’s text without 
alteration.  Nonetheless, they pressured him not to make any change to the text in order to avoid 
further delays in its approval.  Dias accepted the argument, and the CCJ approved Dias’ report 
with no alterations in the text.  By a supra-partisan agreement, the Senate dispensed the five-day 
interval required before the discussion of a constitutional amendment proposal on the floor could 
begin, and the proposal went up for a vote on August 15, 2001.  Without any discussions, the 
proposal was approved in less than ten minutes with 65 senators voting in favor of the proposal 
to one abstention and one against.  The second round of voting took place on September 5, and 
Constitutional Amendment No. 32 was promulgated on September 11, 2001. 
 
 
 
                                                 
108 “Relator quer mudar emenda das PMs e governo vai reagir.” Estado de São Paulo, August 8, 2001, A7. 
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6.5. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 The Brazilian president’s provisional measure has always been a controversial instrument 
since its inception by the 1988 democratic constitution.  The unrestrained use of decree authority 
led the Brazilian Congress to seek to limit this powerful presidential authority in the 1990s.  The 
first major congressional attempt to limit decree authority occurred in the early 1990s in response 
to President Collor’s (perceived) abuse of the instrument.  The second such movement began in 
1995 under President Cardoso during which Congress was no longer able to keep up with the 
pace of issuance and re-issuance of MPs that averaged well over 30 per month.  How did the 
preference and impatience hypotheses do in light of these two episodes? 
 
 
 
Table 6.2: Summary of Hypotheses and Evidence 
 
 
 Preference 
(H1) 
Impatience 
(H2) 
Presidential 
Veto 
Predicted 
outcome 
Predicted 
time in 
congress 
Actual 
outcome 
Actual 
time in 
congress 
Collor Convergent Unknown Yes No reform Short Aborted -- 
Cardoso Divergent Medium? 
Low (Chamber) 
Medium? 
High (Senate) 
No Reform in 
Chamber’s 
terms 
Long Reform in 
Chamber’s 
terms 
5 years 
and 7 
months 
 
 
 
 Table 6.2 is the summary of hypotheses, predictions and findings.  During Collor’s term, 
the Chamber’s and Senate’s positions with respect to the Jobim bill were relatively convergent in 
favor of imposing limitations on presidential decree authority.  The convergence of bicameral 
preferences would have led to a speedy passage of the bill by Congress.  However, since the 
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 Jobim bill was a statutory bill, it would have been subject to a presidential veto, which Collor 
had made clear from the outset.  Unfortunately, the president’s impeachment in 1992 led to the 
tabling of the bill, and therefore we have inconclusive results.   
 By contrast, the constitutional amendment proposal submitted in 1995 during Cardoso’s 
term was voted and approved by Congress.  In this case, the Chamber and the Senate had to 
bargain on at least two critical points:  the extent to which presidential decree authority should be 
limited and the new rules of MPs’ examination in Congress.  The Chamber proposed a more 
restrictive MP regime than the Senate.  The Senate insisted on new rules that would enhance its 
power, which the Chamber opposed.  Thus, the two houses’ preferences were divergent on the 
details of a new MP regime despite the fact that there was a near consensus on the need to limit 
and regulate MP authority.  Since the two houses had to resolve their divergences by the navette 
rule and since their initial levels of impatience were not high, the theory predicted a long delay 
until the passage of the bill by Congress.  In 2001, three factors raised senators’ impatience: the 
increased likelihood that the bill would be aborted should it return to the Chamber; the outbreak 
of a series of scandals that led to the resignations of senate leaders; and the threat of an 
intervention by the Supreme Federal Court.  As predicted, the Senate’s elevated impatience led 
to accepting the Chamber’s version of the proposal in 2001.  Congress finally promulgated the 
constitutional amendment after almost six years of the bill shuttling back and forth between the 
two chambers.   
 The two episodes of congressional attempts to limit presidential decree authority also 
provided valuable lessons.  First, it is important to recognize that not having a law restricting 
presidential decree authority does not evidence the legislators’ passive approval of the 
unrestrained use of decree power by the president.  The Brazilian Congress eagerly sought to 
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 institute new rules to limit and regulate the president’s use of decree power.  Rather, the long 
absence of such regulations reflected the bargaining problems that the two chambers of Congress 
had to resolve in order to pass the reform. 
 Second, these cases showed that policy dimensions may not be necessarily fixed as often 
assumed in spatial models of decisionmaking.  This assumption may hold if decisions are made 
instantaneously.  However, when there are significant delays in making decisions, a possibility 
exists that political players add new dimensions or come up with creative solutions.  Given the 
Collor government’s argument that presidential decree authority could not be modified by a 
complementary law, Brazilian legislators resorted to a constitutional amendment.  With an 
impossibility of reaching an agreement over the issue of taxation, the term tributo was replaced 
by the term imposto, thereby allowing decrees on certain types of taxes to go into effect 
immediately.  Moreover, the stalemate of the proposal in Congress gave President Cardoso an 
opportunity to negotiate an expansion of decree authority by introducing a new dimension 
(Article 246 of the Constitution) that was not originally included in either the Senate’s or 
Chamber’s proposal.   
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 Appendix 6.1:  Evolution of the Proposal on Presidential Decree Authority 
 
 
Constitution Senate Text 1 
(May 1997) 
Chamber Text 1
(June 1999) 
Senate Text 2 
(Dec 1999) 
Chamber Text 2 
(Aug 2001) 
Senate Text 3 
Promulgation 
(Sep 2001) 
-- 
Alters Arts. 48, 
62 and 84  
Alters Arts 48, 
57, 61, 62, 64 
and 84  
Alters Arts 48, 
57, 61, 62, 64, 66 
and 84 
Alters Arts 48, 
57, 61, 62, 64, 
66, 84, 88 and 
246 
Alters Arts 48, 
57, 61, 62, 64, 
66, 84, 88 and 
246 
President 
regulates 
administrative 
matters of 
government by 
bill of law 
(projeto de lei) 
President 
regulates 
administrative 
matters of 
government by 
administrative 
decree (decreto) 
President 
regulates 
administrative 
matters of 
government, 
including 
creation of 
ministries and 
organs, by decree
President 
regulates 
administrative 
matters of 
government, 
including 
creation of 
ministries and 
organs, by decree
President 
regulates 
administrative 
matters of 
government, 
including 
creation and 
extinction of 
ministries and 
organs, by decree 
President 
regulates 
administrative 
matters of 
government, 
including 
creation and 
extinction of 
ministries and 
organs, by decree
The CN will be 
convoked 
extraordinarily, 
within 5 days 
after the 
publication of an 
MP, if it is in 
recess, to 
examine it. 
The validity of 
MPs will not 
count the days 
during a 
congressional 
recess.   
The validity of 
MPs will not 
count the days 
during a 
congressional 
recess.  If the CN 
is convoked for 
extraordinary 
legislative 
sessions, MPs 
will 
automatically be 
included in the 
legislative 
agenda. 
The validity of 
MPs will not 
count the days 
during a 
congressional 
recess.  If the CN 
is convoked for 
extraordinary 
legislative 
sessions, MPs 
will 
automatically be 
included in the 
legislative 
agenda. 
The validity of 
MPs will not 
count the days 
during a 
congressional 
recess.  If the CN 
is convoked for 
extraordinary 
legislative 
sessions, MPs 
will 
automatically be 
included in the 
legislative 
agenda. 
The validity of 
MPs will not 
count the days 
during a 
congressional 
recess.  If the CN 
is convoked for 
extraordinary 
legislative 
sessions, MPs 
will 
automatically be 
included in the 
legislative 
agenda. 
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 Appendix 6.1 (continued). 
 
 
-- 
MPs may not be 
used to regulate 
materials related 
to: 
a. nationality, 
citizenship, 
political and 
electoral rights 
b. penal code, 
c. organization of 
the Judiciary 
and Ministry of 
Public 
Prosecution, 
d. budgetary 
matters, 
e. those reserved 
to 
complementary 
law 
f. those that have 
been approved 
by the CN, 
pending 
sanction or 
veto by the 
President, and 
g. those that 
contain 
provisions at 
odd with 
respect to the 
objects of an 
MP 
MPs may not be 
used to regulate 
materials related 
to: 
a. nationality, 
citizenship, 
political and 
electoral 
rights, and 
political 
parties, 
b. penal and civil 
codes, 
c. organization 
of the 
Judiciary and 
Ministry of 
Public 
Prosecution, 
d. budgetary 
matters, 
e. detention or 
confiscation 
of goods, 
popular 
savings, or 
any other 
financial 
properties, 
f. those reserved 
to 
complementar
y law, 
g. those that 
have been 
approved by 
the CN, 
pending 
sanction or 
veto by the 
President, and 
h. those that 
have been 
vetoed by the 
President, 
pending 
deliberation 
by the CN 
 
(“g” in Senate 
Text 1 deleted) 
MPs may not be 
used to regulate 
materials related 
to: 
a. nationality, 
citizenship, 
political and 
electoral 
rights, and 
political 
parties, 
b. penal and 
civil codes, 
c. organization 
of the 
Judiciary and 
Ministry of 
Public 
Prosecution, 
d. budgetary 
matters, 
e. detention or 
confiscation 
of goods, 
popular 
savings, or 
any other 
financial 
properties, 
f. those 
reserved to 
complementa
ry law,  
g. those that 
have been 
approved by 
the CN, 
pending 
sanction or 
veto by the 
President, 
and 
h. those that 
have been 
vetoed by the 
President, 
pending 
deliberation 
by the CN 
MPs may not be 
used to regulate 
materials related 
to: 
a. nationality, 
citizenship, 
political and 
electoral rights, 
and political 
parties, 
b. penal and civil 
codes, 
c. organization of 
the Judiciary 
and Ministry of 
Public 
Prosecution, 
d. budgetary 
matters, 
e. detention or 
confiscation of 
goods, popular 
savings, or any 
other financial 
properties, 
f. those reserved 
to 
complementary 
law, 
g.  those that have 
been approved 
by the CN, 
pending 
sanction or 
veto by the 
President  
 
(“h” Senate Text 
2 deleted) 
MPs may not be 
used to regulate 
materials related 
to: 
a. nationality, 
citizenship, 
political and 
electoral 
rights, and 
political 
parties, 
b. penal and civil 
codes, 
c. organization 
of the 
Judiciary and 
Ministry of 
Public 
Prosecution, 
d. budgetary 
matters, 
e. detention or 
confiscation 
of goods, 
popular 
savings, or 
any other 
financial 
properties, 
f. those reserved 
to 
complementar
y law, 
g. those that 
have been 
approved by 
the CN, 
pending 
sanction or 
veto by the 
President 
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 Appendix 6.1 (continued). 
 
 
-- -- 
MPs that imply a 
creation of new 
taxes or tax 
increases 
(tributos), except 
for taxes on 
trade, industrial 
products, 
operations of 
credit, foreign 
exchange, 
security or other 
movables, and 
emergency war 
taxes, will have 
effects in the 
following 
financial year 
only if they are 
converted into 
law before the 
last day of the 
year in which 
they are 
published 
MPs that imply a 
creation of new 
taxes or tax 
increases 
(tributos), except 
for taxes on 
trade, industrial 
products, 
operations of 
credit, foreign 
exchange, 
security or other 
movables, and 
emergency war 
taxes, will have 
effects in the 
following 
financial year 
only if they are 
converted into 
law before the 
last day of the 
year in which 
they are 
published 
MPs that imply a 
creation of new 
taxes or tax 
increases 
(impostos), 
except for taxes 
on trade, 
industrial 
products, 
operations of 
credit, foreign 
exchange, 
security or other 
movables, and 
emergency war 
taxes, will have 
effects in the 
following 
financial year 
only if they are 
converted into 
law before the 
last day of the 
year in which 
they are 
published 
MPs that imply a 
creation of new 
taxes or tax 
increases 
(impostos), 
except for taxes 
on trade, 
industrial 
products, 
operations of 
credit, foreign 
exchange, 
security or other 
movables, and 
emergency war 
taxes, will have 
effects in the 
following 
financial only if 
they are 
converted into 
law before the 
last day of the 
year in which 
they are 
published 
MPs will lose 
their effects if 
not converted 
into law within 
30 days of their 
publication, 
obliging the CN 
to discipline their 
juridical 
relations. 
MPs will lose 
their effects, 
from their 
publication, if 
not converted 
into law within 
90 days, 
renewable for the 
same period, 
obliging the CN 
to discipline their 
juridical relations 
by legislative 
decree (decreto 
legislativo) 
MPs will lose 
their effects, 
from their 
publication, if 
not converted 
into law within 
60 days, 
renewable once 
for the same 
period, obliging 
the CN to 
discipline their 
juridical relations 
by legislative 
decree.   
MPs will lose 
their effects, 
from their 
publication, if 
not converted 
into law within 
60 days, 
renewable once 
for the same 
period, obliging 
the CN to 
discipline their 
juridical relations 
by legislative 
decree.   
MPs will lose 
their effects, 
from their 
publication, if 
not converted 
into law within 
60 days, 
renewable once 
for the same 
period, obliging 
the CN to 
discipline their 
juridical relations 
by legislative 
decree.   
MPs will lose 
their effects, 
from their 
publication, if 
not converted 
into law within 
60 days, 
renewable once 
for the same 
period, obliging 
the CN to 
discipline their 
juridical relations 
by legislative 
decree.   
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 Appendix 6.1 (continued). 
 
 
-- 
Not issued a 
legislative decree 
within 60 days of 
rejection or loss 
of validity of an 
MP, juridical 
relations and acts 
practiced while 
an MP was in 
force will  have 
full juridical 
validity  
(validade jurídica 
plena). 
Not issued a 
legislative decree 
within 60 days of 
rejection or loss 
of validity of an 
MP, juridical 
relations and acts 
practiced while 
an MP was in 
force will be 
maintained. 
Not issued a 
legislative decree 
within 60 days of 
rejection or loss 
of validity of an 
MP, juridical 
relations and acts 
practiced while 
an MP was in 
force will be 
maintained. 
Not issued a 
legislative decree 
within 60 days of 
rejection or loss 
of validity of an 
MP, juridical 
relations and acts 
practiced while 
an MP was in 
force will be 
maintained. 
Not issued a 
legislative decree 
within 60 days of 
rejection or loss 
of validity of an 
MP, juridical 
relations and acts 
practiced while 
an MP was in 
force will be 
maintained. 
-- -- 
If an MP is not 
voted within 45 
days of its 
renewal, all 
deliberations of 
the CN and its  
Houses will be 
suspended until 
the examination 
of the MP is 
concluded, 
except for those 
that have 
constitutionally 
determined 
deadlines. 
If an MP is not 
voted within 45 
days of its 
publication, it 
will enter 
legislative 
agenda with 
regime of 
urgency until its 
vote, in each one 
of the Houses of 
the CN, 
suspending all 
other 
deliberations of 
the House where 
it is being 
examined.   
If an MP is not 
appreciated 
within 45 days of 
its publication, it 
will enter 
legislative 
agenda with 
regime of 
urgency until its 
vote, in each one 
of the Houses of 
the CN, blocking 
all other 
deliberations of 
the House where 
it is being 
examined.   
If an MP is not 
appreciated 
within 45 days of 
its publication, it 
will enter 
legislative 
agenda with 
regime of 
urgency until its 
vote, in each one 
of the Houses of 
the CN, blocking 
all other 
deliberations of 
the House where 
it is being 
examined.   
-- 
MPs will have 
their voting 
initiated in the 
CD or SF based 
on the principle 
of alternation 
between the two 
Houses. 
MPs will be 
deliberated in the 
CN. 
MPs will have 
their voting 
initiated in the 
CD or SF based 
on the principle 
of alternation 
between the two 
Houses. 
MPs will have 
their voting 
initiated in the 
CD. 
MPs will have 
their voting 
initiated in the 
CD. 
-- 
The reviewing 
house is not 
allowed to alter 
the text of a  bill 
of conversion 
(projeto de 
conversão) 
except for 
suppression of 
parts of the text. 
(deleted) 
-- -- -- 
  
185 
 Appendix 6.1 (continued). 
 
 
-- 
A mixed 
committee of the 
CD and SF will 
examine and 
report on MPs 
before they are 
examined in the 
floor of the CD 
and SF. 
(deleted) A mixed 
committee of the 
CD and SF will 
examine and 
report on MPs 
before they are 
examined in the 
floor of the CD 
and SF. 
A mixed 
committee of the 
CD and SF will 
examine and 
report on MPs 
before they are 
examined in the 
floor of the CD 
and SF. 
A mixed 
committee of the 
CD and SF will 
examine and 
report on MPs 
before they are 
examined in the 
floor of the CD 
and SF. 
-- 
MPs that have 
been rejected or 
expired may not 
be re-issued in 
the same 
legislative 
session. 
(deleted) MPs that have 
been rejected or 
expired may not 
be re-issued in 
the same 
legislative 
session. 
MPs that have 
been rejected or 
expired may not 
be re-issued in 
the same 
legislative 
session. 
MPs that have 
been rejected or 
expired may not 
be re-issued in 
the same 
legislative 
session. 
-- -- 
Approved a bill 
of conversion 
altering the 
original text of 
an MP, the latter 
will be 
maintained in its 
integrity until the 
bill is sanctioned 
or vetoed. 
Approved a bill 
of conversion 
altering the 
original text of 
an MP, the latter 
will be 
maintained in its 
integrity until the 
bill is sanctioned 
or vetoed. 
Approved a bill 
of conversion 
altering the 
original text of 
an MP, the latter 
will be 
maintained in its 
integrity until the 
bill is sanctioned 
or vetoed. 
Approved a bill 
of conversion 
altering the 
original text of 
an MP, the latter 
will be 
maintained in its 
integrity until the 
bill is sanctioned 
or vetoed. 
Art 246.  An MP 
may not be used 
to regulate an 
article of the 
Constitution 
amended in 1995 
and thereafter.   
-- -- -- 
Art 246.  An MP 
may not be used 
to regulate an 
article of the 
Constitution 
amended 
between 1995 
and the 
promulgation of 
this amendment.   
Art 246.  An MP 
may not be used 
to regulate an 
article of the 
Constitution 
amended 
between 1995 
and the 
promulgation of 
this amendment.  
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 Appendix 6.1 (continued). 
 
 
-- 
MPs issued 
before the 
promulgation of 
this amendment 
will stay in force 
until the 
conclusion of 
their examination 
by the CN or 
revocation by the 
President. 
For MPs issued 
before the 
publication of 
this amendment, 
the rules in effect 
on the dates of 
their publications 
will be applied. 
However, they 
must be 
appreciated 
within 180 days 
from the 
promulgation of 
this amendment, 
suspending all 
other 
deliberations of 
the CN and of its 
Houses, except 
for those with 
constitutionally 
determined 
deadlines. 
MPs issued 
before the 
publication of 
this amendment 
will stay in force 
until new MPs 
explicitly revoke 
them or until the 
CN deliberate 
them. 
MPs issued 
before the 
publication of 
this amendment 
will stay in force 
until new MPs 
explicitly revoke 
them or until the 
CN deliberate 
them. 
MPs issued 
before the 
publication of 
this amendment 
will stay in force 
until new MPs 
explicitly revoke 
them or until the 
CN deliberate 
them. 
  
Notes 
MP: Medida Provisória (Provisional Measure) 
CD: Câmara dos Deputados (Chamber of Deputies) 
SF: Senado Federal (Federal Senate) 
CN: Congresso Nacional (National Congress) 
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 7. CHAPTER 7: ASYMMETRIC BICAMERALISM: POLITICAL REFORM AND 
GUN CONTROL IN CONTRAST 
 
 
 
 
“The way to restrict arms is for the Senate to make 
the final decision.” Senator Renan Calheiros, 
Leader of the PSDB in the Senate, commenting the 
disfigurement of the gun control bill in the Chamber 
(2003).109
 
 
 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 This chapter discusses lawmaking in a context of asymmetric bicameralism.  Unlike 
pension reform and presidential decree authority examined in the previous chapters, the gun 
control bill was a statutory bill intended to regulate the trade and possession of guns by ordinary 
law.  Likewise, the political reform that has been on the agenda of the Brazilian government and 
Congress in the last decade envisions statutory changes in the electoral and party laws.  That gun 
control and political reform proposals are both statutory (ordinary) bills had two important 
consequences for the legislative process.  First, their passage required only a simple majority in 
the Chamber and Senate and thus the threshold of the required vote was lower than the previous 
two cases.  Second, and more importantly for bicameral politics, the house that initiated the bill 
held the last word prerogative.  This last point is the focus of this chapter. 
 The bargaining model in Chapter 2 showed that, holding everything else constant, the 
degree of compromise is less for a bill’s initiator than for its reviewing house when there is a 
                                                 
109 “Relação azeda, de novo.” Correio Brasiliense, October 11, 2003. 
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 bicameral conflict over the content of legislation.  Moreover, under the assumption of complete 
information, the model demonstrated that bargaining is always concluded in the first round.  In 
reality, however, the assumption of complete information is often untenable and as such rational 
delay is possible (Alesina and Drazen 1991).  Furthermore, bargaining also depends upon the 
locations of the ideal points of the two houses.  The further away the ideal points are from each 
other, the harder it is to reach an agreement.  Bicameral legislatures also adopt various 
mechanisms of conflict resolution.  In Brazil, for the passage of statutory bills the house that 
initiates a bill is decisive over the content of legislation as long as the reviewing house approves 
it.   
 In this chapter, I explore in particular three hypotheses elaborated in Chapter 2.  
Hypothesis 1 states that bicameral divergences increase propensity for gridlock.  As I will show 
in subsequent sections, the resistance for change was greater in the Chamber than in the Senate 
in both gun control and political reform cases.  However, in the case of gun control, an ad hoc 
joint bicameral committee helped to consolidate a bill that was acceptable to both houses.  By 
contrast, both the Chamber and Senate had special committees on political reform separately and 
independently.  As a result, although both houses have been discussing similar proposals, there 
has been no joint attempt to harmonize various bills on political reform.  In general, therefore, 
bicameral preferences were relatively convergent with respect to the gun control bill while they 
were divergent in regards to political reform bills.  Hence, gridlock is more likely for political 
reform than for gun control. 
 Hypothesis 4 maintains that the house that initiates a bill compromises less than the 
reviewing house.  The Senate approved both political reform and gun control bills before the 
Chamber, making the former the initiating house.  Thus, the Senate should, ceteris paribus, 
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 compromise less than the Chamber over the contents of those bills.  Moreover, since the 
Brazilian bicameral congress adopts an asymmetric rule by granting the initial house the last 
word prerogative, I examine hypothesis 7, which predicts less likelihood of legislative delay and 
immobility under asymmetric bicameralism than the symmetric one.  I examine the hypothesis 
with counterfactuals, i.e., what would happen if the deliberation occurred under a symmetric, 
navette rule.  The three hypotheses combined leads one to expect a swift approval of the gun 
control bill in line with the Senate’s preference and a rejection or stalemate of the Senate’s 
political reform bills in the Chamber.   
 This chapter is organized as follows.  The next section presents the politics of gun 
control.  I identify the preferences of the deputies and senators and highlight the points of 
bicameral disagreements.  It will be shown that legislators understand the implications of the 
asymmetric rule, which invoked strategic interaction between senators and deputies over the last 
word prerogative.  Section 7.3 discusses political reform.  Since most of the proposed changes 
would affect deputies more profoundly, the Chamber elaborated its own bills even though an 
adoption of the Senate’s proposals would expedite the passage of political reform.  Finally, in the 
concluding section I will evaluate the hypotheses in light of evidence.   
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 7.2. THE GUN CONTROL BILL 
 
 
7.2.1. Public Security and Gun Control in Brazil 
 
 
 Public safety is one of many major concerns for Brazilians.  Statistics shows that every 
thirteen minutes someone is killed by a gun in Brazil.110  According to a public opinion survey 
conducted in February 2002 (Datafolha 2002) , 21 percent of those interviewed considered 
violence and public safety as the principal problem of the country, up from a 1996 survey when 
only 2 percent of the respondents pointed it as the most pressing problem.  The concern for 
public safety was well above those for health (10%) and poverty (9%), and only second to 
unemployment (32%). Furthermore, according to the United Nations, Brazil is the country with 
the highest rate of homicide caused by firearms in the world.111  In 2003 when the Brazilian 
Congress was discussing a gun control bill called the Statute of Disarmament (Estatuto de 
Desarmamento), non-governmental organizations organized marches in major Brazilian cities 
such as Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Vitória, Salvador, Porto Alegre, Curitiba, Manaus, and 
Brasília in favor of a gun free society.  In October 2003, when asked about their opinion on the 
gun control bill, 74 percent of the survey respondents said they were in favor of prohibiting sales 
of firearms whereas only 23 percent responded that they were against such a measure 
(CNT/Sensus October 2003).  Therefore, the Brazilian Congress examined the gun control bill 
under a climate of public approval.   
 
 
                                                 
110 “Brazil wants tighter gun laws,” Viva Rio News, October 24, 2003. 
111 Cited in “Brasília unida contra as armas,” Correio Brasiliense, October 20, 2003.   
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 7.2.2. Joint Committee and the Positions of the Chamber and Senate on Gun Control 
 
 
 Even before the gun control bill drew extensive media attention, many senators were 
interested in the issue.  In fact, the Senate had been discussing gun control since 1999.  In early 
2003, with rising violent crimes especially in Rio de Janeiro, the Senate created a subcommittee 
within the CCJ (Committee on Constitution, Justice, and Citizenship) to study and consolidate 
various bills proposing restrictions on the sale and control of handguns.  However, with 
mounting pressures by citizens’ organizations and increasing media attention to gun control, 
Congress installed in July a bicameral joint committee in order to consolidate over 70 proposals 
in both houses dealing with the question and produce a consensus bill to accelerate passage.   
 The joint committee studied issues pertaining to the registration, bearing, sales, and 
trafficking of firearms and munitions.  The principal points of the joint committee’s substitution 
bill included the following. 
1. Centralization of the registration of firearms in the Federal Police; 
2. To possess a gun, a person must be at least 25 years of age, have no previous criminal 
record, and hold licit occupation and fixed residence; 
3. An illegal purchase, possession, or furnishing of arms will be a crime without a 
possibility of bail; 
4. A popular referendum in October 2005 will decide whether the sales of arms and 
munitions will be completely prohibited; and 
5. Only members of the armed forces, prison guards, and police will be allowed to carry 
guns.  
192 
 Originally, the joint committee’s final text was prepared to become a substitution bill for a 
proposal authored by a deputy,112 which would make the Chamber the first mover.  There was 
also an agreement between the leadership of the Senate and the Chamber that this bill would be 
voted under urgency in both houses.  They aimed for sanctioning the new legislation by the 
president in the month of July. 
 A predominant majority of senators were in favor of gun control under the terms found in 
the joint committee’s substitution bill.  Senator Renan Calheiros, the PMDB’s leader in the 
Senate and former Minister of Justice, had a particularly strong interest.  Certain senators desired 
to ban the sales of arms and munitions once and for all.  However, the joint committee’s 
reporting officer, Deputy Luiz Eduardo Greenhalgh (PT-Sao Paulo), warned that it would not 
pass the Chamber in the current form.  Therefore those senators agreed to leave the decision to a 
popular referendum as mentioned in the substitution bill.113   
 Deputies’ stances on the gun control bill were more divided, however.  Although the 
PMDB in the Senate was a fervent supporter of the gun control bill, the Chamber’s PMDB was 
divided on the issue.  In addition, other mid-sized parties in the government coalition, including 
the PTB, PP, and PL, were the bill’s leading critics.  Deputies with linkages to the police, 
municipal guards, military and arms industry (located in Sao Paulo and especially Rio Grande do 
Sul) were the bill’s primary opponents.  In addition, more than 5 percent of the 513 deputies 
received campaign contributions from arms industry, especially in Rio Grande do Sul.  This 
stands in sharp contrast with the Senate where not single senator reported to the Superior 
Electoral Tribunal to have received contributions from the industry.114  The PT, PSDB, and many 
                                                 
112 Author’s interview with Fabiano Augusto Silveira, Specialist on the Statute of Disarmament in the Senate’s 
Consultoria Legislativa, April 28, 2004 
113 Author’s interview with Sheila Cunha, Senator César Borges’ legislative advisor, May 3, 2004. 
114 “Todos contra as armas,” Correio Brasiliense, November 11, 2003.   
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 smaller parties ardently supported the gun control bill in the Chamber.  The PFL had some 
reservations but its leadership supported the measure.   
 The Lula government’s position on the gun control issue was ambivalent.  Gun control 
was initially not among its priorities.  However, with media attention and public outcry rising, 
the government included gun control in the agenda for the extraordinary session that it convoked 
in July and made public statements in its support.  Nevertheless, at least three issues complicated 
the government’s stance on the question.  First, many parties that were critical of the bill were in 
the government coalition.  The government depended upon their cooperation to pass other key 
reforms (i.e., pension and tax reforms) on its agenda, which deterred it from aggressively 
pursuing its passage.  Second, the bill dealt with many questions that were of the executive’s 
competence.  Municipal guards, of whom the joint committee’s bill dismantled the right to arm 
themselves, lobbied intensively with the federal government to remove this provision.  Finally, 
the Ministry of Defense and the army demonstrated some reservations with the bill, although 
they did not put themselves clearly against it because of the societal pressure in favor of gun 
control (Silveira 2004).   
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Figure 7.1: The Chamber’s and Senate’s Positions on the Gun Control Bill in 2003 
 
 
 
 Figure 7.1 depicts the inferred positions of the joint committee, Chamber, Senate, and the 
government on the committee’s substitution bill.  As discussed above, the Senate’s preference is 
almost perfectly aligned with the joint committee’s position because the senators were almost 
unanimously in favor of the proposal.  On the other hand, the Chamber’s position given its 
median voter’s ideal point would be to the right of the Senate’s, favoring less restrictive gun 
control legislation.  I place the government, which holds package and line-item veto power over 
statutory bills, slightly to the right of the Senate due to the three aforementioned complications. 
 
 
7.2.3. The Senate’s Strategy and the Chamber’s Responses 
 
 
 The joint committee’s text was initially to substitute a bill that originated in the Chamber.  
This would result in an examination of the gun control bill first in the Chamber, thereby giving 
the lower house the last word prerogative in an event of bicameral disagreements.  It would not 
be a problem if the deputies passed the substitution bill without modifications as agreed upon by 
the leadership of the two houses including their presidents.  However, at least some senators did 
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 not trust the Chamber’s ability to pass it in a timely manner and without altering the text.  
Moreover, many senators were keenly interested in the subject—they had been studying gun 
control since 1999—and thus were not ready to give up the last word prerogative to the 
Chamber.115   
 A decisive moment emerged at the close of the joint committee on gun control when 
Senator Calheiros, with support of all party leaders in the Senate, submitted on July 16 a petition 
for urgency in the deliberation of a gun control bill authored by another senator in conjunction 
with the committee’s substitution bill.  The urgency petition triggered an immediate examination 
of those bills by the Senate.  The CCJ’s (Committee on Constitution, Justice, and Citizenship) 
reporting officer, Senator César Borges (PFL-Bahia), collaborated with Deputy Greenhaugh, the 
joint committee’s reporting officer, in preparing his report.  Borges reproduced the committee’s 
text nearly identically in his substitution bill.  The Senate then quickly moved to a floor vote in 
less than a week (July 23) where the substitution bill was approved unanimously.  On July 25, 
the Senate sent the bill to the Chamber for an examination.  By this action, the Senate acquired 
the last word prerogative.  In other words, the final decision regarding the legislation now would 
stay in the senators’ hands.   
 In the Chamber, by the decision of the house’s president, João Paulo Cunha, the bill 
followed a normal process of deliberation involving lengthy discussions in each relevant 
committee despite the prior bicameral agreement that it would be examined under urgency in 
both houses.  The Senate’s bill was first examined in the Committee on Public Security and 
Combat to Organized Crime (CSPCCO).  Deputy Laura Carneiro (PFL-Rio de Janeiro) assumed 
the responsibility of the committee’s reporting officer.  As the senators anticipated, there was 
sizeable opposition to the gun control bill in the Chamber.  In order to pass the bill in the 
                                                 
115 Author’s interview with Fabiano Augusto Silveira and Sheila Cunha (2004).   
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 committee, Carneiro enlarged the number of professional categories permitted to carry guns, 
reduced the minimum age allowed to possess firearms to 21, and revoked the provision that 
made the illegal bearing of firearms a crime without a possibility of bail, to name a few.  With 
these changes and a previous accord by party leaders, the CSPCCO approved Carneiro’s 
substitution bill by 29 to 2.  However, the CSPCCO made a total of 43 alterations to the Senate’s 
original text.  Although the supporters of the gun control bill managed to restore the minimum 
age to 25 during the committee votes, its critics also succeeded in rejecting central points of the 
bill, such as the referendum in 2005 and the concession of the permit to possess firearms 
exclusively by the federal police.  The extent to which the bill was disfigured by the committee 
was such that Deputy Greenhalgh affirmed, “What emerged [from the CSPCCO] was the Statute 
of Armament (as opposed to the Statute of Disarmament).”116  Senator Calheiros also 
emphatically criticized the disfigurement in the Chamber, accusing deputies of being 
sympathetic to arms industry.   
 The CCJC’s (Committee on Constitution, Justice, and Citizenship—formerly CCJR) 
reporting officer was Deputy Greenhalgh, who was also the joint committee’s reporting officer.  
Although the deputy initially promised to restore the principal points of the gun control bill, he 
had to concede on certain points in the face of strong opposition to the bill in the committee.  The 
report that Greenhalgh prepared reinstituted a popular referendum, the emission of authorization 
to bear arms by the federal police, and the determination that the illegal bearing of guns be an 
offense without bail.  However, it permitted bail if the bearer carried registered guns but without 
the authorization for bearing them.  It also allowed the Ministry of Justice to arrange a covenant 
with state governments about the authorization of bearing arms.   
                                                 
116 “Estatuto do Desarmamento chega à CCJR,” Jornal da Câmara, September 19, 2003.   
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  These concessions did not satisfy the critics of the gun control bill.  They insisted that the 
provision of a popular referendum—one of the pillars of the bill—be removed.  With the impasse 
in the CCJC between the bill’s proponents and opponents, the government and the president of 
the Chamber intervened.  First, they proposed the removal of the referendum provision in order 
to reach an accord to bring the bill to a committee vote.  However, critics continued to resist the 
vote due to the fact that the Senate held the last word on the bill—that the upper house was not 
obligated to accept changes made by the Chamber.  A PMDB deputy opposed to the referendum 
argued that “it is difficult to discuss a text that can be totally altered in the Senate….The senators 
can ignore our accord and return to their original text.”117  Deputy Roberto Jefferson, the 
president of the PTB, summarized the problem of the gun control bill by saying, “What’s bad 
about the bill is that we cannot trust the Senate.”118  Although both the president of the Chamber 
and Deputy Greenhaugh sought an agreement with senators not to alter the text approved by the 
lower house, they rejected this proposal completely.  The other strategy that the Chamber 
president and the government contemplated was for the government to send a new gun control 
bill to Congress.  Since the examination of all government proposals begin in the Chamber, this 
would give the lower house the last word prerogative.  This strategy was abandoned in the face 
of a furious reaction by Senator Calheiros, one of the most important government allies in the 
upper house.   
 The impasse was only resolved after anti-gun marches in the capital that united 10,000 
people and repeated pronouncements by the senators in the plenary and media blaming the 
Chamber for the delay of the legislation that the public opinion strongly favored.  On October 22, 
                                                 
117 Statement by Deputy Mendes Ribeiro (PMDB-Rio de Janeiro) cited in “Hora de testar o poder de fogo,” Correio 
Brasiliense, October 21, 2003.   
118 Cited in “’Não podemos confiar no Senado,’ diz presidente do PTB,” Folha de São Paulo, October 21, 2003, 
online version. 
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 the CCJC passed the bill by symbolic voting (i.e., without taking rolls), but nine deputies, of 
whom four were from Rio Grande do Sul, registered their votes against it.  The approved text 
maintained the referendum provision, but the date for its implementation was removed.  
Following its approval in the CCJC, the floor approved the petition of urgency for the 
examination of the material.  The members of the so-called “bloc of bullets” requested a roll call 
voting in the floor, but it was rejected.  Instead the party leaders agreed to proceed with symbolic 
voting in order to protect deputies linked to anti-gun control lobbies from pressures to vote 
against the bill.119  The bill passed the Chamber after three months of heated debates and 
standoffs in that house.   
 In the Senate, the bill was sent to the CCJ for reexamination.  Although the committee 
members were unanimously in favor of the bill, there emerged some concerns about disarming 
municipal guards and certain categories of civil servants with duties that frequently involved 
threats to their safety.  The CCJ’s reporting officer, Senator Borges, attended to those concerns 
by retaining certain changes made by the Chamber, while rejecting other modifications by 
restoring the Senate’s original provisions.  The most controversial change that the Chamber 
made was the removal of the popular referendum’s date.  This point, which was emphatically 
defended by senators, returned to the text.120  The CCJ approved both Borges’ report and an 
urgency petition unanimously in early December.  The bill was quickly approved on the floor 
and President Lula signed the legislation on December 22, 2003 without a veto. 
 To recapitulate the main points, the last word prerogative that the Senate acquired with 
respect to the gun control bill was both a cause of bicameral conflict and the factor that made it 
possible to enact sweeping gun control legislation.  Understanding the strategic importance of 
                                                 
119 Author’s interview with Deputy Jair Bolsonaro (PTB-Rio de Janeiro), February 11, 2004.   
120 Author’s interview with Senator César Borges (PFL-Bahia), May 4, 2004. 
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 being the first house to pass a bill, the senators used an urgency petition to expedite its passage.  
In addition to the difficulty in reaching a consensus on the content of the bill, the Senate 
retention of the last word prerogative generated impasse in the Chamber.  Although the Chamber 
sought a new accord with the Senate, senators rejected such a proposal and restored the central 
points of legislation lost in the Chamber upon the bill’s return to the upper house. 
 
 
 
 
7.3. POLITICAL REFORM 
 
 
7.3.1. Current Debates on Political Reform in Brazil 
 
 
 If the gun control legislation was a solution, albeit an imperfect one, for violence in 
Brazil, many consider political reform as the key to increase governability, strengthen the party 
system, enhance representation and accountability, and combat corruption.  Senator Marco 
Maciel defends a reform of the electoral party system to enhance governability, as do many 
experienced Brazilian politicians:121  
We need to improve our electoral party system.  Our electoral 
system must be changed so that we have fewer parties, and parties 
that are more programmatic and solid.  I am in favor of a mixed 
system or closed list system.  Our system—open list—doesn’t 
strengthen parties.  In closed list systems, voters first think about 
parties.  I believe that the chain of link in a democracy must be 
from the electorate to a party to a candidate, but the open list 
system makes it from the electorate to a candidate to a party.  It is 
bad.  It doesn’t give sufficient governability to the country.  Either 
we do political reform, or we don’t have governability.  It is not 
                                                 
121 Marco Maciel was Vice President during the Cardoso government (1995-2002) and served as the Collor 
government’s leader in Congress (1991-92) and as President Sarney’s Minister of Education and Culture (1985-86) 
and Chief-Minister of Staff (1986-87). 
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 that we have no governability but that we need to strengthen it.  
Brazil has many challenging problems that need to be resolved.  To 
resolve them, we need governability….Governability is 
fundamental to construct a country that we dream of, a country that 
is less unequal, more just, more developed socially and 
economically, with more external credibility.  For this, I think 
political reform is fundamental.  We also need to put an end to 
elitism and corruption.122
 
Likewise, Deputy Luiz Carlos Santos, who was President Cardoso’s government leader in the 
Chamber and later Minister of Political Coordination, contends:  
[Brazil] is technically ungovernable in the sense that there is no 
stable majority to govern.  The majority in Congress is reached 
through negotiations, concessions, exchange of favors, and 
patronage.  Since there are no solid parties or institutions, the 
conquered majorities are ad hoc.  The fragility of the parties is 
frightening: only in the last year, nearly 130 deputies changed their 
parties (Santos 2004).   
 
Short of a constitutional revision, the deputy defends political reform to strengthen the party 
system in Brazil.   
 Like Senator Maciel, many practitioners and analysts of Brazilian politics point to the 
open-list proportional representation system of electing federal deputies as a source of the weak 
party system, poor linkages of the electorate and the elected, and the governability problem in 
Brazil (see Ames 2003; Mainwaring 1999).  In the open-list system, voters cast votes for either 
candidates or parties (and most Brazilian voters choose to vote for candidates), and candidates 
are ranked by the number of votes cast for them.  This candidate-centered electoral rule is a 
cause for the weak party system because party leadership does not have control over the list and 
elected deputies tend to attribute their elections to their personal qualities rather than their 
parties.  Thus, they claim that the mandates are theirs, not their parties’.  Accordingly party-
switching is justified.  However, in reality only very few deputies (13 and 28 of 513 deputies in 
                                                 
122 Author’s interview with Senator Marco Maciel (PFL-PE), May 19, 2004. 
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 the 1994 and 1998 elections, respectively) were elected with their own votes and others rely on 
the votes cast for other candidates to get elected.  Moreover, the open-list system stimulates 
candidate-centered electoral campaigns, which became increasingly expensive.  The high costs 
of electoral campaigns, it has been argued, have made financial power dominant in the electoral 
processes and motivated corruption.123   
 The lack of party fidelity in Brazil is indeed astonishing.  Table 7.1 shows the percentage 
of deputies who switched parties during each legislative period.  The rate of party switching in 
the Chamber of Deputies since democratization has averaged approximately 30 percent.  During 
the last Congress (1999-2003), 26.3 percent (135 deputies) switched party affiliations at least 
once.  Furthermore, between 1985 and 2001, 138 deputies changed parties at least twice during 
the same legislative period (4 years), of which 30 members switched parties at least three times.  
In some extreme cases, certain deputies change parties 6 or 7 times within the same legislative 
period.  Most party switching occurs during the first year when many members migrate to the 
parties in the governing coalition and during the third year when deputies switch parties for 
electoral convenience.124   
 
 
 
Table 7.1: Percentage of Deputies who Switched Parties in Each Congress 
 
 
 1983-87 1987-91 1991-95 1995-99 1999-2003
% Deputies 
who switched 
parties 
31.3 27.5 32.3 26.9 26.3 
Source: Report prepared by Deputy Ronaldo Caiado, reporting officer of the Comissão Especial de Reforma 
Política, for the meeting on August 6, 2003, Câmara dos Deputados. 
                                                 
123 Various conversations with Deputy Bonifácio de Andrada (PSDB-Minas Gerais), member of the Committee on 
Political Reform in the Chamber of Deputies, 2003. 
124 Legislative elections occur in October of the fourth year in Congress.  By law incumbents are not allowed to 
switch parties within one year of election.   
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 The frequency of party switching by deputies has caused distortions in representation of 
the Chamber of Deputies.  Table 7.2 presents the distribution of seats per party according to the 
results of the October 2002 elections and the distribution of seats in the Chamber as of June 
2005.  It shows that the parties in the governing coalition gained many seats at the expense of 
opposition parties.  For example, the opposition PFL, which elected 84 deputies, lost 24 seats by 
2005.  Likewise, the PSDB’s seat share decreased by 30 percent during the same period.  On the 
other hand, the governista PMDB, PP, PL, and PTB increased their seat shares by 13.3 percent, 
10.2 percent, 96.3 percent, and 80.8 percent, respectively.  Consequently, there are enormous 
discrepancies between the number of seats elected per party and the number of seats that parties 
control once an election is over. 
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 Table 7.2: The Distribution of Seats per Party at 2002 Election and 2005 in the Chamber 
 
 
Parties Seats at Election Seats in June 2005 % Change 
PT 91 (1) 91 (1) 0 
PFL 84 (2) 60 (3) -28.6 
PMDB 75 (3) 85 (2) +13.3 
PSDB 70 (4) 49 (6) -30.0 
PP 49 (5) 54 (4) +10.2 
PL/PSL bloc 27 (6) 53 (5) +96.3 
PTB 26 (7) 47 (7) +80.8 
PSB 22 (8) 17 (8) -22.7 
PDT 21 (9) 14 (10) -33.3 
PPS 15 (10) 17 (8) +13.3 
PCdoB 12 (11) 9 (11) -25.0 
PRONA 6 (12) 2(14) -66.7 
PV 5 (13) 7 (12) +40.0 
PSD 4 (14) 0 -100.0 
PST 3 (15) 0 -100.0 
PMN 1 (16) 0 -100.0 
PSC 1 (16) 2(14) +100.0 
PSDC 1 (16) 0 -100.0 
Without Party 0 6 (13) -- 
Total 513 513 -- 
Note: The second column is the distribution of seats per party according to the results of the October 2002 elections.  
The third column is the distribution of seats in the Chamber of Deputies as of June 2005.  The numbers in the 
parentheses are the ranking of parties according to their size.   
Source: Calculated from the information obtained through Secretaria Geral da Mesa, Câmara dos Deputados. 
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  A number of proposals have been submitted to remedy these defects in the Brazilian 
political system.  Although proposals range from changing the system of government (from 
presidentialism to parliamentarism) to a party fidelity law, current congressional debates 
concentrate on the changes that can be made through ordinary legislation, which requires only a 
simple majority to approve, and leave for future agendas constitutional changes, which require 
three-fifth majorities (Cintra 2004).  The principal changes proposed to strengthen the party 
system, representation and accountability, and governability are the adoption of a closed-list 
proportional representation (PR) electoral system, a stricter party fidelity law to discourage party 
switching, and banning ad hoc electoral alliances in elections by PR.  Specifically, a new party 
fidelity law would impose two to four years of a mandatory period of affiliation with the parties 
by which legislators are elected.  Those parties that wish to form an electoral alliance may 
construct an electoral and legislative front (called party federation or federação partidária in 
Portuguese), but they must remain in the alliance for a certain period beyond elections.  The 
current ad hoc electoral alliances have been purely of electoral convenience, often formed by 
parties that are ideologically so diverse, and dissolved after elections.  As an anti-corruption 
measure, Brazilian legislators proposed public financing of electoral campaigns.  The public 
funds would be distributed to political parties exclusively in order to facilitate their oversights, 
and private financing would be prohibited.125   
 One of the remarkable features of the political reform discussed in the Brazilian Congress 
over the last decade is that it essentially affects deputies and senators are little affected.  The 
proposals to adopt a closed-list system and prohibit ad hoc electoral alliances only affect 
candidates in the PR system, which is used to elect federal deputies.  Senators are elected 
through a majoritarian (plurality) rule.  The party fidelity law also affect deputies more than 
                                                 
125 Cintra (2005) provides an extensive review of the arguments in favor and against those reform proposals.   
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 senators because the deputies’ terms of office are four years, and if deputies change their party 
affiliations during their term, the chance that they cannot run for reelection is quite high 
(depending on the timing of the moves).126  In contrast, since the senators’ terms of office are 
eight years, they have a longer period in which they are allowed to change their party affiliations 
and still run for reelection.  Moreover, party-switching is more frequent in the Chamber than in 
the Senate.  Only the exclusivity of publicly financed campaigns would affect both senators and 
deputies similarly. 
 
 
7.3.2. The Positions of the Chamber and Senate on Political Reform 
 
 
 The asymmetric impact of political reform generated different attitudes between senators 
and deputies.  Most senators were either in favor of the proposed changes (closed-list PR, party 
fidelity, publicly financed campaign, and banning ad hoc electoral alliances and its replacement 
by the federation of parties) or indifferent to them.  The PSDB, PFL, PMDB, and PT, which 
altogether comprised approximately 80 percent of the members of the Senate, supported those 
measures.  Those are also parties with aspiration to govern by winning the presidency.  Some 
resistance was found in small parties that relied on electoral alliances to elect legislators.127   
 In contrast, the positions of the deputies were much more polarized in the Chamber.  
Since most changes would directly influence deputies, they were either intensely for or against 
them.  As in the Senate, the Chamber’s PSDB and PT defended the proposed changes.  The PFL 
and PMDB were more divided than the PSDB and PT because of internal factions that were 
against one or more of the proposed changes.  In the PFL, the Carlista faction from Bahia 
                                                 
126 In Brazil, all candidates must be endorsed by a political party to run for election.   
127 Author’s interview with Gilberto Guerzoni, Consultor Legislative do Senado Federal, April 27, 2004. 
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 (named after Senator Antonio Carlos Magalhães), which controls a significant portion of the PFL 
members, was fervently against the closed list proposal.  However, the PFL leadership supported 
the reform.  The PMDB leaders were more cautious about the closed-list system.  The PL, PTB, 
and PP were emphatically against the reform.  For example, in the current 2003-06 Congress, the 
PL decided to impose the party’s position against the reform on its members.  The proposed 
changes would harm the PL electorally, because it was one of the parties that benefited from 
party migration (see Table 7.2).  Moreover, many PL members have evangelical bases of support 
and thus do not rely on expensive campaign strategies.  Smaller parties had issue with ending ad 
hoc electoral alliances.   
 Both the Cardoso and Lula governments ostensibly supported political reform.  As 
discussed in the previous section, fewer, stronger, more programmatic, and more coherent 
political parties would facilitate governing and executive-legislative relations by giving the 
executive a stable base of legislative support.  It would dispense the burden of having to 
negotiate with individual legislators for each policy the government pursues.  Hence, political 
reform would be in the government’s interest in the long run.  In the short run, however, both the 
Cardoso and particularly Lula governments benefited from the weakness of the party system.  
Since party migration generally occurs towards parties in the government from opposition 
parties, both presidents amplified their support bases in Congress within one year of assuming 
their presidencies.  For example, the Lula government started as a minority government; 
however, it controlled more than 70 percent of the Chamber’s seats within a year.  Thus the 
Brazilian government faces a dilemma: political reform will increase the likelihood of having a 
stable majority in Congress, which benefits the government, but it is also a direct beneficiary of 
the weak party system in the short run.   
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  To summarize, the positions of the Chamber, Senate, and government about political 
reform as defined in section 7.3.1 given the simple majority rule would be as follows.  Overall, 
the Senate favors political reform, the Chamber is against it (i.e., it prefers the status quo), and 
the government is ambivalent (see Figure 7.2).   
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Figure 7.2: The Positions of the Chamber, Senate, and Government on Political Reform 
 
 
 
7.3.3. The Deadlock of Political Reform in the Chamber 
 
 
 Political reform has been on the agenda of the Brazilian Congress over a decade.  
Brazilians rejected parliamentarism in a referendum in 1993 and the 1994 Constitutional 
Revision failed to produce any significant changes in the political system.  From 1995 onward, 
every Congress—both the Chamber and Senate—has studied political reform by creating special, 
ad hoc committees on the subject.  As discussed in Section 7.3.1, the debates have centered on 
the electoral rules and political parties.  Unlike the case of gun control, however, these special 
committees worked separately and independently in the Chamber and Senate, although they 
examined almost identical issues.  Therefore, there was no formal bicameral coordination to 
create a consensus bill or to arrange which house should initiate the process and thus have the 
last word prerogative. 
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  In 1995, the Senate installed an ad hoc committee on political parties.  The committee 
understood that the principal problem of the Brazilian political system was the fragility of the 
party system and exaggerated individualism.  It pointed to the open-list PR as the primary cause 
of party weakness (Senado Federal 1998).  This committee recommended the approval of various 
proposals circulating in the house, including banning ad hoc electoral alliances, adopting a mixed 
electoral system, increasing the required time for party affiliation, and making electoral 
campaigns exclusively financed by public funds.  With the submission of the final report, the 
committee was dissolved at the end of 1998.   
 During the first half of the next Congress (1999-2002), Senator Sérgio Machado 
(reporting officer of the committee on political parties) and others submitted a series of bills 
discussed in the special committee.  Most of the materials examined in the committee were 
constitutional amendment proposals.  However, since most of the same materials could be 
addressed by ordinary legislation (which requires only a simple majority to approve rather than a 
three-fifth majority), the senators chose to present bills of ordinary law to pursue proposed 
changes.  Machado submitted two bills in 1999, one pertaining to ad hoc electoral alliances and 
the other on the exclusive public financing of electoral campaigns.  In the same year, other 
senators proposed the institution of a closed-list PR and the option for party federation.  In the 
following year, another bill proposing a stricter party fidelity law was proposed.  The Senate 
expeditiously passed these bills, most of which were under urgency, between 1999 and 2001.  It 
is worth noting that the most controversial change in the Chamber, the adoption of a closed-list 
system, passed the upper house in a year without much opposition.  In fact, it was approved by 
the “conclusive power” of the CCJ (Committee on Constitution, Justice and Citizenship), 
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 dispensing floor examinations.  Since these were statutory bills, the Senate would have the last 
word prerogative should the Chamber pass them.   
 Once arrived in the Chamber, however, the lower house treated those Senate bills just 
like any other proposals without priorities.  Without legislative priorities, they would face the 
slow, normal process in which many bills never get out of the committees.  In fact, the Senate’s 
political reform bills were sent to the CCJR (Committee on Constitution, Justice, and Editing), 
some of them as early as 1999, and have stayed there ever since.  Instead of examining the 
Senate bills, the Chamber created yet another ad hoc committee on political reform in 2001. 128  
The objective of this committee was to study party fidelity, public finance of electoral 
campaigns, closed-list rule, and electoral alliances—in other words, the same materials the 
Senate bills treated—and produce its own bills.  However, this committee did not conclude its 
study on ample political reform because of the difficulty in reaching consensus among different 
parties.   
 In 2003, with the beginning of a new Congress, political reform was back in the 
congressional deliberation and the Lula government.  Both the Chamber’s and Senate’s 
presidents designated political reform as one of their legislative priorities.  Since the Senate had 
already passed their bills, whether Congress was capable of passing political reform depended 
upon the Chamber.  The new Chamber president, João Paulo Cunha, instituted yet another ad hoc 
committee on political reform commissioned to study the subject.  At the same time, the 
Chamber president obtained an accord with party leaders to examine under the urgency rule the 
outcomes of the committee’s deliberation by directly taking the bills to the floor bypassing a 
deliberation in the CCJC.   
                                                 
128 The Chamber had another ad hoc committee on political reform during the previous 1995-98 Congress.   
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  Instead of examining the Senate bills, which would speed up the passage of political 
reform by Congress, the political reform committee once again decided to take on the task of 
producing brand new bills.  The themes remained the same, however: the institution of a closed-
list system; the abolition of ad hoc electoral alliances and its replacement by federation of 
parties; electoral campaigns exclusively financed by public funds; and party fidelity.  In spite of 
the fierce opposition by the PL, PP, and PTB, the committee managed to approve two bills by 
December 2003, one on party fidelity and the other covering a closed-list system, federation of 
parties, and public financing of electoral campaigns.  When asked why the committee did not 
adopt the bills that had already been approved by the Senate and pending examination in the 
Chamber, the committee’s reporting officer, Deputy Ronaldo Caiado (PFL-Goiás), stated that 
each of the Senate bills dealt with a specific issue and the committee was looking for a more 
systemic change.  Thus, the deputy proposed a new bill that was more comprehensive than any 
single one of the Senate’ proposals.129  Despite the initial agreement to take the committee’s 
proposals directly to the floor, however, with the vetoes by the parties in the government 
coalition—PP, PL, and PTB, the Chamber president instructed that the bills be examined by the 
CCJC.  At that point, it appeared that they would stay in the CCJC forever, following the fate of 
the Senate bills. 
 A corruption scandal that broke out at the beginning of 2004 reinvigorated the 
enthusiasm for political reform in the Chamber as well as in the Senate and the government.130  
By defining the defects of the existing electoral rules as the root cause of the ubiquitous 
corruption, Chamber President Cunha convoked a meeting of the College of Leaders in order to 
                                                 
129 Author’s interview with Deputy Ronaldo Caiado, March 3, 2004.   
130 The scandal involved the then under-chief of parliamentary affairs of the Presidential Office who was shown in a 
video tape requesting money illegally ostensibly for the PT’s 2002 electoral campaigns.  Within 48 hours of its 
publication, political reform turned into a number one priority of the government and the presidents of the Chamber 
and the Senate.   
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 expedite the passage of political reform.  However, the leaders of the PTB, PP, PL, and PDT 
refused to sign an urgency petition.131  The PT, which signed the petition initially, pressured by 
its legislative allies also withdrew its signature.  As the preoccupation with the scandal 
dissipated, so did the zeal for political reform.  Although many senators expressed their concerns 
about the delays in the examination of political reform, they did not exercise the extent of the 
pressure they did to approve gun control.  As of this writing, political reform bills sit still in the 
Chamber’s CCJR.   
 
 
 
 
7.4. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Both gun control and political reform were statutory bills with their origins in the Senate, 
but their fates proved to be different.  In 2003, the gun control bill was approved by Congress 
and sanctioned by the president.  Political reform, which has been on legislative agenda for more 
than a decade, seems to have suffered a legislative lapse in Congress once again.  What accounts 
for the difference?   
 One of the important features of statutory bills is that the house of origin makes the final 
decision in case of bicameral disagreements.  This means that Brazilian bicameralism is 
asymmetric in the examination of statutory bills.  Hypothesis 7 states that legislative delay and 
gridlock are less likely under asymmetric bicameralism than symmetric bicameralism.  
Moreover, the combination of the last word prerogative accorded to the initiating house under 
asymmetric bicameralism and hypothesis 4, which predicts less compromise for the initial house 
                                                 
131 “Atraso na reforma política,” Correio Brasiliense, March 5, 2004.   
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 than for the reviewing house, suggests that gun control and political reform, if passed by 
Congress, should be closer to the upper house’s ideal points than those of the lower house.  
However, the passage of those bills also depended upon another variable: bicameral preferences.  
When bicameral preferences are convergent, the expected outcome is a bill’s passage.  By 
contrast, when bicameral preferences are divergent, the expected outcome is gridlock regardless 
of the bicameral type.   
 
 
 
Table 7.3: Summary of Hypotheses and Evidence 
 
 
 
Preference 
(H1) 
Initial house 
advantage 
(H4) 
Bicameral 
type  
(H7) 
Predicted 
outcome 
Actual 
outcome 
Gun Control Convergent Yes Asymmetric Approval in 
line with initial 
proposal 
Approval in 
line with initial 
proposal 
Political 
Reform 
Divergent Yes Asymmetric Rejection or 
stalemate 
Stalemate 
 
 
 
 Table 7.3 summarizes the hypotheses and findings in this chapter.  The analysis of the 
gun control legislation showed that both the Senate and Chamber desired stricter gun legislation.  
However, there was some notable opposition in the Chamber to that measure.  In order to resolve 
bicameral disagreements, the Senate and Chamber held a joint committee to produce a consensus 
bill, making bicameral preferences relatively convergent with respect to the bill.  Subsequently 
the Senate passed the bill first, thereby acquiring the first word prerogative.  Although the bill 
suffered certain modifications in the Chamber, the Senate reinstalled the principal points of the 
legislation lost in the lower house and sent the bill to the president for sanctioning.  This finding 
is consistent with the theoretical expectation.  Were it deliberated under the symmetric, navette 
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 rule, the bill would have been required to return to the Chamber as a result of the modifications 
made by the Senate, causing further delays in its passage.   
 In contrast to the gun control bill, the Senate’s political reform bills, once arrived in the 
Chamber, were practically buried in a committee.  Since political reform proposals were also 
bills of ordinary law, as the initiating house, the Senate held the last word prerogative.  What was 
different between the cases of gun control and political reform was that, in the case of the latter, 
many deputies were intensely against the proposed changes and others had many reservations 
with certain points of the reform.  Thus, despite much talk, deputies on average seem to have 
preferred the preservation of the status quo to radical changes in the electoral rules and party 
behavior.  Once again, this case demonstrated the importance of bicameral convergence of 
preferences for a passage of a bill.  Institutions are mechanisms by which preferences are 
processed.  If preferences are divergent enough, institutions do not wield much impact in the 
political process.   
 Political reform is one of those reforms that are permanently on the agenda.  Each and 
every Congress declared political reform as one of the legislative priorities.  In each Congress, an 
ad hoc committee on the subject was created.  However, political reform was never approved.  If 
the Senate passed it, it became stalled in the Chamber, but the Chamber does not pass its own 
bills. At every scandal, many legislators cry for political reform.  But as the political scandal 
subsides, so does the zeal for reform.   
 Those case studies also revealed that legislators are not simply passive followers of the 
rules of the game.  Understanding the implications of the asymmetric rules, both senators and 
deputies tried to maneuver.  With respect to gun control, the insistence of the senators to have the 
last word prerogative led Senator Calheiros, with support of his colleagues, to petition urgency at 
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 the close of the joint committee.  This was a decisive moment that gave the Senate the right to 
make the final decision on the legislation.  This last word prerogative acquired by the Senate in 
turn caused repercussions in the Chamber.  The critics of the gun control bill refused to vote it in 
the fear that any compromise reached in the Chamber would not be honored in the Senate.  The 
Chamber president attempted to resolve the impasse by requesting the executive to send a new 
bill on gun control, which would give the lower house the last word prerogative.  In the case of 
political reform, it appears that the insistent refusal of the Chamber to examine and approve the 
Senate bills stemmed, at least in part, from the fact that doing so would give the upper house the 
last word prerogative.  Since the bills of both houses proposed almost identical changes, the 
Chamber could have examined the Senate bills instead of newly drafting its own bills.  But the 
fact that most of the proposed changes would affect deputies much more than senators must have 
led even its advocates to refuse to accept the Senate proposals.   
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 8. CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 This dissertation had two objectives.  First, I sought to demonstrate that bicameral 
politics are consequential even in president-dominant new democracies such as Brazil.  Previous 
work on legislative politics in nascent presidential democracies has too often focused on the 
executive or the lower chamber even where the legislature is bicameral.  I argued that 
bicameralism affects legislative capacity, i.e., the ability to make law effectively and efficiently.  
My second objective was to uncover the ways in which bicameralism impacts legislative 
capacity.  Bicameralism affects legislative capacity but their effects are mediated by various 
factors, namely the location of preferences, legislative rules, and the context in which inter-
chamber bargaining occurs.  The previous chapters provided strong support for the arguments of 
this dissertation. 
 Chapter 2 discussed theories of lawmaking in a bicameral legislature and put forward a 
set of hypotheses.  Social choice theories posit that bicameralism reduces the propensity for 
policy change than unicameralism.  Bicameralism induces policy immobility when the ideal 
points of the two houses are sufficiently apart from each other.  When their ideal points overlap, 
however, policy change is as likely to occur in bicameralism as in unicameralism.  Therefore, the 
stability-inducing property of bicameralism critically depends upon the two houses having 
divergent preferences.   
 When both houses desire a policy change, bicameral bargaining is a key to understanding 
both the timing of new legislation and its outcome.  Rational delay in passing legislation can 
occur under the assumptions of impatience and incomplete information.  I highlighted three 
hypotheses based on Rubistein’s (1982, 1985) and Alesina and Drazen’s (1991) bargaining 
216 
 models.  First, impatience reduces the likelihood for legislative delay.  Second, the longer the 
expected duration of legislation, the longer will be the pre-legislation bargaining.  Finally, the 
house that initiates a bill’s a consideration is likely to compromise less than the reviewing house.   
 In addition, Chapter 2 also discussed the effects of informational expertise.  Rogers 
(1998) argued that bills initiated by the lower house are more likely to be approved than bills 
initiated by the upper house because of the former’s lower cost of information acquisition.  
Finally, I argued that legislative rules and bicameral “types” are likely to affect legislative 
capacity.  Supermajority rules raise the probability of legislative gridlock because it reduces the 
size of the winset of the status quo policy.  There is also a greater likelihood of legislative delay 
and gridlock under symmetric bicameralism than under asymmetric bicameralism.   
 Chapter 3 discussed formal and informal legislative rules and practices under the 1988 
Brazilian Constitution.  It identified the actors and decision rules with respect to constitutional 
amendments, statutory bills, and presidential decrees.  The chapter also compared Brazilian 
deputies and senators in terms of their political trajectories and electoral mandates, and drew 
their implications for legislative behavior.   
 In Chapter 4, I tested the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2.  By arguing that greater 
attention should be given to analyzing the timing of legislation as well as legislative outcomes, I 
used event history analysis to examine the dynamics of legislative successes and failures.  The 
results of statistical analyses with Brazilian legislative data (1988-2004) supported various 
hypotheses of this dissertation.  The data analysis demonstrated that bicameral divergences are 
indeed consequential for legislative capacity in Brazil.  In particular, bicameral incongruence 
raises the risk of legislative gridlock but the president having (coalitional) majorities in both 
houses of Congress speeds up legislative approval.   
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  In order to assess the impact of impatience on lawmaking, I used two indicators that 
measure the desire to legislate sooner than later.  One measure of impatience was presidential 
and legislative elections.  Their findings were interesting in that they pointed to opposite effects 
of presidential and legislative elections.  The estimation results showed that the likelihood of bill 
approval decreases during legislative election periods whereas it rises during presidential 
election years.  In contrast, the risk of bill rejection increases during legislative election years but 
diminishes during presidential election years.  Thus, I did not find conclusive evidence for the 
effects of impatience when it was measured by elections.  However, when impatience was 
measured by inflation rates, I found clear effects on legislative activities: high levels of inflation 
increase both bill approval and rejection, but low inflation has no impact on such activities.   
 Other notable findings include that the chances of approval are higher for bills proposing 
a temporary change than those proposing a permanent change.  This finding suggests the relative 
ease of bargaining in striking an agreement when one proposes a short-term change rather than a 
long-term change.  With respect to the effects of bicameral sequence, when the Chamber of 
Deputies is the first house to deliberate (and pass) a bill, it has a much higher chance of being 
approved subsequently and a lower risk of being rejected compared to when the Senate is an 
initiating house.  Finally, contrary to the hypothesis, I found no statistical evidence indicating 
that decision rules and bicameral types impact bill approval or rejection. 
 The next three chapters investigated several important legislative issues discussed in 
Brazil since democratization.  Chapter 5 examined pension reform under Presidents Cardoso and 
Lula.  It took nearly four years for Cardoso’s pension reform to pass the Brazilian Congress, and 
the reform that Congress passed was far from what the government had originally proposed.  In 
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 contrast, Congress approved Lula’s pension reform rather quickly, in less than a year.  In 
addition, the fundamental items of Lula’s reform proposal suffered only minor adjustments.   
 The chapter highlighted the difficulties of passing controversial legislation under a 
qualified majority rule, especially in the system with weak party discipline, and the striking 
impact that impatience has on the timing of a proposal’s passage.  The bargaining hypothesis 
maintains that impatience speeds up the passage of legislation.  The pension reforms in Brazil 
were considered primarily a question of public finance, and as such economic contexts in which 
the issue was debated affected the levels of impatience of legislative actors.  Cardoso’s pension 
reform began in the environment of economic improvement, and consequently it entailed 
prolonged negotiations.  The threat of an imminent economic crisis led to the reform’s passage at 
the end of 1998.  Contrary to Cardoso’s experience, adverse economic situations marked Lula’s 
inauguration in 2003.  Legislative actors understood that the approval of the pension reform was 
a necessary step to restore Brazil’s economic credibility.  Hence, Lula’s pension reform was 
examined in a context of high impatience, and the proposal passed in less than a year.   
 Both Cardoso’s and Lula’s pension reforms were constitutional amendment proposals, 
and thus they required three-fifth majorities in both houses of the legislature.  Anecdotal 
evidence showed that the governments did not have to concede as much as they actually did had 
the proposals been examined under simple or absolute majority rules.  The need to secure 
comfortable supermajority votes compelled both Cardoso and Lula to bargain with legislators by 
attenuating the proposed changes, funding deputies’ pork projects, and providing patronage.  
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that supermajority rules raise the hurdle of a 
bill’s passage.  
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  Evidence also provided support for the preference hypothesis.  The preferences of the 
Chamber and the Senate were relatively convergent on Lula’s pension reform, and consequently 
Congress passed the president’s proposal virtually intact, involving only minor adjustments in 
the terms of key provisions.  This compared with the struggle of the Cardoso government in 
passing the proposal in the Chamber.  Although a predominant majority of senators supported 
the reform, most deputies were either against the entire proposal or had some reservations with 
it.  Therefore, not only were some of the principal items of Cardoso’s reform defeated; the entire 
reform proposal was once rejected on the Chamber floor.  Only political maneuvering of the 
legislative process saved the proposal in the lower house.   
 I also pointed out, however, that the divergent preferences of the lower and upper 
houses—distant from each other but both located in one side of the status quo (favoring a less 
generous pension system)—allowed for a greater extent of reform than what would have been 
possible if the president had faced only the lower house.  Since Cardoso did not have veto power, 
the Chamber’s most preferred position (closer to the status quo) would have prevailed if it were 
the sole house.  In fact, the proposal approved by the Chamber in the first round of deliberation 
was so shattered that government leaders thought it became innocuous.  The return of some of 
the fundamental provisions was made possible only because the Senate, with its preference close 
to the government’s, reinstated them in the proposal sent back to the Chamber.  In addition, the 
proposal was examined in the Chamber under pressure of an impending economic crisis, and 
some of the provisions rejected in the first round were accepted this time.   
 The next chapter considered the impatience and preference hypotheses by examining 
congressional attempts to limit and regulate presidential decree authority called provisional 
measure.  This was a case in which proposed legislation was desired by almost all legislators but 
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 its passage involved significant delays in Congress.  The Brazilian president’s provisional 
measure has always been a controversial instrument since its inception by the 1988 democratic 
constitution.  The unrestrained use of decree authority led the Brazilian Congress to seek a 
limitation of this powerful presidential authority first in the early 1990s during President Collor’s 
term, and second in the mid-1990s during President Cardoso’s era.  Unfortunately, Collor’s 
impeachment in 1992 led to the tabling of the bill, and therefore the results were inconclusive.   
 However, the constitutional amendment proposal submitted in 1995 during Cardoso’s 
term was voted and approved by Congress.  In this case, the Chamber and the Senate had to 
bargain on at least two critical points:  the new rules regarding decrees’ examination in Congress 
and the extent to which presidential decree authority should be limited.  The Chamber proposed a 
more restrictive decree regime than the Senate.  The Senate insisted on new rules that would 
enhance its power, which the Chamber opposed.  Thus, the two houses’ preferences were 
divergent on the details of a new decree regime despite the fact that there was a near consensus 
on the need to limit and regulate decree authority.  Since the two houses had to resolve their 
divergences by the navette rule, and since their initial levels of impatience were not high, they 
were unable to reach a compromise to pass the bill.  In 2001, three factors raised senators’ 
impatience: the increased likelihood that the bill would be aborted should it return to the 
Chamber; the outbreak of a series of scandals that led to the resignations of senate leaders; and 
the threat of an intervention by the Supreme Federal Court.  Consequently, the Senate’s elevated 
impatience led to accepting the Chamber’s version of the proposal in 2001.  Congress finally 
promulgated the constitutional amendment after almost six years of the bill shuttling back and 
forth between the two chambers.   
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  The case of presidential decree authority also suggested that policy dimensions may not 
be necessarily fixed as often assumed in spatial models of decisionmaking.  The assumption of 
fixed policy space may hold if decisions are made instantaneously.  However, if bargaining 
involves significant delays, a possibility exists that political players add new dimensions or come 
up with creative solutions.  Given the Collor government’s argument that presidential decree 
authority could not be modified by a complementary law, Brazilian legislators found a 
constitutional amendment as a way to impose limitations on the power.  With an impossibility of 
reaching an agreement over the issue of taxation, the term tributo was substituted for by the term 
imposto, thereby allowing decrees on certain types of taxes to go into effect immediately.  
Moreover, the stalemate of the proposal in Congress gave President Cardoso an opportunity to 
negotiate an expansion of decree authority by introducing a new dimension (Article 246 of the 
Constitution) that was not originally included in either the Senate’s or Chamber’s proposal.   
 Chapter 7 analyzed gun control and political reform.  Both gun control and political 
reform were statutory bills with their origins in the Senate, but their fates diverged.  In 2003, 
Congress passed the gun control bill and it was subsequently sanctioned by the president.  
Political reform, which has been on the legislative agenda for more than a decade, seems to have 
suffered a legislative lapse in Congress once again.  One of the important features of statutory 
bills is that the house of origin makes the final decision in case of bicameral disagreements.  This 
means that Brazilian bicameralism is asymmetric in the examination of statutory bills.  The 
theory predicted a lower likelihood of legislative delay and gridlock under asymmetric 
bicameralism than symmetric bicameralism.  In addition, the combination of the last word 
prerogative accorded to the initiating house and the hypothesis that predicts less compromise for 
the initial house than for the reviewing house suggests that gun control and political reform, if 
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 passed by Congress, should be closer to the upper house’s ideal points than those of the lower 
house.  However, the passage of those bills also depended upon another variable: bicameral 
preferences.  Convergent bicameral preferences predict a bill’s passage while divergent 
bicameral preferences predict non-passage.   
 The analysis of the gun control legislation showed that both the Senate and Chamber 
desired stricter gun legislation.  However, there was some notable opposition in the Chamber to 
that measure.  In order to resolve bicameral disagreements, the Senate and Chamber held a joint 
committee to produce a consensus bill, making bicameral preferences relatively harmonious with 
respect to the bill.  The Senate subsequently passed the bill first, thereby acquiring the first word 
prerogative.  Although the bill suffered certain modifications in the Chamber, the Senate 
reinstalled the principal points of the legislation lost in the lower house.  The new gun control 
law was sanctioned in December 2003 in less than six months of creating a joint committee.  
Were it deliberated under the symmetric, navette rule, the bill would have been required to return 
to the Chamber as a result of the modifications made by the Senate, causing further delays in its 
passage.  Thus, the case of gun control supported the hypotheses. 
 In contrast, the Senate’s political reform bills, once arrived in the Chamber, were 
practically buried in a committee.  Since political reform proposals were also bills of ordinary 
law, as the initiating house, the Senate held the last word prerogative.  What distinguished 
political reform from gun control was that, in the case of the former, many deputies were 
intensely against the proposed changes and others had many reservations with certain points of 
the reform.  Thus, despite much talk, deputies on average seem to have preferred the preservation 
of the status quo to radical changes in the electoral rules and party behavior.  Once again, this 
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 case demonstrated the importance of bicameral convergence of preferences for the passage of a 
bill. 
 One of the important lessons that emerged from these case studies is that legislators are 
not simply passive followers of the rules of the game.  Understanding the implications of the 
asymmetric rules, both senators and deputies tried to maneuver.  With respect to gun control, the 
insistence of the senators to have the last word prerogative led them to petition urgency at the 
close of the joint committee.  This was a decisive moment that gave the Senate the right to make 
the final decision on the legislation.  This last word prerogative acquired by the Senate in turn 
caused repercussions in the Chamber.  The critics of the gun control bill refused to vote on it in 
the fear that the accords made within the Chamber would not be honored in the Senate.  The 
Chamber president attempted to resolve the impasse by requesting the executive to send a new 
bill on gun control, which would give the lower house the last word prerogative.  In the case of 
political reform, it appears that the Chamber’s refusal to examine and approve the Senate bills 
stemmed, at least in part, from the fact that doing so would give the upper house the last word 
prerogative.  Since the bills of both houses proposed almost identical changes, the Chamber 
could have examined the Senate bills.  However, the lower house chose instead to draft its own 
bills.  The fact that most of the proposed changes would affect deputies much more than senators 
must have led even its advocates to refuse to accept the Senate proposals.   
 The previous chapters thus demonstrated that modeling bicameralism explicitly in 
legislative research enhances a better understanding of the dynamics of lawmaking.  Even the 
case of presidential decree authority, which is an exemplary case of executive-legislative 
conflict, revealed that bicameral politics played a critical role in the timing and the outcomes of 
the reform.   
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  Table 8.1 summarizes the findings of the empirical analyses.  The hypothesis that was 
repeatedly confirmed by the evidence, both quantitatively and qualitatively, regards the distance 
of bicameral preferences.  Evidence showed that convergent bicameral preferences instigated 
speedy approval of legislation whereas gridlock ensued when bicameral preferences were 
divergent.  The preeminence of bicameral preferences as a determinant of legislative success and 
failure was particularly clear in the case of political reform.  Even though political reform was 
considered under an asymmetric bicameral rule and a simple majority rule, which would, ceteris 
paribus, prompt speedy approval of legislation (as in the case of gun control), the Chamber's 
opposition to such reform led to the tabling of the bill.  This case demonstrated that if 
preferences are divergent enough, institutions do not wield much impact in the political process.  
In other words, preferences dominate institutions.   
 
 
 
Table 8.1: Summary of Findings 
 
 
 
Quantitative 
Analysis 
Pension 
Reform 
Decree 
Authority 
Gun 
Control 
Political 
Reform 
Bicameral Preference (H1) Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο 
Impatience (H2) ∆ Ο Ο -- -- 
Duration of Legislation (H3) Ο -- -- -- -- 
First Mover Advantage (H4) -- -- -- Ο ? 
Lower House Advantage (H5) Ο -- -- -- -- 
Voting Quota (H6) X Ο -- -- -- 
Bicameral Type (H7)  X -- -- Ο ? 
Note: Ο = The hypothesis is supported; ∆ = The hypothesis has mixed evidence; X = The hypothesis is not 
supported; ? = Legislation is still under consideration; and -- = The hypothesis is not subject to testing. 
 
 
 
 The impatience hypothesis was also consistently supported by the case studies.  The cases 
of pension reform and presidential decree authority both showed that elevated impatience led to 
225 
 greater concessions, thus making it possible to pass these reforms.  Furthermore, although the 
event history analysis produced inconclusive evidence when impatience was measured by 
upcoming elections, it provided strong support when the variable was measured by inflationary 
crises. 
 The event history analysis also strongly supported the hypotheses regarding the duration 
of legislation and the lower house advantage in lawmaking.  While I was not able to test the first 
mover (initiating house's) advantage over the content of legislation in the quantitative analysis, 
this hypothesis also found some support in the case of gun control.   
 The weakest hypotheses turned out to be the supermajority rule and types of 
bicameralism.  Neither of these hypotheses found support in the quantitative analysis.  However, 
their effects were clear in the case studies.  As for asymmetric bicameralism, the new gun control 
legislation that passed the Brazilian Congress maintained the terms defended by the Senate, the 
holder of the last word in this instance.  With respect to the effects of a supermajority rule, the 
anecdotal evidence revealed that both Presidents Cardoso and Lula, both of whom held 
comfortable simple majorities but lacked solid supermajorities in at least one of the houses of 
Congress, had to make significant concessions in the texts of their proposals and distributed or 
promised to distribute pork and patronage in order to increase the margins of vote to pass their 
reforms under the supermajority rule.  Therefore, the non-results of those variables in the 
quantitative analysis may be caused by the possibility that the government and Congress expend 
extra resources to pass bills under supermajority rules.  Therefore, an analysis of the costs of 
supermajority rules need more research.   
 Future research should also take a step further and identify and include legislative 
priorities in a quantitative analysis.  As Ames (2001) point out, there are many important 
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 legislative issues that never even reach Congress.  On the other hand, there are many non-priority 
and/or non-controversial bills that do get proposed and approved.  A more accurate measure of 
legislative success would thus analyze how priority bills fare in a bicameral (or even in a 
unicameral) legislature.   
 Another interesting line of research would be to explore under what conditions bicameral 
divergences can, paradoxically, lead to greater policy change.  The general prediction of 
bicameral divergence based on spatial models is policy immobility.  Nonetheless, prolonged 
bargaining between the two chambers caused by bicameral divergences may allow for the 
emergence of innovations and addition of new policy dimensions, as was the case in the reform 
of presidential decree authority.  Legislators’ preferences may also shift during protracted 
negotiations as a result of learning.  These and other possibilities call for further research.   
 This dissertation also has policy implications.  First, it pointed to the importance for the 
president to have solid bases of support in both chambers of Congress in order to strengthen 
legislative capacity.  Both quantitative and case study analyses indicated that the president 
having bicameral majorities increased legislative success not only in bills’ approval in Congress 
but also in reducing delays in their passage.  The research also showed that having a comfortable 
majority only in one house was not sufficient for legislative success.  Cardoso enjoyed a solid 
majority in the Senate but his base of support in the Chamber—although it was numerically a 
majority—was precarious.  Consequently, the president experienced many defeats in the lower 
house and had to resort to pork and patronage in order to pass key reforms.  Similarly, Lula’s 
coalition in the Senate was much smaller than that in the Chamber.  As a result, many initiatives 
of the Lula government were defeated in the Senate.  Moreover, although Lula was able to 
construct a large coalition in the Chamber, his support base was primarily built around 
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 opportunism rather than a programmatic cohesion.  As such, his government had to use pork and 
patronage in order to pass legislation even in the Chamber where the president had a large 
majority.  One of the remedies to reduce inefficiency in the legislative process and strengthen the 
government’s solid bases of support is political reform.  The introduction of a closed list system 
and stricter party fidelity law that have long been debated in the Brazilian Congress would be an 
important first step to increase legislative capacity.  
 Another measure that the Brazilian Congress can adopt to promote legislative efficiency 
is a conference committee.  The creation of joint committees is a rare occurrence in the Brazilian 
Congress.  Even when they are created to draft a common bill, they have no binding power over 
the two houses.  Both the Chamber and the Senate can amend the joint committee’s bill, and the 
bill must follow the normal route of examination just like any other bills.  Given that the 
legislative process in the Brazilian Congress is extremely slow, creating a conference committee 
to study controversial and/or urgent legislation and giving the Chamber and the Senate the power 
to vote only up or down the committee’s bill would make the process more efficient.   
 This dissertation also has implications for the design of political institutions more 
generally.  For centuries, political pundits have discussed the merits of bicameralism. Among 
others, bicameralism has been argued to increase policy stability and improve quality of 
legislation by providing more opportunities for deliberation and by increasing veto points that 
would block the passage of flawed bills.  In contrast, in the last few decades, many political 
scientists and policymakers have deplored the state of policy immobility as a consequence of 
having more veto gates that any legislation must clear before it is implemented.  Whether policy 
immobility is beneficial or detrimental for a society depends upon the current situation.  If a 
prevailing policy is generally considered “good,” then policy mobility may be harmful.  By 
228 
 contrast, if a prevailing policy is sub-optimal, or even harmful, then a political system’s capacity 
to change the status quo may be desirable.  In this latter sense, a “merit” of bicameralism—
stability that bicameralism is argued to induce—may be considered a “liability.”  
 But bicameralism takes a variety of forms.  It ranges from a bicameralism where one 
chamber has virtually no legislative power and little democratic legitimacy (as in the British 
system) to a bicameralism where both chambers possess equal legislative powers and democratic 
legitimacy (as in the United States and Brazil).  The findings of this dissertation showed that the 
forms and rules of bicameral legislatures and the configuration of legislative actors’ preferences 
critically determine a political system’s legislative capacity.   
 In the last decade, not-so-democratic leaders of Latin American countries (Presidents 
Alberto Fujimori of Peru and Hugo Chavez of Venezuela) undertook sweeping institutional 
reforms.  One of the changes made by those leaders was to abolish their countries’ bicameral 
congresses to adopt unicameral legislatures.  For reform-minded political leaders, bicameral 
legislatures mean one more institutional check on their power than single-chamber legislatures 
would place on them.  This additional barrier to reform may frustrate both those political leaders 
and those who support them.  But we have to question—would citizens really want to remove 
such a hurdle permanently?  Once a bicameral legislature is reformed into a unicameral one, 
returning to bicameralism may be more difficult than one would think, because, as a political 
science caveat has taught us, whoever is in charge of the legislative process now must be 
persuaded to accept an institutional constraint on their power. 
 The forms of institutions that a political system will adopt should ultimately be 
determined by the citizens.  But to make a good decision, citizens and institutional reformers 
need be informed of various forms that bicameral legislatures can take and their varying 
229 
 consequences for policymaking processes and their outcomes.  I hope this dissertation 
contributed to such information building. 
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